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Abstract 
Health protection involves the prevention and control of threats to health from both communicable 
diseases and the environment. I conducted a variety of projects across the breadth of Health 
Protection within NSW Health between March 2016 and October 2017 to fulfil the requirements of 
the Masters of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE).   
My first placement was within the Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases division of the Communicable 
Disease Branch. A large outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul occurred in Australia between December 
2015 and June 2016 with a total of 547 confirmed and probable cases notified. When I commenced 
in March 2016 this outbreak had been underway since December 2015 with no clear vehicle of 
infection identified. I conducted a case-control study including 72 confirmed cases and 144 controls 
from SA and NSW which identified that Mung bean sprout consumption was reported by 40.6% 
(28/69) of cases and 4.3% (6/140) of controls (OR 14.6, 95% CI 5.9-39.4). This outbreak led to a recall 
of mung bean sprouts from an implicated sprouter in South Australia and public messaging about 
the safe preparation and consumption of bean sprouts.  
In July 2016 six states and territories of Australia were affected by a large outbreak of Salmonella 
Hvittingfoss with 144 confirmed and suspected cases notified. I led a coordinated multi-jurisdictional 
investigation to identify the source of infection and control the outbreak, including conducting a 
case-control study. The epidemiological, microbiological and environmental investigation implicated 
consumption of rockmelon (OR 7.2, 95%CI 1.87-27.93) from a single producer as a significant risk for 
infection. The producer initiated a voluntary recall of the product. 
My second placement was in the Environmental Health Branch of Health Protection. I completed a 
review of the epidemiology of notifications in NSW to provide a snapshot of elevated blood lead 
levels in NSW and to inform an evaluation of the NSW elevated blood lead surveillance system. 
There were 9,486 notifications of elevated blood lead from 1997–2016, with an average annual 
notification rate of 6.9 per 100,000. I analysed notification data for by age, sex, geographic area, 
exposure and occupation and compared notification rates over time and between geographic 
regions. I identified several limitations with the dataset that made it difficult to analyse notification 
rates, particularly by risk and exposure history and by blood lead level, and made recommendations 
to improve the data collection system. I also collected qualitative data about the function of the 
blood lead surveillance system by conducting face-to-face interviews with key stakeholders 
throughout NSW. Key areas for improvement in the system included changes to the way data is 
entered into the surveillance system, greater guidance for public health units on following up 
notifications, a review of the information collected on exposure, and guidance regarding liaising with 
occupational health regulatory agencies to ensure follow-up of occupational notifications.  
Through completing these projects, I made valuable contributions to protecting the health of NSW 
residents. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
During the MAE I travelled the breadth of the state of New South Wales, from Broken Hill to Sydney, 
Parramatta to Newcastle, as well as across borders to liaise with our interstate colleagues in 
Queensland, South Australia and Victoria. I was fortunate to experience a variety of epidemiological 
projects covering general public health, environmental health, and enteric and zoonotic diseases.  
My primary placement was within Health Protection NSW. Health protection involves the prevention 
and control of threats to health from both communicable diseases and the environment. There are 
two main branches within Health Protection NSW. Communicable Diseases Branch (CDB) has five 
main divisions which cover immunisation, respiratory and vector-borne disease, blood borne viruses 
and sexually transmitted infections, enteric and zoonotic diseases, and tuberculosis. The 
Environmental Health Branch (EHB) is divided into general environmental health, health policy and 
risk assessment, Aboriginal environmental health, and the water unit. Each branch has a director 
who reports to the executive Director of Health Protection.   
In addition to the central Health Protection, within NSW there are 15 Local Health Districts (LHD) 
served by one or more public health units (PHUs), each headed by a PHU Director. These public 
health units collectively are known as the Public Health network. The PHUs have responsibility for 
the day-to-day activities of health protection in their district related to communicable diseases, 
environmental health and immunisation, including following up individual notifications of disease, 
managing localised outbreaks, and providing community information. The PHU Directors meet with 
the Directors of Health Protection regularly as members of the Health Protection Leadership Team, 
including monthly via teleconference and quarterly face-to-face in North Sydney. These meetings are 
held to discuss current public health issues across the state of NSW. In addition, both branches of 
Health Protection NSW hold annual workshops on topical issues within their respective fields to 
which PHU staff from across the state attend, to ensure continuing education and build capacity 
within the Public Health network.    
I conducted a variety of projects between March 2016 and October 2017 to fulfil the requirements 
of the Masters of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE), and participated in the daily life of 
Health Protection NSW, which included responding to critical incidents, completing education 
activities and acting as surge staff when needed. 
My first placement was within the Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases division of the Communicable 
Disease Branch, working on the response to a large outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul that had been 
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ongoing in Australia since December 2015; when I commenced in March 2016 this outbreak 
continued with no clear vehicle of infection identified. I conducted a case-control study including 
cases and controls from SA and NSW which identified an association between mung bean sprout 
consumption and illness. This outbreak led to a recall of mung bean sprouts from an implicated 
sprouter in South Australia and public messaging about the safe preparation and consumption of 
bean sprouts.  
In July 2016 six states and territories of Australia were affected by a large outbreak of Salmonella 
Hvittingfoss with 143 confirmed and suspected cases notified. I coordinated a large multi-
jurisdictional investigation to identify the source of infection and control the outbreak, including 
conducting a case-control study. The epidemiological, microbiological and environmental 
investigation implicated consumption of rockmelon from a single producer as a significant risk for 
infection, and the producer initiated a voluntary recall of the product. 
My second placement was in the Environmental Health Branch of Health Protection. I completed a 
review of the epidemiology of notifications in NSW to provide a snapshot of elevated blood lead 
levels in NSW and to inform an evaluation of the NSW elevated blood lead surveillance system. I 
analysed notification data for by age, sex, geographic area, exposure and occupation and compared 
notification rates over time and between geographic regions, and identified a number of limitations 
with the dataset that made it difficult to analyse notification rates, particularly by risk and exposure 
history and by blood lead level, and made recommendations to improve the data collection system. I 
also collected qualitative data about the function of the blood lead surveillance system by 
conducting face-to-face interviews with key stakeholders throughout NSW. Key areas for 
improvement in the system included changes to the way data is entered into the surveillance 
system, greater guidance for public health units on following up notifications, a review of the 
information collected on exposure, and guidance regarding liaising with occupational health 
regulatory agencies to ensure follow-up of occupational notifications.  
In addition, I participated in activities of Health Protection NSW as they arose. This included 
responding to a notification by the Health Care Complaints Commission to NSW Health of an 
individual with no medical qualifications who was performing cosmetic surgery procedures in her 
home. The response team identified a risk that clients who had procedures performed by this person 
could have been exposed to blood borne viruses and other pathogens. I developed a fact sheet 
(Appendix 1) written for the general public outlining the problem, how it was identified, what risk 
this posed, and what people should do if they visited these premises. I also arranged for this to be 
translated in simplified and traditional Chinese. These documents were published on the NSW 
Health website.  
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I also contributed to the Health Protection NSW report. This report highlights the major health 
outcomes and achievements related to Health Protection NSW’s activities on an annual basis. Within 
this report is a segment titled “Epi Corner” which provides a small vignette on an epidemiological 
concept, together with some short questions for readers to test their knowledge and understanding 
of the concept. I authored the 2016 Epi Corner on the topic of case-controls and case-case studies, 
and the 2017 Epi Corner on confidence intervals and p-values. These are included in Appendix 2.      
I presented twice at the NSW Health Bug Breakfast seminar series. Bug Breakfast is a series of hour-
long breakfast seminars on communicable disease that have been delivered since 1990, and are 
made available to the entirety of the NSW public health network by attendance in person or via 
webinar.  Typically, a trainee or other employee or NSW Health will identify a key topic, present an 
overview of the topic, and invite two experts to also deliver presentations around the topic. On the 
topic of Salmonella in October 2017 I was invited by the convenor to present on the Salmonella 
Hvittingfoss outbreak I investigated in July-August 2016 (discussed further in Chapter 3). In April 
2017, I convened the session on Campylobacter, including giving an introductory presentation and 
inviting Craig Shadbolt and Martyn Kirk to speak. The flyer and Campylobacter presentation slides 
are included in Appendix 3.  
Whilst working in Communicable Disease Branch, I was the trainee representative on the committee 
organising the 2016 Communicable Disease workshop. I developed several activities including a quiz 
on public health topics to engage the attendees and an exercise using chocolates to explore the 
concept of whole genome sequencing (Appendix 4). I also organised prizes, participated as a 
facilitator of a small group, and conducted the final evaluation of the workshop including production 
of a written document analysing participant responses and outlining what worked well, what didn’t 
work well and suggestions for improvement for future workshops.   
Finally, whilst working in Environmental Health Branch I contributed to the investigation of 
community complaints regarding a Cruise Ship Terminal located in White Bay NSW. This included 
completing data analyses of air quality readings in the area and comparing these to other locations 
in Sydney, and looking at these trends over time. I prepared a report that was provided to the 
Environmental Health Expert Advisory Committee for consideration, and used this as the basis for 
my Lesson from the Field (LFF) on Risk Communication (outlined further in Chapter 6).  
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Masters of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) requirements: 
I completed the following requirements for the qualification of Master of Philosophy (Applied 
Epidemiology): 
Field projects 
Public health data analysis The epidemiology of elevated blood lead levels in NSW, 
1997–2016 (Chapter 4) 
Public health surveillance system 
establishment and evaluation  
An evaluation of the NSW elevated blood lead 
surveillance system (Chapter 5) 
Field investigation of a public health 
problem  
Investigation of a multijurisdictional Salmonella 
Hvittingfoss outbreak (Chapter 3) 
Epidemiological study Investigation of a multijurisdictional Salmonella 
Saintpaul outbreak (Chapter 2) 
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Additional requirements 
Requirement 
Literature review A literature review was completed for each of the field projects 
listed above 
Report to a non-scientific 
audience  
NSW Health “Infection control breaches in cosmetic procedures: 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)”. Published online 6 July 
2016 at 
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/Infectious/alerts/Pages/cosmeti
c-procedures.aspx
Publications Draft paper being prepared for publication: 
Todd KM, Beazley R, Furlong C, Kenny B, Shadbolt C, Centofanti 
A, Schobben X, McAnulty J, Kirk M, Sheppeard V, Polkinghorne 
B, Gregory J, Easton M, Stafford R, Koehler A, Sintchenko V, 
Howard P, Wang Q, Da Silva AG, Williamson D, and Hope K. A 
multi-state outbreak of Salmonella Hvittingfoss associated 
with melons in Australia.  
Intended for submission to Epidemiology and Infection 
Draft paper being prepared for publication: 
Todd KM, Scalley B, Kirk M and McAnulty J. The epidemiology of 
lead poisoning notifications in New South Wales, Australia, 
1997-2016.  
Intended for submission to Public Health Research and Practice.  
Oral presentation Todd KM, Miller M, Hope K. A large multi-state outbreak of 
Salmonella Saintpaul: the hazards of stealth ingredients. 
Presented at the NSW Gerry Murphy Prize – Australian Faculty 
of Public Health Medicine (AFPHM), Sydney, Australia - 19th 
October 2016 
Todd KM, Beazley R, Furlong C, Kenny B, Shadbolt C, Centofanti 
A, Schobben X, Polkinghorne B, Gregory J, Easton M, Stafford R, 
Koehler A, Sintchenko V, Howard P, Wang Q, Williamson D, and 
Hope K. A multi-state outbreak of Salmonella Hvittingfoss 
associated with melons in Australia, 2016. Paper presented at 
the 2017 Communicable Disease Control Conference, 
Melbourne, Australia, 26-28th June 2017 
Todd KM, Scalley B, Kirk M and McAnulty J. The epidemiology of 
lead poisoning notifications in New South Wales, Australia, 
2011-2016. Paper presented at the 9th TEPHINET Global 
Scientific Conference, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 7-11th August 2017  
Todd KM, Scalley B, Kirk M and McAnulty J. The epidemiology of 
lead poisoning notifications in New South Wales, Australia, 
1997-2016. Paper presented at the 29th Conference of the 
International Society for Environmental Epidemiology, Sydney, 
Australia, 24-28th September 2017 
Poster presentations Todd KM, Beazley R, Furlong C, Kenny B, Shadbolt C, Centofanti 
A, Schobben X, Polkinghorne B, Gregory J, Easton M, Stafford R, 
Koehler A, Sintchenko V, Howard P, Wang Q, Williamson D, and 
Hope K. A multi-state outbreak of Salmonella Hvittingfoss 
associated with melons in Australia, 2016. Oral poster 
presented at the 9th TEPHINET Global Scientific Conference, 
Chiang Mai, Thailand, 7-11th August 2017   
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Teaching 
Activity 
Teaching first year cohort Tier S, Collins J, Todd K. Outbreaks: What I Wish I Knew. 
Presented at MAE courseblock March 2017 
Bug Breakfast presentations Todd K. Salmonellosis. Presented at the NSW Health Bug 
Breakfast seminar session, 7 October 2016 
Todd K. Campylobacter. Presented at the NSW Health Bug 
Breakfast, 7 April 2017.  
Lesson from the field Todd K. Lesson from the Field: Risk communication. 
Conducted via teleconference, 20 July 2017  
Clinical Associate Lecturer, 
Integrated Population Medicine 
Program, University of Sydney 
Medical School  
Tutorial 2 – Social determinants of health (11 March 2016) 
Tutorial 3 – Costs of care, resource management and low-
value care (1 March 2016) 
Tutorial 4 – Person-centred management (22 April 2016) 
Tutorial 5 – Global health (2 June 2017)  
Tutorial 6 – Advocacy (7 July 2017) 
Infection control breaches in cosmetic procedures 
6 July 2016 
Frequently Asked Questions 
What has caused this issue? 
Following a recent complaint to the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC), NSW Health 
has become aware that Ms Pu Liu, also known as Mabel Liu, has been performing cosmetic 
procedures from premises situated at 14/239 Great North Road, Five Dock. Ms Liu is not a 
medical practitioner registered in Australia. 
Inspection of the residential unit in Five Dock found evidence of poor infection control. 
There is a risk that clients who have had cosmetic procedures performed at this address may 
have been exposed to blood-borne viruses such as hepatitis B, hepatitis C and HIV. There is also 
a risk of skin and soft tissue infections and poor cosmetic results. 
Injectable drugs not approved for use in Australia were also found on the premises, raising 
concerns about the safety and effectiveness of these medicines. 
The HCCC has issued an order prohibiting Ms Mabel Liu from: 
1. Providing any cosmetic surgical and medical procedures, including any cosmetic surgery
that involves cutting beneath the skin and any cosmetic medical procedure that involves
piercing the skin
2. Possessing any Schedule 4 drugs for cosmetic use including botulinum toxin (Botox) and
hyaluronic acid injection preparations (dermal fillers).
NSW Health recommends that clients who have had procedures performed by Ms Liu at this 
address should seek the advice of a GP and be tested for blood-borne viruses (hepatitis, B, 
hepatitis C and HIV.) 
How was this identified? 
A client who had a poor outcome from a cosmetic surgical procedure performed by Ms Liu at the 
Five Dock premises made a formal complaint to the Health Care Complaints Commission. 
What did the investigations show? 
The inspection of the premises in Five Dock found evidence that surgical and other procedures 
were being performed at the premises; drugs for injection that are not registered for use in 
Australia; and a general environment not suitably fitted out for the performance of surgical 
procedures. 
What infection control problems were identified? 
There was evidence of a lack of hygiene, possible re-use of medications and equipment between 
patients, and a lack of effective cleaning and sterilisation. Sharing items that should be sterile 
between patients can allow infection to spread from one person to another. 
Appendix 1 - Fact Sheet regarding infection control breaches
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What procedures are classified as “at risk”? 
Based on the very poor level of infection control measures found at the premises, there is a 
concern that any procedure in which the skin was cut or penetrated such as surgery, stitching or 
injection undertaken at the Five Dock unit could pose a risk of infection. This could be an acute 
skin or soft tissue bacterial infection, or a blood-borne virus. 
Are there any physical symptoms if people have been infected? 
There are two main risks of infection: an acute skin or soft tissue bacterial infection caused by 
unclean hands and instruments (non-sterile technique), and; infection caused by blood-borne 
viruses. 
People experiencing acute skin or soft tissue bacterial infections might experience: 
1. Increased pain at the site of the procedure
2. The site may be red, hot, swollen and painful
3. There may be pus or the wound may smell; stitches may come apart
4. Tiredness, sickness or a fever (temperature above 37.5°C)
5. Becoming very unwell (“septic”) and needing antibiotics urgently.
People will experience these symptoms in the first few days after a procedure. If you feel unwell 
or experience any of the above after having a cosmetic procedure done, you should seek health 
advice from your GP. 
People exposed to a blood-borne virus might experience: 
1. No symptoms for months or years afterwards
2. A mild illness when first infected
3. Uncommonly, people present with acute hepatitis when first infected with hepatitis B or
hepatitis C, which causes liver problems and may lead to hospitalisation.
Infections with these viruses can be detected by a blood test. 
Can you describe the testing process? 
Testing for blood borne viruses is straightforward – all that is required is for you to attend your GP 
and ask to be tested. Your GP can order a blood test to check if you have hepatitis B, hepatitis C 
or HIV. We suggest you take this fact sheet with you when you visit your GP. 
When will results be available? 
Results for hepatitis B, hepatitis C and HIV testing are usually available within a few days of 
testing. 
Where will testing take place? 
Blood tests can be arranged by your GP, and can usually be collected at local pathology 
collection centres. 
8
Do patients have to pay to see their doctor and have their blood 
test done? 
Patients should follow their usual practice when visiting their doctor and get the blood tests 
through the usual Medicare processes. 
What do patients do if they have a positive test result? 
You should talk to your doctor about your results. 
What does it mean if I have a positive test result? 
A positive result means that you have been infected with a blood borne virus sometime in the 
past. For hepatitis B and C, you may have cleared the virus by yourself, or you may have a long-
term (chronic) infection. Your doctor will tell you whether or not your infection is active now. HIV 
infection is a lifelong infection. There are effective treatments for these infections, so it is 
important to know whether you are infected or not, so that you can be assessed and receive 
treatment if needed. 
There are many ways in which people can get infected with HIV and hepatitis B and C viruses. If 
you have been recently infected with one of these viruses, your doctor should notify the local 
Public Health Unit and work with the local Public Health Unit to investigate possible sources of 
your infection. 
For more information on infection with blood borne viruses please refer to the Hepatitis B, 
Hepatitis C or HIV factsheets. 
How many patients are at risk? 
Due to the poor record keeping practices at the Five Dock premises, it is not clear how many 
clients may be at risk. 
Are there services like this being provided by other people? 
There may be other unregistered practitioners operating in NSW who perform cosmetic 
procedures and/or surgeries in unregulated, unlicensed premises including homes and hotels. 
These may also pose a health risk 
How can I protect myself? 
If you are considering cosmetic surgical and medical procedures you should undertake careful 
research and make sure the person doing the procedure is qualified to do so. Members of the 
public can search the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency’s register to check that a 
health practitioner is registered. 
If you have had a procedure with a poor outcome or have concerns about a practitioner or 
location you can inform the HCCC on 1800 043 159. This phone line operates from 9am to 5pm 
on weekdays and can provide advice on how to make a complaint. Information about how to 
make a complaint can also be accessed by following the link on the HCCC’s website. 
Further information on how to protect yourself and how to make a complaint can also be 
accessed by following the link to the public warning made by the HCCC on 30 June 2016. 
Where can I get further information? 
Contact your local Public Health Unit on 1300 066 055. 
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有關Mabel LIU女士所做的外科整容手術程序的問答 
收到最近向醫療保健投訴委員會（HCCC）的一 投訴以後份 ，新州衛生廳 獲知 PU LIU
女士，又名Mabel LIU女士，在 14/239 Great North Road, Five Dock 地址做整容。劉
女士不是在澳大利亞註冊的醫生。 
檢 在查 Five Dock的住所發現證據顯示該住所缺乏防範感染措施。 
那些曾在該地址進行美容手術的客戶可能已經感染血源性病毒例如乙型和丙型肝炎病
毒和艾滋病毒。皮膚和軟組織可能也受到感染以及美容效果不佳。 
在該處所也發現澳大利亞不允許使用的注射藥物，這些藥物的安全性和有效性令人擔
憂。 
HCCC發出命令，禁止Mabel LIU女士： 
a.提供任何整容手術和醫療程序，包括任何涉及切割皮膚整容手術，任何涉及
刺入皮膚穿孔的 美容醫療程序。
b.擁有任何附表 4 美容用藥，包括肉毒桿菌毒素（肉毒桿菌）和透明質酸注射
製劑（ 皮 充物真 填 ）。
新州衛生廳建議，曾在該地址接受劉女士手術程序的客戶應該諮詢家庭醫生並做血液
傳播病毒 （乙型和丙型肝炎病毒和艾滋病毒）的檢測。 
如何發現了這一情況？ 
一位在 Five Dock 地址接受 LIU女士整容手術結果不佳的客戶向醫療保健投訴委員會
提出正式投訴。 
調 結果發現什 問題麼查 ？
檢查 Five Dock處所有證據顯示該處所用於手術和其他醫療程序; 注射藥物未經註冊未
經允許在澳大利亞使用;和整體環境裝修不宜做外科手術。 
發現 些預防感染措施問題哪 ？
有證據顯示衛生較差、有可能患者和患者之間重複使用藥物和設備，以及缺乏有效的
洗和消毒清 。病人共用應該是用完後要消毒的物品會造成感染從人與人之間傳播。
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什 程序被列麼 為“有危險”？
因 在處所內發現的預防感染措施非常差為 ，任何在 Five Dock 處所進行的皮膚切割或
穿孔醫療程序如手術，縫合或註射都可能造成感染。感染可能會是一種急性皮膚或軟
組織的細菌感染，或血源性病毒感染。 
如果被感染是否有任何身體不適症狀？ 
感染主要有兩類：由於不干淨的手和儀器 （ 非無菌技術）引起的急性皮膚或軟組織細
菌感染 ; 和由血液傳播的病毒引起的感染。 
受急性皮膚或軟組織細菌感染的人可能會感到： 
1.在手術部位疼痛加劇
2.該部位可能出現紅、熱、腫及疼痛
3.可能出現膿血或傷口異味;針口可能會裂開。
4.疲勞、生病或發燒（高於 37.5℃度）
5.變得非常不適（“潰瘍”）並迫切需要抗生素。
某些人在手術程序後頭幾天會出現以上症狀。如果 在做完美容手術後感到不適或出你
現上述情況， 應該去看 的家庭醫生你 您 。
受到血源性病毒影響的人可能會： 
1.之後數月或數年無症狀
2.感染初期會輕微發病
3.剛感染乙型肝炎或丙型肝炎，少數人會得急性肝炎，這會導致肝臟出現問
題，並可能需要住院治療。
這些病毒的感染可以通過血液測試來檢測。 
是否能描述一下測試過程你 ？
血液傳播的病毒測試很簡單 – 只需諮詢 的家庭醫生你 您 ，並提出要求檢測。 的家庭您
醫生可以安排驗血，檢測 是否有乙型肝炎你 ，丙型肝炎或艾滋病。我們建議，當 去您
看 的家庭醫生時帶上這 資料你 份 。
什 時候有結果麼 ？
乙型肝炎，丙型肝炎和艾滋病毒檢測，通常在檢測幾天后會有結果。
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去 裡檢測呢哪 ？
血液測試可以通過 的家庭醫生安排你 ，並且通常可以在當地的病理檢測中心檢測。
病人看醫生和驗血需要付費嗎？
患者去看自己的醫生時應該按照他們的慣例，並通過常規的Medicare 程序做血液檢
查。 
如果檢測結果是陽性的，病人該 辦怎麼 ？
應該跟 的醫生討論檢驗結果你 你 。
如果我的測試結果是陽性,這意味著什麼？
陽性結果意味著 曾經感染血液傳播病毒你 。對於乙型和丙型肝炎， 也許已經自行你 清
除了病毒，或者 也可能受到長你 期性的（慢性）感染。 的醫生將會告訴 受到的你 你你
感染是否依然是活性。艾滋病毒感染是一種終身感染。對這些感染都有有效的治療方
法. 所以, 首先要 楚 是否受到感染搞清 你 . 這樣 就可以接受評估和做相應的治療你 。
感人艾滋病毒, 乙型和丙型肝炎病毒的渠道有多種。如果 最近受到你 其中一種這些病毒
的感染， 的醫生你 應該通知當地的公共衛生部門，並與當地的公共衛生部門一起調查
感染的可能來源你 。
有關血液傳播病毒感染的詳細信息，請參閱： 
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/Infectious/factsheets/Pages/default.aspx 
有多少病人可能受到影響？ 
由於位於 Five Dock的住所缺乏保存記錄，目前 不 楚有多少客戶可能受到影響尚 清 。
有沒有其他的人也在提供同類服務？ 
在新南威爾士州, 可能有其他未註冊的從業人員, 在未受監管和無牌照的場所, 包括住宅
和酒店, 從事美容程序和/或手術 。這些都可能對健康構成威脅。 
我該如何保護自己？ 
如果 在考慮做整容手術和醫療程序你 ， 應該做仔細的 究你 研 ，並確保操作該程序的人
員符合資格。市民可以通過下列網址, 搜索澳大利亞衛生執業者監管機構的註冊記錄，
證某個衛生從業者是否登記註冊查 ：https://www.ahpra.gov.au/。 
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如果 做了美容醫療程序而結果不佳你 , 或對某個從業人員或場所有疑問, 可以聯繫衛你
生保健投訴委員會, 電話: 1800 043 159. 星期一到星期五, 上午 9點到下午 5點.工作人
員可以就有關如何進行投訴提供建議。如何進行投訴的信息也可以通過訪問下列
HCCC網站上的鏈接獲得: http://www.hccc.nsw.gov.au 
有關如何保護自己，如何進行投訴的更多信息, 也可以從 2016年 6月 30日起通過下
面的鏈接獲得: public warning made by the HCCC 
我可以從那裡獲得更多的信息？ 
聯繫 當地的公共健康結構你 , 電話: 1300 066 055.
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Case-control studies  
Case control studies have traditionally been frequently used to determine exposures in outbreaks. 
Their benefits include that they can be carried out rapidly, usually do not require as large a sample 
size as cohort studies, and are generally less expensive. They allow for multiple exposures to be 
studied, and for a rare event, they are often the only practical way to test a hypothesis. 
However, case-control studies have their limitations; one of the major limitations is their potential 
for bias, particularly recall and selection bias. In cases of an acute illness like gastroenteritis, patients 
may search for a cause for their illness, and so be more likely to report an exposure (for example, 
eating takeaway chicken) than controls; this is a form of recall bias.  
It can also be difficult to define an appropriate control group, and methods to select controls also 
have the ability to introduce selection bias. Traditional sources of controls in case-control studies 
include:  
• Population controls – these are people randomly selected from the general population, for
example by random-digit dialling by telephone, or knocking on every third door in a
neighbourhood. These control selection methods can be very time-consuming and expensive
• Friend controls – the case is asked to nominate a friend to serve as their control
• Physician nominated controls – this involves asking the patients’ GP to select a similar
patient from their records to act as a control
In traditional case-control studies, a significant bias can arise because controls are selected 
randomly, whereas cases that are notified to public health authorities have undergone a process of 
self-selection. This arises because not all people who suffer from a disease will present to their GP 
for testing, and not all tests recommended by GPs will be carried out. For every case of salmonella 
reported in surveillance systems in Australia, it is estimated that there could be between 3 and 12 
cases occurring in the community who do not present to GPs and/or undertake faecal testing.  This 
process can be affected by factors such as occupation, social status, health seeking behaviours; and 
these factors can also be related to differences in possible exposures, for example diet.  
Therefore, in this population, the notified cases do not represent a truly random sample of cases. 
Case-case studies and their advantages  
As we have discussed, the difference in exposure histories seen in a traditional case-control studies 
between cases and controls may not be due to true differences in exposure, but to biases involved in 
the how cases are selected (via surveillance system notifications) vs. controls (which are randomly 
selected). 
An alternative is the case-case study.  Case-case studies draw on pre-existing surveillance systems 
and use notifications of different diseases, or of different serotypes of the same disease, as proxy 
controls. An example of the use of case-case studies is in the setting of salmonellosis. In Australia, 
Appendix Ϯ - Ɖi orner
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Salmonella strains are subtyped in the reference laboratory by serotyping, allowing further 
characterisation of salmonellosis as caused by Salmonella Typhimurium, Salmonella Enteriditis, 
Salmonella Virchow, etc. This subtyping allows for the identification of outbreaks of less common 
Salmonella serovars.  
The data collected on cases via routine surveillance mechanisms can be used in the place of controls 
to compare exposure histories between different groups of cases. For example, in an ongoing 
outbreak of one particular Salmonella strain – e.g. Salmonella Hvittingfoss – information on 
exposures for these cases, as collected using standard questionnaires, can be compared against 
exposure data from other recent interviewed cases of Salmonella Typhimurium as controls.  
This method is time and cost efficient, as it removes the difficulties of identifying community 
controls for the outbreak and draws on pre-existing surveillance systems. It also helps eliminate the 
recall and selection biases associated with traditional case-control studies  
Benefits of case-case studies: 
1. All cases came through the same selection process, therefore biases that may be introduced
by differences in health-seeking behaviours etc. between cases and randomly-selected
controls is minimised
2. It reduces differences in recall between cases and controls, as both cases and “controls” in
this method have suffered from a recent gastrointestinal disease, and will have had the
same consideration given to potential exposures
Disadvantages of case-case studies 
1. Problems can arise with validity – in the case-case study, each “control” will have one
exposure which differs systematically from that of the cases – the exposure which led to
their own infection. For example, if using Salmonella Typhimurium cases as controls, there
may be higher rates of consumption of chicken in the control group compared to the case
group. The bias whereby all of the cases form the previous outbreak may differ from the
general population in some important aspect could be circumvented by mixing cases from
several different serotypes in the pool of controls
2. In small populations, it can be difficult to source a large enough group of controls
3. If using historical cases as controls, there is the problem that dietary habits can change over
time – therefore “controls” should not be more than a few years old at most
4. There can be seasonal variation in eating habits, particularly around fresh produce and
salads, which may lead to systematic differences between cases and control groups if the
control group cases occurred at a different time of year.
Questions 
We have discussed recall bias and selection bias. What are some other types of biases that can arise in 
epidemiological studies?  
Bias in epidemiology occurs when errors affect comparison groups differently. Bias is usually 
categorised into three broad types: 
1. Selection bias: errors in the selection of populations for study
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2. Information bias: errors in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data
3. Confounding
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Confidence intervals and p-values  
When we get a result from an epidemiological study, the result can be due to three things: 
1. Chance (also known as random error)
2. Bias or error
3. Confounding
The impact of chance on the results of a study is usually expressed as p-values and confidence 
intervals. The impact of chance on results is mostly determined by the sample size of the study. 
P-values
The p-value (or probability value) represents the probability that the association shown in a research
study could have occurred by chance alone, if there was no actual relationship between the
exposure and outcome.
The size of the p-value helps you understand the possible impact of chance on the result.  A 
statistically significant p-value is traditionally set at less than or equal to 0.05 – this number means 
that if you repeated the same study 20 times, the probability that the observed result could occur 
due to chance alone is 5 out of 100 (or 1 in 20). Similarly, a p value of 0.001 means that the 
probability of the result being due to chance is 1 in 1000. The smaller the p-value, the less likely the 
results are due to chance.  
P-values can be very useful because their method of calculation includes a lot of information,
including the sample size, the sampling variation, and difference from expectation, all in one
convenient number. Many modern statistical software packages such as SPSS or SAS will calculate
the p-value automatically for many different types of statistical test. However, the p value can often
be misused. The p value is heavily influenced by sample size – the bigger the population the more
likely you are to find a significant result of some kind, even if the statistically significant result is
clinically meaningless.
Confidence intervals  
Confidence intervals provide an indication of the precision of the result obtained from the study. The 
confidence interval expresses the concept that the result achieved from the study is probably not 
100% accurate, and that the real answer lies somewhere within a given range – the confidence 
interval is the range within which the true answer is likely to lie. 
Traditionally confidence intervals of 95% are used. A 95% confidence interval means that if we 
repeated the same study many times, then we would include the true result in our interval 95% of 
the time.  
Confidence intervals are influenced by sample size; a small sample will typically give a wide 
confidence interval whilst a large sample will give a narrower confidence interval. A narrow 
confidence interval indicates that our result is quite precise.  
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Question  
An outbreak of Salmonella Dural occurred in a large town. To identify risk factors for infection, the 
public health unit conducted a case-control study with 13 cases and 25 controls frequency-matched 
for age and sex. Telephone interviews were conducted using a standardized questionnaire. Raw 
dragonfruit consumption was the only exposure significantly associated with illness (OR, 26.7; 95% 
CI, 5.4-101.5; P = .003). 
1. What is the confidence interval?
2. What is the p-value?
3. Write a sentence interpreting these two results
4. What do you think of the size of the confidence interval? What could you do to change the
size of the confidence interval?
Answer 
1. The confidence interval is between 5.4 and 101.5
2. The p-value is 0.003
3. The odds ratio was 26.7. If we repeated the same experiment 100 times, 95% of the time the
odds ratio would lie between 5.4 and 101.5. The probability of this result occurring due to
chance is 3 in 1000.
4. The confidence interval is very wide (between 5.4 and 101.5). This is because there was a
very small sample size of only 13 cases and 25 controls. If we increased the number of cases
and controls in our study (increasing the sample size), this would result in a narrower
confidence interval (i.e. a more precise estimate)
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Introduction to the exercise  
There is no wrong answer – this is about understanding some of the basics of trees and what they 
are showing.  
This exercise is about looking at what characteristics are shared. This can be ingredients, preference, 
brand etc., but whatever participants choose, it should be clear what criteria they are using.  
- Let participants know that trees haven’t always been drawn from genetics – they can be
drawn from physical traits, behaviour, and fossil record.
- Make sure that all the taxa (chocolates) are at terminal nodes – nothing can be within the
tree
- Discuss how the tree would look different if you chose different criteria.
Encourage the table to take photos of completed trees (before eating) 
Question:  
Create a WGS tree with the following chocolates 
Appendix ϯ - t'S teaching eǆercise for ϮϬϭϲ  ǁorŬshoƉ
WGS teaching exercise – chocolates 
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Answer:
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Remote Site Participants: Albury Base Hospital  WebEx Contact: Tracey Oakman (02) 6080 8916 
Bathurst Population Health 
WebExContact: Deborah Shaw (02) 6330 5941 
Broken Hill Hospital  
WebEx Contact: Margie Lesjak (08) 8080 1278 
Camperdown 
WebEx Contact: Essi Huhtinen (02) 9515 9420 
Canberra – Department of Health  
WebEx Contact: Leroy Trapani (02) 6289 2732 
Coffs Harbour 
WebEx Contact: Michele Greenwood (02) 6656 7676 
Dubbo - Allan Coates Cancer Centre 
WebEx Contact: Therese Channell (02) 6809 8963 
Goulburn - Springfield House  
WebEx Contact: Lisa Stephenson (02) 4824 1840 
Gosford Hospital 
WebEx Contact: Kirsty Graham (02) 4320 3382 
Gosford PHU 
WebEx Contact: Paul Cook (02) 4320 9737 
Grafton 
WebEx Contact: Helen Lennon (02) 6641 8797 
Justice Health 
WebEx Contact: Greg Cheguelman (02) 9700 3226 
 
 
Lismore PH Planning & Performance site 
WebEx Contact: Colleen Nosworthy (02) 6588 2750 
Liverpool - Refugee Health Service 
WebEx Contact: Elaine Ochoa (02) 8778 0770 
Newcastle Wallsend 
WebEx Contact: Julie Kohlhagen (02) 4924 6477 
Parramatta – Cumberland Campus 
WebEx Contact: Shopna Bag (02) 9840 3603 
Penrith – Nepean Blue Mountains LHD 
George Truman (02) 4734 2022 
Port Macquarie Community Health Centre  
WebEx Contact: Colleen Nosworthy  (02) 6588 2750 
Randwick Hospital 
WebEx Contact: Liz Smedley (02) 9382 8309 
Tamworth Office - Hunter New England PHU 
WebEx Contact: Peter Massey (02) 6764 8000 
Wagga Community Health 
WebEx Contact: Tony Burns (02) 6933 9120 
Westmead - Children’s Hospital 
WebEx Contact: Robyn Ivey (02) 9845 3566 
Wollongong Hospital - SEALS South Pathology 
WebEx Contact: Diane Lovatt  (02) 4221 6700 
Wyong Hospital 
WebEx Contact: Jessica Hagan (02) 4394 8342 
Bug Breakfast Topic: Salmonellosis 
7 October 2016  
08.15am – 09:30am AEST 
For information on Bug Breakfast please contact Kate Kirkman, NSW Ministry of Health via email: BugBreakfast@doh.health.nsw.gov.au 
Hosting Venue: NSW Ministry of Health 
 Level 4, 73 Miller Street, North Sydney - Taronga, Tumbalong & Kurraba Rooms 
Click here to 
register 
In-Person 
attendance 
Remote sites 
click here to 
register for 
WebEx 
SPEAKERS 
• Leigh McIndoe, Trainee Public Health Officer, NSW Ministry of Health
• Dr Katherine Todd, Master of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) Scholar, Public Health Medicine Registrar
• Marianne Tegel, Policy and Regulatory Manager, Woolworths Food Company
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Remote Site Participants: Albury Base Hospital  WebEx Contact: Bridget Doyle (02) 6080 8900 
Bathurst LHD Hampden Park Road 
WebEx Contact: Deb Shaw (02) 6330 5880 
Broken Hill Hospital  
WebEx Contact: Guddu Kaur (08) 8080 1278 
Camperdown 
WebEx Contact: Essi Huhtinen (02) 9515 9420 
Canberra – Department of Health  
WebEx Contact: Leroy Trapani (02) 6289 2732 
Coffs Harbour 
WebEx Contact: Michele Greenwood (02) 6656 7676 
Dubbo – Pop House 
WebEx Contact: Kerry Gordon (02) 6809 8979 
Goulburn - Springfield House  
WebEx Contact: Lisa Stephenson (02) 4824 1840 
Gosford Hospital 
WebEx Contact: Kirsty Graham (02) 4320 3382 
Gosford PHU 
WebEx Contact: Paul Cook (02) 4320 9737 
Hornsby PHU 
Webex Contact: Adelaide Nyinawingeri (02) 9477 9057 
Grafton 
WebEx Contact: Helen Lennon (02) 6641 8797 
Justice Health 
WebEx Contact: Greg Cheguelman (02) 9700 3226 
Lismore PH Planning & Performance site 
WebEx Contact: Colleen Nosworthy (02) 6588 2750 
Liverpool - Refugee Health Service 
WebEx Contact: Elaine Ochoa (02) 8778 0770 
Newcastle Wallsend 
WebEx Contact: Julie Kohlhagen (02) 4924 6477 
Parramatta – Cumberland Campus 
WebEx Contact: Shopna Bag (02) 9840 3603 
Penrith – Nepean Blue Mountains LHD 
George Truman (02) 4734 2022 
Port Macquarie Community Health Centre  
WebEx Contact: Colleen Nosworthy  (02) 6588 2750 
Randwick Hospital 
WebEx Contact: Liz Smedley (02) 9382 8309 
Tamworth Office - Hunter New England PHU 
WebEx Contact: Peter Massey (02) 6764 8000 
Wagga Community Health 
WebEx Contact: Tony Burns (02) 6933 9120 
Westmead - Children’s Hospital 
WebEx Contact: Robyn Ivey (02) 9845 3566 
Wollongong Hospital - SEALS South Pathology 
WebEx Contact: Diane Lovatt  (02) 4221 6700 
Wyong Hospital 
WebEx Contact: Jessica Hagan (02) 4394 8342 
Mona Vale Hospital 
WebEx Contact: Jessica Nguyen  
BUG BREAKFAST 
Campylobacter 
7 April 2017 
08.15am – 09:30am AEST 
Hosting Venue: NSW Ministry of Health 
Level 4, 73 Miller Street, North Sydney - Taronga, Tumbalong & Kurraba Rooms 
Click here to 
register 
In-Person 
attendance 
Remote sites 
click here to 
register for 
WebEx 
SPEAKERS 
Dr Katherine Todd, Master of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) Scholar, Health Protection NSW and Australian National 
University  
Dr Craig Shadbolt, Food Incident Response & Complaints Manager, NSW Food Authority    
Associate Professor Martyn Kirk, National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health (NCEPH), Australian 
National University  
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Master of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) 
Scholar 
Health Protection, NSW Health 
April 2017 
Campylobacter Background 
z Spiral, “S” or curved, rod shaped bacteria 
z 17 species and 6 subspecies within the genus Campylobacter 
z C. jejeni and C. coli most frequently reported in human 
disease 
z Inhabit the intestinal tract of warm-blooded animals 
z Frequently detected in foods derived from these animals
Background Public Health Importance 
Public Health Importance 
z Most common bacterial cause of human gastroenteritis in the
world 
z 96 million foodborne illnesses globally each year
z Leading foodborne illness in children under five years of age
z Infections are generally mild, but can be fatal
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Clinical features of campylobacteriosis Clinical features of campylobacteriosis 
z Onset usually occurs 2-5 days after infection
z Symptoms include: 
– diarrhoea (frequently bloody)
– Abdominal cramping and pain
– Fever
z Symptoms typically last 3-6 days
z Rarely, campylobacter can cause invasive disease
Sources and transmission Sources and transmission 
z Undercooked meat, especially chicken 
z Unpasteurised milk or drinking water 
z Eating cooked food which has been cross-contaminated
with Campylobacter from raw food 
z Handling infected animals 
z Person-to-person 
Treatment Treatment 
z Usually a self-limited condition 
– Symptomatic/supportive treatment indicated 
z Rehydration and correction of electrolyte abnormalities 
z Antibiotics only in severe or high-risk cases
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Diagnosis Diagnosis 
z Suspect in the setting of severe abdominal pain with
diarrhoea 
z Detected via stool culture or CIDT
z Speciation and strain typing may be useful
epidemiologically 
z Further typing is usually performed in specialised reference 
laboratories 
Prevention Prevention 
z Hand washing 
z Cooking 
z Careful food preparation 
– Cook all raw foods, especially meat
– Wash raw vegetables
– Preventing cross-contamination of raw and cooked foods
z Temperature control 
z Isolation of unwell children from school or child care
z Preventing unwell food handlers from working 
Outbreaks Outbreaks 
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Outbreaks Notification in NSW 
Summary 
z Campylobacter is an important cause of infectious
gastroenteritis 
z Presentation ranges from mild self-limiting infection (common) to
severe disease and long-term sequelae or death (rare)
z Most commonly contracted from uncooked animal products 
including poultry, raw milk, and water 
z Currently notifiable in all states and territories of Australia except 
NSW
z Proposed to make Campylobacter a notifiable disease in NSW
through an amendment to the Public Health Act (2010)
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Part I: 
Communicable Diseases 
Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases 
“Everybody always knows something,” said Adam, “even if it’s something they don’t know they 
know.” 
Agatha Christie, “Cat Among the Pigeons”, 1959 
“You can't eat tomatoes because they're tainted with deadly salmonella! First there was tainted 
lettuce. Now, tainted tomatoes. Who would have thought that the healthiest part of a B.L.T. would 
be the bacon?” 
David Letterman, “The Late Show”, 2008 
“A bag of Bertie Bott's Every Flavour Beans. ‘You want to be careful with those," Ron warned Harry. 
"When they say every flavour, they mean every flavour - you know, you get all the ordinary ones like 
chocolate and peppermint and marmalade, but then you can get spinach and liver and tripe. George 
reckons he had a booger-flavoured one once."  
Ron picked up a green bean, looked at it carefully, and bit into a corner. 
"Bleaaargh - see? Sprouts.”  
 J.K. Rowling, “Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone”, 1997 
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Chapter 2  
Epidemiological investigation of a large 
multi-state outbreak of Salmonella 
Saintpaul: the hazards of stealth 
ingredients 
From NewsCorp Australia article: “SA Health says not to eat raw bean sprouts”, April 22nd 2016. 
Photo: Stephanie Timotheou 
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Prologue 
My role  
My first eight months of the MAE were spent within the Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases division of the 
Communicable Disease Branch, Health Protection NSW. When I commenced in March 2016 the 
outbreak described in this chapter had been ongoing since December 2015, with no signs of abating 
and no clear source identified. NSW had the most cases at the outset of the outbreak, and was thus 
leading the outbreak response. 
The NSW, SA and ACT OzFoodNet epidemiologists collaborated with public health unit staff and 
public health officers within their jurisdictions to interview cases of Salmonella Saintpaul using the 7-
day National Salmonella Hypothesis-Generating Questionnaire (HGQ). Information on food purchase 
locations ascertained on these interviews were passed on to regulatory agencies in NSW and SA who 
conducted traceback, sampling of fresh produce, and liaison with industry about fresh produce 
supply patterns. Laboratory staff at the Institute for Clinical Microbiology and Medical Research 
(ICPMR) in NSW and the Microbiological Diagnostic Unit (MDU) in Victoria conducted whole genome 
sequencing (WGS) of case isolates to identify the extent of the outbreak and confirm which 
jurisdictions were affected. In addition, the epidemiologists from SA, NSW and ACT developed a 
case-control study protocol to attempt to identify the food vehicle involved in the outbreak via an 
analytical study.  
During my first week, the case-control study protocol was finalised and I was appointed to co-
ordinate the NSW arm of the study with the assistance of Kirsty and Megge Miller, the SA 
OzFoodNet Epidemiologist. As the outbreak gained momentum in SA and simultaneously waned in 
NSW, my role changed to include responsibility for data entry and analysis for both states, as 
resources in SA were significantly stretched by the extremely large number of cases occurring. At 
this point I understood the important role of the MAE in providing a surge staff in the case of acute 
public health emergencies.  
My role included participating in teleconferences and providing input into the final design of the 
questionnaire and protocol for the case-control study. I ĂůƐŽ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ Ă ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ ĂŶĚ 
was responsible for selecting and allocating cases and controls for interview in NSW, which included 
frequency matching by age group and local government area (LGA). I designed and built an Epi-infoTM 
database based on the questionnaire, and used this to enter and analyse the data. I was responsible 
for conducting daily data analyses at the height of the outbreak ;pril 2016Ϳ. On a typical day, I 
would enter newly-interviewed cases and controls into the database until 1pm, when I would stop 
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and conduct an analysis of the data to prepare and disseminate a report to SA by 4pm; this was done 
to enable urgent public health action to be taken on the strength of association that was emerging 
between bean sprouts and infection. I was custodian of all NSW data relating to the outbreak, 
including maintaining the line list, and provided updates on case numbers for situation reports.  
I provided input into the final outbreak report and presented on the outbreak for my public health 
physician colleagues at the Australian Faculty of Public Health Medicine (AFPHM) presentation night 
in Sydney in October 2016, and at the National Centre for Epidemiology & Population Health 
(NCEPH) ANU seminar series as a field report in Canberra in March 2017. I also presented a report on 
this outbreak to Infectious Disease medical registrars at a continuing education evening in Sydney in 
November 2017. I provided input into the abstract and presentation that Megge Miller presented at 
the CDC conference in June 2017, and I will be a co-author on a paper currently being written about 
this outbreak.   
In this chapter, I report the findings of the case-control study that the investigation team conducted 
during the outbreak to identify the likely vehicle of infection, and place this in the context of the 
overall epidemiology of the outbreak. Whilst not the focus of this report, I acknowledge all the hard 
work that went into the environmental and laboratory investigations during this outbreak, which 
were essential in identifying the source of the outbreak and implementing control measures. The 
public health actions arising from the investigation of this outbreak are illustrated in the media 
reports in Appendix 5.   
Lessons learned  
This was my first experience of working in a multidisciplinary outbreak team that was dispersed 
across multiple geographic locations. I gained an appreciation of the value of large teams (including 
access to expertise and human resources from other states, as well as the professional satisfaction in 
collaborating effectively), as well as the challenges involved in coordinating a multijurisdictional and 
multidisciplinary response. Coordinating activities included managing competing priorities, resource 
limitations, the difficulties of communication in large teleconferences, over the phone and by email 
and even the simple challenge of coordinating a teleconference across different time zones.  
As my first project, I also experienced the challenges of learning and doing simultaneously—time 
pressures were so intense that I often had little time to ask or learn how to do new ways of doing 
things. As an example, I was initially calculating 2x2 tables one by one for each food exposure 
variable because I hadn’t yet learned how to automatically generate tables in Epi-infoTM or Stata. 
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However, I found this process an excellent learning tool because I gained an understanding of the 
fundamentals very quickly, and then subsequently appreciated shortcuts when I did discover them. 
I also learned about different analytical study designs in case-control studies and the different biases 
that can arise through the way cases are selected, how questions are asked, and how controls are 
selected. Based on this experience I wrote a segment for “Epi Corner” in the NSW Health Protection 
newsletter, included in Appendix 2 in Chapter 1.  
Public health implications  
This was one of the largest Salmonella common-source outbreaks recorded in Australia. More than 
500 people tested positive for S. Saintpaul and it is likely that hundreds more became ill but did not 
present for testing. Cases occurred across four states and territories of Australia and were implicated 
in several point-source outbreaks in the Northern Territory as well as the wider outbreak.  
This outbreak reinforced the potential for contamination of bean sprouts with Salmonella and other 
enteric bacteria. Sprouts are a known high-risk food that has been associated with multiple large and 
serious outbreaks over recent years, frequently occurring across large geographical areas and often 
very challenging to investigate. Sprouts are often described as a “stealth foods”, which are garnish-
type foods that are often poorly identified and recalled by case patients as something they have 
eaten. The “stealth” nature of sprouts was reflected in the overall low frequency of recalled sprout 
consumption identified in this outbreak (41% among case-control study participants and 30% 
overall) reflected findings of other sprout-associated outbreaks both in Australia and 
internationally1-11  
Although not discussed further in this chapter, the environmental investigation of this outbreak 
combined with the epidemiological and microbiological investigation led to the recall of bean sprouts 
from an implicated sprout producer in South Australia, as well as the closing down of the sprouting 
facility for a period whilst it was improved to meet regulatory standards. The sprouter in South 
Australia was unable to be linked with the NSW cases based on supply patterns and it was 
hypothesised that contaminated seeds supplied to both states rather than the sprouted beans 
themselves were the cause of the outbreak, although this was unable to be proved. Routine 
surveillance and on-going monitoring were maintained after the outbreak to detect any new 
increase in case numbers.  
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Abstract 
Background 
Previous outbreaks of Salmonella Saintpaul in Australia have been associated with the consumption 
of contaminated drinking water and fresh produce. In December 2015, a large outbreak of S. 
Saintpaul occurred in Australia with a total of 376 confirmed and probable cases occurring in NSW, 
SA, ACT, and later the NT over a six-month period.  An extensive epidemiological investigation 
initially failed to identify a clear source of exposure, however consumption of fresh produce items 
including onions, bean sprouts, limes, chilli, fresh salad mix, were suspected. We conducted a 
multijurisdictional case-control study to identify the vehicle of infection.  
Method 
For the purposes of the case control study, we defined a case as isolation of the outbreak strain of S. 
Saintpaul on whole genome sequencing (WGS) from a faecal specimen in an individual resident in 
ACT, SA or NSW and with acute gastroenteritis with onset between 16 March and 17 April 2016. We 
identified cases via routine laboratory notifications.  
We compared cases with controls. Controls were selected from routinely notified cases of S. 
Typhimurium and Campylobacter with onset dates within 40 days of cases’ onsets. Controls were 
frequency matched to cases by age and geographic location of residence. We interviewed both 
groups about exposures in their incubation period using a tailored questionnaire. We compared 
characteristics and carried out univariate and multivariate analysis to identify significant associations 
between consumption patterns and infection.  
Results  
The case-control study included 72 confirmed cases and 144 controls from SA and NSW. No 
association was identified between illness and consumption of tomatoes, raw cucumbers, potatoes, 
broccoli, limes, black pepper, milk, chicken or eggs prepared at home.  Consumption of beansprouts 
was reported by 40.6% (28/69) of cases and 9.7% (14/144) of controls (unadjusted OR 6.3, 95% CI 
3.0-13.2), with consumption of mung bean sprouts specifically reported by 40.6% (28/69) of cases 
and 4.3% (6/140) of controls (unadjusted OR 14.6, 95% CI 5.9-39.4).  
Conclusion  
S. Saintpaul infection was strongly associated with consumption of mung bean sprouts. Sprouts are a
known high-risk food for bacterial contamination due to unique aspects of their production, and
have been the source of many past outbreaks of Salmonella. It is imperative that sprout producers
adhere to stringent hygiene process during production to minimise the risks of contamination.
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Introduction 
Salmonella enterica is a common cause of outbreaks of acute gastroenteritis and is usually 
transmitted by contaminated food. Salmonella affects people of all ages, but rates are particularly 
high in young children. Salmonella infections may be particularly severe in the elderly, 
immunosuppressed and in pregnant women12. Symptoms usually last 3-7 days and include 
diarrhoea, fever, headache, abdominal pain and myalgia. Asymptomatic infection may also occur, 
and approximately 1% of infected adults and 5% of infected children aged under 5 will excrete 
Salmonella for greater than a year12, 13.  
Common sources of Salmonella infection include undercooked poultry or raw or undercooked eggs; 
as well as via cross-contamination to other foods that may not be cooked before eating via contact 
with contaminated food, food surfaces or utensils. Raw produce is also increasingly recognised as a 
vehicle for transmission of infection14. Australia has seen an increase in gastroenteritis outbreaks 
associated with fresh fruit and vegetables over recent years, as have other developed countries15. 
Fresh produce associated outbreaks can pose challenges due to their ability to be widely and quickly 
distributed geographically, including crossing state and international borders15, 16.  
S. Saintpaul accounted for 4.5% of national annual salmonellosis notifications in 2015 (unpublished
data). Queensland is traditionally the jurisdiction with the highest proportion of S. Saintpaul cases in
Australia. In 2011, Queensland accounted for 53.0% (215/406) of all cases of S. Saintpaul notified in
Australia17. Known reservoirs of S. Saintpaul include reptiles, amphibians, wallabies and kangaroos,
and in Australia it has been detected in a variety of environmental samples18, 19.  Foodborne
outbreaks with this Salmonella serotype in Australia have previously been associated with the
consumption of contaminated water and rockmelon, and an overseas outbreak implicated bean
sprout seeds produced in Australia1, 19, 20.  Internationally, S. Saintpaul outbreaks have been
attributed to the consumption of jalapeno peppers, bean sprouts, cucumbers, paprika and mangoes
20-22.
During December 2015, an increase in Salmonella Saintpaul (S. Saintpaul) notifications was detected 
through routine surveillance in New South Wales (NSW), South Australia (SA) and the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT). In April 2016, a substantial increase in notifications of S. Saintpaul in the 
Northern Territory (NT) was identified and they were retrospectively and prospectively added to the 
outbreak investigation. 
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Methods 
Study objectives 
A coordinated epidemiological investigation was launched in December 2015 order to: 
1. Determine whether the increase in notifications across multiple jurisdictions were linked
2. Identify the source of the illness
3. Control the source of the outbreak
The epidemiological investigation had three main phases: a hypothesis-generation phase to identify 
a possible source from food histories of cases; a hypothesis-testing phase involving a case-control 
study using SA and NSW cases; and a post case-case study period of monitoring to assess if there 
was an ongoing risk to public health.  
Hypothesis generation   
A confirmed outbreak case was initially defined as: 
Any resident of NSW, SA or ACT with laboratory-confirmed S Saintpaul infection with 
specimen collection on or after 1 December 2015 to date.  
As the outbreak continued and following an expert advisory committee recommendation, whole 
genome sequencing (WGS) was included in the case definition from February 2016 onwards. Cases 
that had occurred previously were retroactively sequenced. Cases who otherwise met the case 
definition but did not have isolates sent for WGS were classified as probable cases.  
Cases from NSW, SA and ACT were interviewed within their jurisdictions by public health staff using 
the OzFoodNet national Salmonella hypothesis-generating and trawling questionnaire. This 
questionnaire asks what people ate in the 7 days before they become unwell and consists of an 
open-ended food history as well as specific yes/no questions for over 200 individual food items. 
These interviews suggested a fresh produce item, possibly onions, might be the source of infection. 
The results from the hypothesis-generating questionnaires conducted between December 2015 and 
March 2016 were compared with consumption frequency rates obtained from the Victorian food 
consumption database. This is a database of food histories from well people living in Victoria, and 
was used to provide some indication of what “normal” consumption patterns might be. The analysis 
was seasonally adjusted to cover the same time period as cases were reported (the summer months 
of 2015-2016). We generated odds ratios using these as estimated background rates to identify 
foods that appeared to be consumed more frequently among cases than among the wider 
population.  
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Case-control study  
In March 2016, a multi-jurisdictional frequency-matched case-control study was initiated to test the 
hypothesis that Salmonella Saintpaul infection was associated with the consumption of fresh 
produce items. Food items were selected for inclusion based on data collected in the hypothesis-
generating phase of the investigation. Although fresh produce (particularly onions) emerged as a 
possible vehicle there was no obvious suspect food identified; thus, the following items were 
included in the development of a targeted questionnaire:  
• Foods with an elevated odds ratio where the p-value was <0.05 when compared with
consumption rates among the Victorian community participants
• Foods where the frequency of consumptions was >60% amongst cases interviewed during
the hypothesis-generating phase of the investigation
Case definition  
We defined a case for the purposes of the case-control study as: 
Isolation of the outbreak strain on WGS of S. Saintpaul from a faecal specimen in an individual who: 
1. Experienced acute onset of gastroenteritis* since with onset between 16 March and 17
April 2016, AND
2. Was resident in or visited ACT, NSW or SA within 7 days prior to illness onset
*Gastroenteritis was defined as diarrhoea consisting of three or more loose bowel
motions in a 24 hours period
Cases were excluded from the study if they: 
• Were found to have a different sequence to the outbreak on whole genome sequencing as
determined by the reference laboratory
• Could not be reached after 6 attempts to contact them, spread over 3 days
• Were unable to recall the date that their diarrhoea began (onset date)
• Were unable to answer questions (e.g. dementia) or need an interpreter
• Were not interviewed within 40 days of collection of a faecal specimen
• Had an enteric pathogen other than S. Saintpaul isolated in or detected in their stool
specimen
• had another member of the household who had an onset of diarrhoea in the 2 weeks prior
to the onset of diarrhoea in the laboratory-confirmed case selected for the study
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• Returned from travelling overseas within the 7 days prior to onset of their illness or to
another state other than NSW, SA and ACT
• Resided in an institution, such as an aged care facility.
The protocol and questionnaire from the study are included in the appendix (ppendix 3 and 4). 
Recruitment of cases and controls  
Cases were identified through routine passive notifications to jurisdiction based surveillance systems. 
Controls were selected from notifications of S. Typhimurium in NSW and/or Campylobacter in SA. S. 
We selected S. Typhimurium and Campylobacter controls since these pathogens are typically 
associated with chicken and egg consumption rather than fresh produce. Controls were selected from 
the same broad age groups as cases (aged <15 years, 15-40 years and 40+ years) and from the same 
local government area (LGA). If a control was unable to be found in the LGA as a case, a control was 
selected from an LGA that had previously reported cases of S. Saintpaul. Using red onions as the 
hypothesis, 51 cases and 102 controls was the target sample size in total to detect an odds ratio of 
3.0 assuming 17% consumption rates of red onions among controls (as identified in the Victorian 
community database). 
Cases and controls were asked whether they had consumed ham, bacon, salami, carrots, tomatoes, 
onions, bean sprouts, raw cucumbers, salad mixes, chili, potatoes, broccoli, limes, peaches, bananas, 
pepper, milk, eggs or prepared raw chicken at home in the 7 days prior to diarrhoea onset. A 7-day 
incubation period was selected given longer incubation periods identified in previous outbreaks28 
and the potential for missing an exposure with low inoculum if a shorter incubation period was used. 
Cases were excluded if there was no diarrhoea or no clear onset date. For fruit and vegetable items, 
further information including sub-types (e.g. Roma or cherry tomatoes) was asked. For each food 
item consumed, we collected data on time and place of purchase in NSW, although not in SA.  
During the period of the case-control study there were no cases in ACT. Both NSW and SA 
interviewed the cases and controls resident within their borders, and de-identified responses were 
entered into a single Epi-infoTM database for analysis.   
Statistical analysis  
Statistical analyses were initially conducted using Epi-infoTM version 7, and confirmed using Stata 
version 14.1. Case and control demographic details were compared using Pearson’s F2 test. We used 
univariate analysis to calculate crude odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals for all exposures. We 
constructed a maximum-likelihood logistic regression model using sequential backward elimination 
for all variables significantly associated with illness in the univariate analysis (p-value <0.05), and 
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including age group and sex. For items that were statistically significant we included the parent 
category in the model rather than the sub-category (e.g. “carrots” was used instead of “raw 
carrots”) with the exception of bean sprouts, where mung bean sprouts was used as the variable. 
Stratified analysis was carried out on the variables of red onions, eggs eaten outside the home and 
mung bean sprouts using Mantel-Haenszel weighted odds ratio to further investigate the relationship 
between significant variables and examine for potential confounding or effect modification.  
Ethics  
As this was considered an investigation of public health importance, clearance from a Human 
Research Ethics Committee (HREC) was not required to be obtained. Participation in the study was 
voluntary and verbal consent was obtained. Retention of information regarding cases and controls is 
maintained in accordance with relevant privacy legislation.  
Results 
Between 1 December 2015 and 31 August 2016, there were 376 confirmed or probable outbreak 
cases notified across Australia, including 237 from South Australia, 77 from NSW, 56 from the 
Northern Territory and 6 from the ACT (Figure 1).  Of these 376 cases, 239 were confirmed and 137 
were probable cases. Females accounted for 59.6% of confirmed and probable cases. Cases ranged 
from 0-95 years with a median age of 32 years; 28% of cases were aged between 25 and 34 years of 
age.  
Hypothesis generation  
The food items that were reported consumed most frequently included carrots (88%), milk (86%), 
onions (81%), tomatoes (81%), potatoes (79%), black pepper (74%) and cucumber (72%). When 
compared with community consumption rates among Victorian participants in a community survey 
conducted in 2015, red onion, beansprouts, brown onions, limes, chili, bacon, salad mix and peaches 
were all consumed at rates higher than expected (p<0.05). However, no clear hypothesis was 
identified prior to the commencement of the case-control study.  
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Figure 1 - Notifications of Salmonella Saintpaul by calculated onset date for ACT, NSW, NT and SA, Australia, 1 December 2015 to 31 August 2016 
Calculated onset date was based on the recalled onset date for cases who were interviewed, or the specimen collection date for cases who were not interviewed
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Case-control study  
The case-control study was conducted between 10 March and 24 May 2016. 72 consecutive cases 
with the outbreak strain and 144 frequency-matched controls with onsets within 40 days of the case 
were recruited. There was a higher proportion of females in the case group (61.1%) compared to the 
control group (52.1%); however, this difference was not statistically significant.  
Table 1 – Characteristics of cases and controls recruited into the Salmonella Saintpaul study, 
Australia, 10 March – 24 May 2016 
Characteristic Cases Controls P value 
N % N % 
Age (years) 
    < 15   8 11.1 14 9.7 0.95 
15-40 34 47.2 69 47.9 
    40+ 30 41.7 61 12.4 
Jurisdiction 
   NSW 10 13.9 20 13.9 - 
    SA 62 86.1 124 86.1 
Sex 
    Female 44 61.1 75 52.1 0.21 
    Male 28 38.9 69 47.9 
Total 72 144 
Univariate analysis 
In univariate analysis, cases were significantly more likely to have reported consuming bean sprouts 
(OR 6.3, 95% CI 3.0-13.2) and particularly mung bean sprouts (OR 15.2, 95% CI 5.9-39.4) during the 
7-day exposure period compared with controls. Other significant exposures associated with an
elevated odds ratio among cases included carrots, chili, salami, red onions, ham, four leaf salad mix
and eggs eaten outside the home (Table 2). The full univariate analysis results for all exposures are
included in ppendix 1.
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Table 2 – Food items with elevated odds of exposure among cases of Salmonella Saintpaul 
infection: case-control study, Australia, 10 March- 24 May 2016 
Exposure name Cases Controls OR 95% CI p-value
Bean sprouts 28/69 40.6% 14/144 9.7% 6.3 3.0 - 13.2 <0.001 
Mung bean sprouts 28/69 40.6% 6/140 4.3% 15.2 5.9 - 39.4 <0.001 
Bagged carrots  33/71 46.5% 35/134 26.1% 2.5 1.3 - 4.5 0.003 
Eggs away from home 20/67 29.8% 21/140 15.0% 2.4 1.2 - 4.8 0.012 
Other carrots  7/59 11.9% 4/136 2.9% 4.4 1.2 - 15.8 0.020 
Other chili  15/66 22.7% 14/134 10.4% 2.5 1.1 - 5.6 0.020 
Chili 29/71 40.8% 35/138 25.4% 2.0 1.1 - 3.7 0.021 
Other salami  8/69 11.6% 4/140 2.9% 4.5 1.3 - 15.4 0.022 
Raw carrots 43/72 59.7% 61/140 43.6% 1.9 1.1 - 3.4 0.026 
Red onions  21/69 30.4% 23/134 17.2% 2.1 1.1 - 4.2 0.030 
Ham 34/68 50.0% 47/136 34.6% 1.9 1.0 - 3.4 0.034 
Other ham 8/58 13.8% 7/136 5.1% 2.9 1.0 - 8.6 0.039 
Dried chili  7/68 10.3% 4/136 2.9% 3.8 1.1 - 13.4 0.045 
Four-leaf salad mix 14/68 20.6% 14/135 10.4% 2.2 1.0 - 5.0 0.046 
* OR – odds ratio; CI – confidence interval
* “Other” indicated not otherwise specified in the questionnaire – e.g. “other carrots” could include carrots that
were not purchased bagged or loose, but consumed in some other form e.g. in a purchased salad
Multivariate regression  
The final model included ham, salami, carrots, red onions, mung bean sprouts, four leaf salad, chili, 
and eggs eaten away from home, adjusted for age and sex as matching variables. Consumption of 
mung bean sprouts (OR 18.4, 95% CI 5.36-63.25), red onions (OR 3.4, 95%CI 1.26-8.96) and eggs 
eaten outside the home (OR 2.8, 95% CI 1.10-7.24) were the only items that remained significantly 
associated with infection in the final model. The full model is shown in ppendix 2.  
Stratified analysis 
A stratified analysis was done on the key exposure categories of bean sprouts, red onions and eggs 
outside the home to further explore the association between mung bean sprouts, red onion and 
eggs outside the home that was seen in the multivariate analysis (Table 3). When looking at only 
those cases and controls who consumed any bean sprouts, no exposure was statistically 
significantly associated with infection. Among those cases and controls who did NOT consume any 
bean sprouts, red onions (OR 2.36, 95%CI 1.03-5.41) and eggs away from home (OR 2.47, 95% CI 
1.08-5.66) were associated with infection. The Mantel-Haenszel weighted odds ratio for mung 
beans (stratified by red onion) was 16.5 and for mung beans (stratified by eggs) was 16.6.  
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Table 3 – Stratified analysis of selected food items consumed by cases and controls 
Exposure name Cases Controls OR 95% CI p-value
DID consume MUNG bean sprouts 
    Red onions 9/27 33.3% 1/5 20.0% 2.00 0.19-20.61 1.000 
    Eggs away from home 5/25 20.0% 1/5 20.0% 1.00 0.09-11.03 1.000 
DID NOT consume MUNG bean sprouts 
    Red onions 12/39 30.8% 20/126 15.9% 2.36 1.03-5.41 0.034 
    Eggs away from home 12/39 30.8% 20/131 15.3% 2.47 1.08-5.66 0.030 
DID consume eggs outside the home 
    Mung bean sprouts 5/17 29.4% 1/21 4.8% 8.33 0.87-80.12 0.071 
    Red onions 6/19 31.6% 2/19 10.5% 3.92 0.68-22.71 0.232 
DID NOT consume eggs outside the home 
    Mung bean sprouts 20/47 42.6% 4/115 3.5% 20.56 6.49-65.11 <0.001 
    Red onions  14/46 30.4% 20/112 17.9% 2.01 0.91-4.45 0.081 
DID consume red onion 
    Mung bean sprouts 9/21 42.9% 1/21 4.8% 15.00 1.68-133.56 0.009 
    eggs away from home 6/20 30.0% 2/22 9.1% 4.29 0.75-24.42 0.122 
DID NOT consume red onion 
    Mung bean sprouts  18/45 40.0% 4/110 3.6% 17.67 5.52-56.52 <0.001 
    Eggs away from home 13/45 28.9% 17/109 15.6% 2.20 0.96-5.02 0.058 
* OR – odds ratio; CI – confidence interval
Discussion 
This was the largest documented Salmonella outbreak associated with bean sprouts in Australia. It 
affected multiple states and territories and continued for over 6 months due to the challenges in 
identifying the source of infection. This outbreak once more highlighted the well-recognised risks 
associated with consumption of sprouts, in this case mung bean sprouts, as well as the difficulties 
involved in investigating sprout-associated outbreaks.  
Seed sprouts have been associated with over 50 foodborne outbreaks around the world over the 
past three decades1-3, 5, 7-11, 23, 24. A variety of sprout varieties have been implicated in previous 
outbreaks, most commonly alfalfa, but also mung bean, radish, fenugreek and clover sprouts; these 
outbreaks have included multiple serotypes of Salmonella enterica as well as pathogenic E. coli9, 25. 
Two of the largest and most serious foodborne outbreaks documented in the literature were due to 
enterohaemorrhagic E. coli contaminated bean sprouts: an outbreak in Europe, the US and Canada 
affecting 4321 people in 16 countries with 50 deaths attributed to contaminated fenugreek sprouts, 
and an outbreak primarily among Japanese schoolchildren attributed to white radish sprouts in 1996 
resulted in 9,451 cases and 12 deaths26, 27.  
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Mung bean sprout-associated outbreaks are less common than alfalfa sprout-associated outbreaks. 
Possible reasons for few outbreaks being associated with mung bean sprouts include the fact that 
mung bean sprouts are often cooked (for example, in Asian dishes), and that consumption of mung 
bean sprouts may not be easily recalled by patients. They may also not be inquired about during an 
investigation28. 
Sprout consumption has been increasing globally due to their widespread availability, high 
nutritional content and perceived health benefit; however, consumer awareness of the risks 
associated with sprout consumption is frequently low24, 29. Sprouts remain a high-risk food for 
several reasons. Pathogens can be internalised within the seed and reside inside sprout tissues, 
meaning that surface sanitation and washing in the absence of cooking is insufficient to render the 
sprout safe for consumption25, 30.  The germination and sprouting process, involving soaking in water 
and being placed in warm and humid conditions, provides optimal conditions for bacterial growth29. 
Contamination of sprouts can occur at any stage of the production process including during seed 
production, storage and distribution, sprout germination and growth, or during sprout harvest, 
packaging and distribution (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 - Simplified sprout production process31, 32 
A review by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that in most outbreaks caused 
by sprout products, the seeds used for sprouting were suspected to be the primary source of 
contamination5, 33. This is a cause for concern as seeds remain viable for years, so they may be 
transported long distances and stored for some time prior to sprouting9. Salmonella has been 
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demonstrated to remain viable on alfalfa seeds in dark storage for two years34. Australian-produced 
sprout seed has frequently been a source of sprout-associated outbreaks overseas1, 2, 35. In a US 
study into sprout-associated outbreaks occurring in the US between 1998-2010, among 13 outbreaks 
caused by imported seeds Australia was the most frequently identified source of imported seeds for 
Salmonella outbreaks (responsible for outbreaks of Salmonella Kottbus, Bovismorbificans, and 
Oranienburg) and was source of all identified STEC-associated outbreaks9.  
Compared with other foodborne-disease outbreaks, sprout-associated outbreaks tend to be larger 
and more likely to involve multiple geographical regions (whether states or countries) 9. A US study 
found sprouts were responsible for eight percent of multistate foodborne disease outbreaks in the 
USA, the fourth most common vehicle after fruits, vegetable row crops and beef36. In this S Saintpaul 
outbreak, cases were widely dispersed with clusters of cases occurring in December 2015 and March 
2016 followed by a large peak in April 2016. Although the source of cases in South Australia and 
Northern Territory was traced to a sprouter in Adelaide, this did not account for the cases in NSW or 
the ACT, as the implicated producer did not supply to either of these states. However, the cases 
were known to be part of the same outbreak due to the use of WGS in confirming outbreak cases. In 
this outbreak, the temporal and geographic clustering of cases suggested that a contaminated seed 
batch as the source of the outbreak (although this was not proved based on environmental testing), 
and this is further supported by the literature demonstrating seeds as the primary source for most 
outbreaks. The explosive nature of the outbreak in South Australia was possibly due to poor 
practices in the sprouting facility that allowed amplification of the outbreak.  
In our outbreak, cases were predominantly adult women, which has been noted in several previous 
sprout-related outbreaks2-4, 7, 23, 37. This suggests that in an outbreak in which there is no clear source 
and which primarily women and middle-aged adults are affected, a fresh produce source and 
specifically sprouts should be suspected. It is possible that women have different eating habits to 
men and are more likely to eat salad-type items. Additionally, in this outbreak as in previous sprout-
related outbreaks, more than half of cases did not recall eating sprouts. Sprouts are often used as 
garnish or side dishes, or are served mixed with other food items in dishes such as Asian rolls, which 
makes them difficult to remember by patients and renders them classical “stealth” vehicles10, 38 
The case-case study design was used in this outbreak as a convenient way of recruiting controls. 
Case-case studies are not frequently used, although this is changing. In Australia in 2016 they were 
utilised for three multi-jurisdictional Salmonella outbreaks, with the source successfully identified in 
all three. The case-case study design offers two key advantages over traditional control selection: it 
provides a convenient control source in a setting in which developments of new technologies have 
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rendered traditional control selection methods obsolete (e.g. single digit changes to phone 
numbers); it also helped reduce bias and improve response to the questionnaire from controls16. 
Study li mitations 
The case-controls study conducted during this outbreak had several limitations. One was an 
emerging lack of appropriate controls to match with the S Saintpaul cases, particularly in South 
Australia where the outbreak became so explosive that there were insufficient S. Typhimurium 
controls available requiring recruitment of Campylobacter controls instead. This may have 
introduced selection bias, particularly if the Campylobacter controls were different from the S. 
Typhimurium controls. This would be an important consideration in future outbreaks. However, the 
use of these as controls also had the benefit of reducing recall bias, as both cases and controls had a 
clear date of onset of illness, and a similar probability of recalling what they had eaten in the week 
prior.     
Cases and controls were also interviewed by different interviewers in different states. This could 
have led to differences in the way the questionnaire was administered and the degree of probing, 
leading to the potential for information ascertainment to be systematically different between states. 
In addition, once the hypothesis of bean sprouts became clear there was the potential for 
interviewers to ask more probing questions about bean sprouts than other exposures, potentially 
overestimating the association between bean sprouts and infection. We attempt to adjust for this by 
having a clear and prescriptive protocol, and by providing an initial orientation to the questionnaire 
with all interviewers.  
We initially included in the questionnaire all foods where the frequency of consumptions was >60%. 
In hindsight, given the investigation eventually identified the “stealth” food of sprouts with a 
consumption rate of only 40%, in the absence of microbiological or environmental evidence of the 
source of infection this could have implied that the true vehicle was not something that had been 
enquired about on the questionnaire that was also a “stealth” food (for example other garnish such 
as coriander).   
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Conclusion 
In this outbreak, S. Saintpaul infection was strongly associated with consumption of mung bean 
sprouts. Bean sprouts are a known high-risk food, given they are not typically cooked before 
consumption and are grown in an environment that provide optimal conditions for bacterial 
growth. To prevent future outbreaks, it is essential that sprout producers adhere to stringent 
hygiene process during production to minimise the risks of contamination. Given the inability of the 
production process to completely eliminate the risk of contamination, consumers should also be 
educated about the potential risks of consuming bean sprouts to enable them to make an informed 
choice. Bean sprout-associated outbreaks and those caused by "stealth" foods remain challenging 
to investigate, and case-case studies can be invaluable epidemiological tool in identify potential 
suspect food items. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 – full univariate analysis 
Table 4 – Association between all food items included in the questionnaire and Salmonella 
Saintpaul infection: case-control study, Australia 24 March – 10 May 2016 
Exposure name 
Cases Controls 
OR 95% CI p-value
N % N % 
Ham 34/68 50.0% 47/136 34.6% 1.89 1.05-3.42 0.034 
- Pre-packaged 7/64 10.9% 9/136 6.6% 1.73 0.61-4.88 0.294 
- Deli ham 22/65 33.8% 31/136 2.8% 1.73 0.90-3.32 0.096 
- Other 8/58 13.8% 7/136 5.1% 2.95 1.02-8.56 0.039 
Bacon 33/70 47.1% 50/135 37.0% 1.52 0.84-2.72 0.162 
- Pre-packaged 11/64 17.2% 19/137 13.9% 1.29 0.57-2.90 0.538 
- Deli bacon 13/65 20.0% 22/135 16.3% 1.28 0.60-2.75 0.519 
- Other 9/66 13.6% 13/129 10.1% 1.41 0.57-3.49 0.457 
Salami 16/71 22.5% 19/142 13.4% 1.88 0.90-3.94 0.089 
- Pre-packaged 3/70 4.3% 5/141 3.5% 1.22 0.28-5.25 1.000 
- Deli salami 6/69 8.7% 11/141 7.8% 1.13 0.40-3.18 0.823 
- Other 8/69 11.6% 4/140 2.9% 4.46 1.29-15.37 0.022 
Raw carrots 43/72 59.7% 61/140 43.6% 1.92 1.08-3.42 0.026 
- Bagged 33/71 46.5% 35/134 26.1% 2.46 1.34-4.50 0.003 
- Loose 7/70 10.0% 10/134 7.5% 1.38 0.50-3.79 0.534 
- Pre-made salad or sandwich 10/71 14.1% 16/138 11.6% 1.25 0.54-2.92 0.605 
- Other 7/59 11.9% 4/136 2.9% 4.44 1.25-15.81 0.020 
Tomatoes 49/72 62.1% 89/143 62.2% 1.29 0.71-2.35 0.401 
- Truss 24/68 35.3% 33/135 24.4% 1.69 0.89-3.18 0.104 
- Roma 5/67 7.5% 14/136 10.3% 0.70 0.24-2.04 0.515 
- Cherry 12/69 17.4% 31/138 22.5% 0.73 0.35-1.52 0.396 
- Grape 2/71 2.8% 7/134 5.2% 0.53 0.11-2.60 0.722 
- General 14/70 20.0% 32/138 23.2% 0.83 0.41-1.68 0.601 
- Pre-made salad or sandwich 7/69 10.1% 12/129 9.3% 1.10 0.41-2.94 0.848 
- Other 4/56 7.1% 8/119 6.7% 1.07 0.31-3.71 1.000 
Raw onions 29/72 40.3% 44/138 31.9% 1.44 0.80-2.60 0.225 
- Brown 5/71 7.0% 13/139 9.3% 0.73 0.25-2.15 0.572 
- Red 21/69 30.4% 23/134 17.2% 2.11 1.07-4.17 0.030 
- White 1/70 1.4% 6/138 4.3% 0.32 0.04-2.70 0.427 
- Salad onions 0/70 0.0% 1/139 0.7% 0.00 - 1.000
- Spring onions 8/71 11.3% 9/139 6.5% 1.83 0.68-4.98 0.228
- Pre-made salad or sandwich 7/68 10.3% 6/130 4.6% 2.37 0.76-7.36 0.126
- Other 0/55 0.0% 1/110 0.9% 0.00 - 1.000
Bean sprouts 28/69 40.6% 14/144 9.7% 6.34 3.05-13.18 0.000
- Mung bean sprouts 28/69 40.6% 6/140 4.3% 15.25 5.91-39.38 0.000
- Alfalfa sprouts 2/69 2.9% 2/139 1.4% 2.04 0.28-14.83 0.601
- Pre-made salad or sandwich 2/69 2.9% 2/140 1.4% 2.06 0.28-14.94 0.600
- Other 0/60 0.0% 2/134 1.5% 0.00 - 1.000
Raw cucumbers 47/71 66.2% 80/139 57.5% 1.44 0.80-2.62 0.226
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- Lebanese 15/68 22.1% 29/137 21.2% 1.05 0.52-2.13 0.884 
- Continental/ telegraph 30/68 44.1% 53/133 39.8% 1.19 0.66-2.15 0.561 
- Pre-made salad or sandwich 8/66 12.12% 14/134 10.4% 1.18 0.47-2.98 0.722 
- Other 4/59 6.8% 2/123 1.6% 4.40 0.78-24.75 0.088 
Salad #N/A 
- Crunchy salad mix 6/70 8.6% 7/140 5.0% 1.78 0.58-5.52 0.311 
- Baby spinach 12/68 17.6% 25/137 18.2% 0.96 0.45-2.05 0.916 
- Rocket 4/70 5.7% 14/139 10.1% 0.54 0.17-1.71 0.434 
- Greek/Mediterranean salad mix 3/71 4.2% 4/139 2.9% 1.49 0.32-6.84 0.691 
- Coleslaw/dry slaw 6/71 8.4% 12/137 8.8% 0.96 0.35-2.68 0.940 
- Four-leaf salad mix 14/68 20.6% 14/135 10.4% 2.24 1.00-5.02 0.046 
- Any other lettuce mix 6/71 8.4% 12/143 8.4% 1.01 0.36-2.81 0.988 
- Any other pre-packaged salad 9/68 13.2% 11/140 7.9% 1.79 0.70-4.55 0.217 
Chili 29/71 40.8% 35/138 25.4% 2.03 1.11-3.74 0.021 
- Fresh 11/69 15.9% 21/134 15.7% 1.02 0.46-2.26 0.960 
- Dried 7/68 10.3% 4/136 2.9% 3.79 1.07-13.42 0.045 
- Other 15/66 22.7% 14/134 10.4% 2.52 1.13-5.60 0.020 
Potatoes 50/71 70.4% 116/142 81.7% 0.53 0.27-1.04 0.062 
- Red 6/66 9.1% 17/130 13.1% 0.66 0.25-1.77 0.413 
- White 37/66 56.1% 93/138 67.4% 0.62 0.34-1.13 0.115 
- Other 11/59 18.6% 25/119 21.0% 0.86 0.39-1.90 0.712 
Broccoli 43/71 60.6% 79/142 55.6% 1.22 0.69-2.19 0.493 
- Fresh 36/69 52.2% 61/138 44.2% 1.38 0.77-2.46 0.279 
- Frozen 4/69 5.8% 11/137 8.0% 0.70 0.22-2.30 0.778 
- Broccolini 6/69 8.7% 13/137 9.5% 0.91 0.33-2.50 0.853 
- Other 1/62 1.6% 2/123 1.6% 0.99 0.09-11.16 1.000 
Limes 14/72 19.4% 16/143 11.2% 1.92 0.88-4.19 0.099 
- Bagged 3/70 4.3% 2/136 1.5% 3.00 0.49-18.39 0.339 
- Loose 10/70 14.3% 10/141 7.1% 2.18 0.86-5.52 0.093 
- Other 3/67 4.5% 4/136 2.9% 1.55 0.34-7.12 0.687 
Peaches 14/72 19.4% 18/144 12.5% 1.69 0.79-3.63 0.176 
- Yellow 7/69 10.1% 13/143 9.1% 1.13 0.43-2.97 0.806 
- White 6/69 8.7% 4/142 2.8% 3.29 0.90-12.05 0.083 
- Other 4/65 6.1% 4/140 2.9% 2.23 0.54-9.21 0.267 
Bananas 36/71 50.7% 95/142 66.9% 0.51 0.28-0.91 0.022 
- Regular/Cavendish 35/70 50.0% 93/142 65.5% 0.53 0.29-0.94 0.030 
- Other 0/50 0.0% 4/105 3.8% 0.00 - 0.306
Black pepper 42/71 59.1% 95/143 66.4% 0.73 0.41-1.32 0.296 
- Whole 34/69 49.3% 68/136 50.0% 0.97 0.54-1.73 0.922 
- Ground 9/68 13.2% 30/134 22.4% 0.53 0.24-1.19 0.119 
- Other 0/60 0.0% 1/123 0.8% 0.00 - 1.000
Milk 60/72 83.3% 127/144 88.2% 0.67 0.30-1.49 0.323 
- Full cream 33/67 49.2% 69/136 50.7% 0.94 0.52-1.69 0.843 
- Skim 24/64 37.5% 43/134 32.1% 1.27 0.68-2.37 0.452 
- Other 14/59 23.7% 28/130 21.5% 1.13 0.55-2.35 0.737 
Chicken purchased raw and prepared
at home
46/72 63.9% 94/140 67.1% 0.87 0.48-1.57 0.636 
- Whole chicken 8/67 11.9% 10/138 7.2% 1.74 0.65-4.62 0.265 
- Chicken pieces 42/70 60.0% 82/136 60.3% 0.99 0.55-1.78 0.967 
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- Other 2/60 3.3% 13/131 9.9% 0.31 0.07-1.43 0.152 
Eggs at home 54/72 75.0% 98/142 69.0% 1.35 0.71-2.56 0.362 
- Free range 39/68 57.3% 69/133 51.9% 1.25 0.69-2.25 0.462 
- Barn laid 4/66 6.1% 3/121 2.5% 2.54 0.55-11.70 0.245 
- Caged eggs 4/64 6.2% 14/123 11.4% 0.52 0.16-1.65 0.307 
- Other 10/59 16.9% 11/115 9.6% 1.93 0.77-4.85 0.157 
Eggs away from home 20/67 29.8% 21/140 15.0% 2.41 1.20-4.85 0.012 
Cafés, restaurants, bars 43/69 62.3% 73/141 51.8% 1.54 0.86-2.77 0.149 
Bakeries 14/67 20.9% 23/140 16.4% 1.34 0.64-2.81 0.433 
Takeaways including service stations,
fast food outlets
38/68 55.9% 66/141 46.8% 1.44 0.80-2.58 0.219 
Social gatherings 14/68 20.6% 20/140 14.3% 1.56 0.73-3.31 0.249 
Appendix 2: Multivariate analysis: logistic regression model 
Figure 3 – Logistic regression, selected food items, age and sex: case-control study, Australia 24 
March – 10 May 2016 
_cons     .1720197   .0992263    -3.05   0.002     .0555365    .5328164
eggs_away_~e      2.81813    1.35684     2.15   0.031     1.096818    7.240814
chili     1.375228    .613367     0.71   0.475     .5737587     3.29625
fourleafsa~x     1.536215   .8503383     0.78   0.438     .5191445     4.54586
mungbeansp~1     18.40955   11.59275     4.63   0.000 5.35833    63.24946
 red_onions1     3.363949   1.681056     2.43   0.015     1.263226    8.958139
     carrots     1.006498   .4207958     0.02   0.988     .4435508    2.283929
     salami1     .7302877   .4353851    -0.53   0.598 .226998    2.349448
ham      1.52062   .6675458     0.95   0.340     .6432008    3.594964
sex     1.244882   .5177123     0.53   0.598     .5509815    2.812675
age     .9921084   .0103516    -0.76   0.448     .9720257    1.012606
 casecontrol   Odds Ratio   Std. Err. z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
Log likelihood = -80.264971 Pseudo R2 =     0.2387
Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
LR chi2(10) = 50.33
Logistic regression Number of obs     = 166
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Background 
During December 2015, a notable increase in Salmonella Saintpaul 
(S. Saintpaul) notifications was detected through routine surveillance in 
NSW, SA and ACT. As at 3 March 2016, a total of 146 notifications for 
S.Saintpaul have been received across the three jurisdictions since 1
December 2015.
S. Saintpaul is a relatively uncommon Salmonella serotype in Australia,
accounting for 3.3% of national annual salmonellosis notifications in
2011. Queensland is traditionally the jurisdiction with the highest
proportion of S.Saintpaul cases in Australia. NSW have seen a large
increase in S.Saintpaul notifications peaking in week 52 of 2015 and SA
have observed a peak in their notifications in week 3 of 2016 (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Salmonella Saintpaul notifications by month of diagnosis date and jurisdiction of 
residence, Australia, 1 Jan 2008- 29 Feb 2016 
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Foodborne outbreaks with this Salmonella serotype in Australia have 
previously been associated with the consumption of rockmelon and bean 
sprouts.  Internationally, S. Saintpaul outbreaks have been attributed to 
the consumption of jalapeno peppers, bean sprouts, cucumbers, paprika 
and mangoes (Appendix 1). 
Study Rationale 
Cases of Salmonella Saintpaul continue to occur in NSW, SA and ACT 
above expected levels. Hypothesis generating interviews indicate onions 
(amongst other vegetables) may be the source of these infections.  It is 
important to determine if there is an association between onion 
consumption and illness in order to prevent illness and inform future food 
safety measures.  
Study Hypotheses 
This study is designed to test the hypothesis that there is no association 
between S. Saintpaul and the following foods, using data collected in the 
hypothesis generating phase of this investigation 
- Foods with an elevated odds ratio where the p value was <0.05
- Foods where the frequency of consumption was >60%
Methods 
The study design is a case-case study, with investigators recruiting two 
cases of Salmonella Typhimurium (STM) for every case of Salmonella 
Saintpaul.  
Case Definition 
A case is a person who has: 
• Isolation of the outbreak sequence of Salmonella Saintpaul in an
individual who:
(a) experienced acute onset of gastroenteritis since 1 Dec 2015*, AND
(b) was resident in or visited ACT, NSW or SA within 7 days prior to
illness onset.
Questionnaire 
The case-case questionnaire contains questions on eligibility, consent and 
demographics, and structured questions on a limited range of fresh and 
frozen fruit and vegetables. Most questions will be designated as 
Yes/No/Unknown.  
55
Case Eligibility 
Investigators will recruit cases reported under State legislation. Cases will 
be excluded from the study if: 
• If they are found to have a different sequence to the outbreak.
• Cases cannot be reached after 6 attempts to contact them, spread over
3 days.
• Unable to recall the date that their diarrhoea began (onset date).
• They are unable to answer questions (eg Dementia) or need an
interpreter
• They are not interviewed within 40 days of collection of a faecal
specimen.
• Another enteric pathogen other than S. Saintpaul was isolated in or
detected in their stool specimen.
• If there has been another member of the household who has had an
onset of diarrhoea in the 2 weeks prior to the onset of diarrhoea in the
laboratory-confirmed case selected for the study.
• They have returned from travelling overseas within the 7 days prior to
onset of their illness or to another state other than NSW, SA and ACT.
• They reside in an institution, such as an aged care facility.
Enrolment of cases 
• As there is a delay in obtaining the whole genome sequencing (WGS)
results, Salmonella Saintpaul cases will be enrolled into the study and
interviewed. The case will later be excluded if they have a sequence
different to the outbreak sequence.
• As per standard surveillance guidelines, consent to contact the patient
or the patient’s parent or guardian for a child aged less than 18 years,
will be sought from the referring medical practitioner in NSW and ACT
or during the process of medical notification in SA.
• Cases will then be contacted, verbal consent obtained and questions
asked to determine eligibility. If eligible, interviewers will administer
the study questionnaire.
• It will be at the parent’s or guardian’s discretion as to whether a child
aged between 15 and 17 years is interviewed directly.  Information
from a child aged less than 15 years will be obtained from the parent
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or guardian who is most familiar with their dietary and behavioural 
lifestyle.   
• Cases will be interviewed by telephone by trained public health staff
as soon as possible after notification using a structured national case-
case questionnaire regarding their illness and food consumed in 5
days prior to their onset of illness.
• Cases will continue to be enrolled until a decision is made by the
investigation team to cease or the required sample size is reached.
Control Selection 
Investigators will select cases of STM (herein after referred to as 
“controls”), from a list provided by the OzFoodNet (OFN) 
Epidemiologist. Controls will be frequency matched by age group 
(<15 years, 15-40, 40+) and geographic location to the cases (LGA). 
If controls cannot be found within the same LGA then they can be 
selected from an LGA within the state that has previously had cases.  
Controls should have a specimen collection date within four weeks of the 
case. When more than two controls are available the ones with the closest 
onset date to the case should be tried first.  
Two controls will be interviewed per case. If interviewers are unsuccessful 
in speaking with a potential control after 6 attempts to contact them over 
3 days, they should move onto the next potential control.  
Bias associated with control group 
STM controls Comments 
Selection bias Cases and control-cases 
both identified through the 
same surveillance system 
Recall bias Reduced due to both 
groups experiencing some 
symptoms. 
Information bias 
Representative Selections of controls 
based on factors related to 
exposure – may not 
represent true exposure 
prevalence of larger 
population.  
Results will only be 
generalizable to STM 
control-cases, not the 
general population. 
57
STM controls Comments 
Interpretation of 
Odds ratio 
Measure of effect should 
be interpreted cautiously 
with regards to what 
group is being used as the 
comparison group 
Identification of 
new or unique risk 
factors 
Risk factors may be 
underestimated or not 
identified because present 
in both groups, but useful 
to generate hypotheses for 
other studies 
If analysis is done often, it 
may detect changes in risk 
factors not otherwise 
found 
NEPSS data from MDU 
and SA Pathology data 
have indicated there 
have been no recent 
STM isolates from fresh 
produce.   
If the source is chicken 
or eggs, we will be 
unlikely to detect this 
with the study design 
as MDU and SA 
Pathology data indicate 
there have been recent 
isolations of Salmonella 
Saintpaul in chicken 
meat and from chicken 
layer litter 
environment.  
System 
requirements 
Recruitment Cases and control-cases 
already in the routine 
surveillance system. 
Cost Minimal cost, as the cases 
and control-cases are 
already in the routine 
surveillance system. 
Timeframes Can be done quickly in an 
outbreak  
Control eligibility 
A control will be excluded from the investigation if: 
• They have already been interviewed as part of an outbreak
investigation
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• Controls cannot be reached after 6 attempts to contact them over 3
days.
• Unable to recall the date that their diarrhoea began (onset date).
• They are unable to answer questions (eg dementia) or need an
interpreter.
• They are not interviewed within 40 days of collection of a faecal
specimen.
• Another enteric pathogen other than S. Typhimurium was isolated in or
detected in their stool specimen.
• If there has been another member of the household who has had an
onset of diarrhoea in the 2 weeks prior to the onset of diarrhoea in the
laboratory-confirmed control-case selected for the study.
• They have returned from travelling overseas or interstate (other than
NSW, ACT, SA) within the 7 days prior to the onset of their diarrhoea.
• They reside in an institution, such as an aged care facility.
Case and control interviews 
Interviewers will follow specific introductions and prompts in the 
questionnaire. Cases and controls will be interviewed about their 
exposures to various foods in the seven days prior to onset of their 
illness. The exposure period includes the seven whole days prior to the 
onset of illness, along with the part day when the illness began. To assist 
with case and control recall, all interviewers should recommend to 
interviewees to have a calendar in front of them. 
Interviewers should make 6 attempts to contact both cases and controls 
for interview. At least 3 attempts should be made within normal business 
hours and 3 attempts outside business hours. If a person cannot be 
contacted an SMS can be sent if able or a message left on their phone. 
The outcomes of case and control interviews should be recorded for 
quality control assessment. 
Interviewers should not give details of specific hypotheses under study. 
Any request for information regarding Salmonella infection and potential 
sources should be given at the end of the interview. Interviewers may 
offer to send out standard public health information about Salmonella 
prepared by their local health department.  
As this is an outbreak investigation, results of the study may not be 
available publicly and their information can be accessed through a FOI 
process.  
If study subjects request information on the conduct of this study 
interviewers should indicate that it is an outbreak investigation of 
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Salmonella being conducted under the relevant jurisdictional public health 
legislation. 
Sample size 
Estimated sample sizes are based on the following assumptions: 
• Prevalence of eating onions 55%, brown onions 39%, red onions 17%.
among healthy community controls (obtained from Victorian Food
Frequency study)
• To detect an odds ratio of 2 to 4
• D=0.05,
• E=80%, and
• Study design is unmatched
Table 1: Numbers of cases and controls required to observe a statistically 
significant odds ratio of either 2 to 4 based on different fresh produce and 
their prevalence.  
If using any onions as the hypothesis: it has a frequency consumption of 
55%, therefore for an OR of 3 and 1:2 control ratio we would need 47 
cases and 94 controls. If we use the hypothesis of red onions, which has a 
frequency of consumption of 17%, an OR of 3 and a 1:2 control ratio we 
would need 51 cases and 102 controls. 
OR
Ratio cases:controls 1:1 1:2 1:3 1:1 1:2 1:3 1:1 1:2 1:3
Food Variable ID Prevalence
Fruit_PawPaw VAR420 2% 1221 875 758 412 288 246 231 159 134
Fruit_Exotic VAR429 2% 1221 875 758 412 288 246 231 159 134
Veg_Beansprout_Any VAR327 6% 438 316 274 151 107 92 87 61 52
Veg_Capsicum_Other_Any VAR207 6% 438 316 274 151 107 92 87 61 52
Veg_Onion_Brown_Raw VAR233 7% 382 276 240 133 94 81 76 54 46
Fruit_Limes VAR401 8% 341 246 214 119 85 73 69 48 41
Veg_Onion_Red_Raw VAR239 10% 283 205 179 100 71 62 58 41 35
Veg_Chill i_Any VAR213 15% 208 151 132 75 54 47 45 32 28
Veg_Onion_Red_Any VAR236 17% 191 139 122 70 51 44 42 30 26
DeliMeat_Bacon_Any VAR118 31% 140 104 91 55 41 36 35 26 23
Veg_Saladmix_Any VAR330 31% 140 104 91 55 41 36 35 26 23
Veg_Mush_Any VAR359 37% 134 100 88 54 40 36 35 26 23
Veg_Onion_Brown_Any VAR230 39% 133 99 88 54 40 36 35 26 23
Veg_Onion VAR229 55% 143 108 97 62 47 42 42 32 29
2.00 3.00 4.00
No. of cases
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Public health follow-up 
As part of this study, interviewers may identify cases that work in 
occupations with a higher likelihood of transmitting Salmonella to other 
people, such as health care workers, child-care workers or food handlers. 
If cases work in these occupations they should be advised not to work 
until symptoms resolve in line with recommendations contained in 
jurisdictional protocols. 
Interviewers may also identify cases that are part of a potential point 
source outbreak where other people are either confirmed or not confirmed 
as infected with Salmonella. The source of outbreaks identified from case 
interviews should be followed up separately and may form part of a 
separate investigation. Cases that are identified as part of recognised 
outbreaks should be brought to the attention of the OFN epidemiologist. 
Data Entry & Analysis 
Interviewers will collect data on cases and controls on paper forms and 
update the case information and case notes on the relevant jurisdictional 
database at the end of the interview. For analytical purposes, the food 
exposure data will be entered into an excel spreadsheet as designated by 
the lead jurisdiction, by a person assigned to data entry. Analysis will be 
done by the lead jurisdiction.  
The lead jurisdiction will analyse exposure histories between cases and 
controls to generate odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals using an 
unmatched analysis.  
Interim analysis will be required during the conduct of the study to 
examine potential associations requiring public health action. This will be 
done at 25 cases. The investigation team will review the data and decide 
on next steps.  
The lead jurisdiction will conduct a final univariate and multivariate 
analysis once the investigation is complete, which will take into account: 
 age and sex difference between cases and controls.
Ethical considerations 
Participation in the study will be voluntary and verbal consent will be 
obtained. As this is considered an investigation of public health 
importance, clearance from a Human Research Ethics Committee will not 
be obtained. Retention of information regarding cases and controls is 
maintained in accordance with relevant privacy legislation.  
Study outcomes 
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The main objective of this study is to identify food-based risk factors for 
infection with Salmonella Saintpaul. Summary results of this study will be 
communicated to the public health network, CDNA and food safety 
enforcement agencies. Depending on the results, the investigation team 
will prepare a final report and a manuscript for publication. 
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Salmonella Saintpaul 
CASE-CONTROL STUDY 
 Case (Salmonella Saintpaul)      Control (Salmonella Typhimurium)
Name: ___________________________________________________________ 
Notification ID: __________________________ 
Contact number: _________________________________ 
Age: _____________ 
Sex:     Male (1)   [    ]       Female (0) [    ] 
Local Government Area of residence:  __________________ 
Attempts to contact case 
Date Time Interviewer Outcome 
ƉƉendiǆ ϰ - Salmonella SaintƉaƵl ase ontrol StƵdǇ YƵestionnaire
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 “ Hello, my name is…………………………. I work for the _____________________ NSW 
Ministry of Health.” 
For adults:  May I please speak with …………………<name of case>?“ 
For children under 18 years: May I please speak with the parent or guardian of 
..…………………<name of case>?“ 
………… 
 
We are currently investigating an outbreak of gastroenteritis due to Salmonella. As 
Salmonella is a notifiable infectious disease, doctors and laboratories are required 
to notify the Health Department of all cases diagnosed in NSW. You/ your child has 
recently been diagnosed with Salmonella infection and we would like to ask you 
some questions about {your / your child’s} illness, travel history and foods 
consumed prior to {your / your child’s} illness. The questions should take about 20 
minutes. Your participation is voluntary and all responses are totally confidential. 
The information you provide in this questionnaire is for the purpose of trying to 
prevent further cases of illness. We do this by trying to find out what is likely to 
have caused your illness and also by providing you with information to reduce the 
spread of illness to others. 
Can you assist us in this investigation by participating? 
If declining interview, what is the reason for not participating? 
 No time   Not interested    Other:___________________________________
When the case comes to the phone then repeat the introduction and proceed with the explanatory
statement. 
If the case is unavailable then arrange an alternative time for the interview 
If case is under 15 years of age you will need to speak to parent or guardian. 
If case is aged 15 -17 years you will need to obtain parent or guardian consent prior to interview. 
 
Verbal consent given for interview  Yes    No   
1. INTRODUCTION
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For children 15-17 years  
Do you give your consent for me to speak directly with …………………<name of case>?“ 
Interviewer Note: Please note that for cases under the age of 15 years, (and those 15-
17 if parent being interviewed) questions relate to the case, not the 
person being interviewed unless specified in the body of the 
questionnaire. 
“Because I will be asking about specific 
dates around the time of your illness, it may be 
helpful for you to have a calendar or diary in front 
of you. Do you need a few minutes to get these?” 
Interviewer to complete before interview:  
Date of specimen collection 
Day Month Year 
1. On what date did your illness begin?
Day Month Year 
(If person is unsure of date then prompt with date of stool specimen) 
2. During this illness, did {you / your child} have any of the following
symptoms?
Symptom Yes No DK/NS 
Diarrhoea Date of onset: 
____/_____/____ 
Nausea 
Vomiting 
Stomach cramps 
Blood in your stool 
Fever 
Headache 
Muscle/body aches 
Other 
Please specify: 
Verbal consent given to interview child 15-17 years   Yes    No   
2. CLINICAL INFORMATION
65
3. For how many days did {your / your child’s} diarrhoea last? DAYS
 ....... Still continuing
 ....... No diarrhoea
 ....... Don’t know/not sure
4. Did you { your child} present to an emergency department at a hospital for
this illness?
 ....... Yes
 ....... No, go to question 7
 ....... Don’t know/not sure, go to question 7
5. Were you {was your child} admitted to hospital for this illness?
 ....... Yes
 ....... No, go to go to question 7
 ....... Don’t know/not sure, go to question 7
6. If yes, for how many nights were {you / your child} hospitalised? NIGHTS 
 ....... Don’t know/not sure, go to question 7
7. When your symptoms began, were you employed as a health care worker, child-
care worker or food preparer/foodhandler?
 ....... Yes, please specify:_________________________________________________
 ....... No
 ....... Don’t know/not sure
8. In the 2 weeks before your illness began, did anyone in your household have
diarrhoea or a stool test that was positive for Salmonella?
 ....... Yes- END INTERVIEW (see below)
 ....... No, go to question 9
 ....... Don’t know/not sure, go to question 9
If there was someone in the case’s household with diarrhoea in the 2 weeks before illness onset –  END 
INTERVIEW  
with “Since there was someone else in your household who was unwell with diarrhea before you, 
we will not be able to include you in our study. It is possible that you may have caught the 
Salmonella infection from them.  
Are there any questions you would like to ask me?   
Would you like some information about Salmonella?  
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.” 
 
 
Interviewer note: If the case responds yes to the above questions (7 & 8), you will need to 
ensure that this is followed up with the relevant public health action.  
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9. In the 7 days before your diarrhoea began, did {you / your child} travel outside
of Australia?
 ....... Yes
 ....... No, go to question 12
 ....... Don’t know/not sure, go to question 12
10. To which country or countries did {you / your child} travel?
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
 ....... Don’t know/not sure
11. What date did {you / your child} return to Australia?
______/_______/__________
 ....... Don’t know/not sure
If case was overseas for any of the exposure period (7 days prior to onset date)  –  End the 
interview for case control study. Please go to question 40 for eating outside of the home. 
Please state “Since you were overseas during the exposure period, we will not be able to 
include you in our investigation. However, we would still like to know where you ate 
outside of the home while in SA/NSW/ACT”- go to question 40. 
12. In the 7 days before your diarrhoea began, did {you / your child} travel interstate or within
the state?
 ....... Yes
 ....... No, go to question 16
 ....... Don’t know/not sure, go to question 16
13. Where did you travel to?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
 ....... Don’t know/not sure
14. What was your date of departure?
______/_______/__________ 
15. What was your date of return?
______/_______/__________ 
3. TRAVEL INFORMATION
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If case was not in SA, NSW, or ACT for all the exposure period (entire 7 days prior to onset date)  – 
 End the interview for case control study. Please go to question 40 for eating outside of the home. 
Please state: “Since you were overseas during the exposure period, we will not be able to 
include you in our investigation. However, we would still like to know where you ate 
outside of the home while in SA/NSW/ACT”- go to question 40. 
Interviewer Note: Refer to your calendar to determine the interval from the DATE 7 
DAYS BEFORE DIARRHOEA BEGAN to the DAY DIARRHOEA BEGAN. 
Please note that this exposure period means that the person 
should include the seven whole days prior to onset of illness and 
the part of the day when their illness began. PLEASE ENSURE THAT 
YOU CLARIFY THE DATES WITH THE PERSON BEING INTERVIEWED AND 
RECORD THE DATES OF INTEREST HERE. 
EXPOSURE PERIOD IS BETWEEN ___/___/______ (onset date minus 7 days) and ___/___/______ 
(onset date) 
“ For the rest of the questions, I would 
like to ask you about foods that you/your child may 
have consumed in the 7 days before [your / your 
child’s] diarrhoea/illness began, and the day that 
your/your child/s illness began. We are interested 
in food that you ate inside the home and outside 
of the home” 
16. Did you/your child eat any ham?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 1
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 17
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 1 
Table 1:  Did you eat any of the following types of ham? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, 
describe packaging 
e.g. colour)
Ham Prepackaged 
Deli section 
4. FOOD EXPOSURES
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Other, please specify: 
17. Did you/your child eat any bacon?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 2
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 18
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 2 
Table 2:  Did you eat any of the following types of bacon? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, 
describe packaging 
e.g. colour)
Bacon Prepackaged 
Deli section 
Other, please specify: 
18. Did you/your child eat any salami?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 3
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 19
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 3 
Table 3:  Did you eat any of the following types of salami? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, 
describe packaging 
e.g. colour)
Salami Prepacked 
Deli section 
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Other, please specify: 
19. Did you/your child eat any carrots raw, including any carrots that may have
been part of a pre-made salad or sandwich? 
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 4
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 22
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 4 
Table 4:  Did you eat any of the following types of carrots raw? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, 
describe packaging 
e.g. colour)
Carrots Bagged 
Loose 
Any raw carrots 
consumed as part of a 
pre-made sandwich or 
salad  
Other, please specify: 
20. Do you still have any carrots left over from the batch of carrots you ate from in the 7
days before you became unwell?
 Yes
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 22
21. Would we be able to organise someone to come and collect the carrots from your
home for testing?
 Yes   make arrangements for the samples to be collected from the case’s home
 No
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22. Did you/your child eat any tomatoes raw, including any tomatoes that may have
been part of a pre-made salad or sandwich?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 5
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 23
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 5 
Table 5:  Did you eat any of the following types of tomatoes raw? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & 
suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, 
describe packaging 
e.g. colour)
Tomatoes Truss (vine attached) Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Packaged
Roma Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Packaged
Cherry Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Packaged
Grape Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Packaged
General Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Packaged
Any raw tomatoes 
consumed as part of a 
pre-made sandwich or 
salad  
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Other, please specify 
23. Did you/your child eat any onions raw, including any onions that may have been
part of a pre-made salad or sandwich?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 6
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 26
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 6 
Table 6:  Did you eat any of the following types of onions raw? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & 
suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, 
describe packaging 
e.g. colour)
Onions Brown Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Bagged 
Red Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Bagged 
White Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Bagged 
Salad onion 
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Spring onions 
Any raw onions 
consumed as part of a 
pre-made sandwich or 
salad  
Please describe type of 
onion: 
Other, please specify 
24. Do you still have any onions left over from the batch of onions you ate from in the 7
days before you became unwell?
 Yes
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 26.
25. Would we be able to organise someone to come and collect the onions from your
home for testing?
 Yes   make arrangements for the samples to be collected from the case’s home
 No
26. Did you/your child eat any bean sprouts raw, including any bean sprout that
may have been part of a pre-made salad or sandwich?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 7
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 27
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 7 
Table 7:  Did you eat any of the following types of bean sprouts raw? (Please ask about each option and fill 
out purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & 
suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, 
describe packaging 
e.g. colour)
Bean 
sprouts 
Mung bean sprouts 
73
Alfalfa sprouts 
Any raw sprouts 
consumed as part of a 
pre-made sandwich or 
salad  
Other, please describe 
27. Did you/your child eat any cucumbers raw, including any cucumbers that may
have been part of a pre-made salad or sandwich?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 8
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 28
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 8 
Table 8:  Did you eat any of the following types of cucumbers raw? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & 
suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, 
describe packaging 
e.g. colour)
Cucumbers Lebanese 
Continental/telegraph 
Any raw cucumbers 
consumed as part of a 
pre-made sandwich or 
salad  
Other, please describe 
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28. Did you/your child eat any of the following pre-packaged salads?
Table 9: Please ask about each option and fill out purchasing and brand details 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & 
suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, 
describe packaging 
e.g. colour)
Pre-packaged 
salads 
Crunchy salad 
mix/crunchy vegetable 
mix 
Baby spinach 
Rocket 
Greek/Mediterranean 
salad mix 
: 
Coleslaw/dryslaw 
Four leaf salad mix 
Any other lettuce mix, 
please describe 
Any other pre-
packaged salads, please 
describe 
29. Did you/your child eat any chilli?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 10
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 30
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 10 
Table 10:  Did you eat any of the following types of chilli? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand and type 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
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Chilli Fresh Eaten: 
☐ Raw ☐ Cooked
Dried Eaten: 
☐ Raw ☐ Cooked
Other, please 
specify: 
30. Did you/your child eat any potatoes?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 11
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 31
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 11 
Table 11:  Did you eat any of the following types of potatoes? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand and type 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
Potatoes Red Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Bagged 
White Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Bagged 
Other, specify: Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Bagged 
31. Did you/your child eat any broccoli?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 12
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 32
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 12 
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Table 12:  Did you eat any of the following types of broccoli? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
Broccoli Fresh Eaten: 
☐ Raw ☐ Cooked
Frozen 
Broccolini Eaten: 
☐ Raw ☐ Cooked
Other, please specify: 
32. Did you/your child eat any limes?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 13
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 33
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 13 
Table 13:  Did you eat any of the following types of limes? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
Limes Bagged 
Loose 
Other, please specify: 
33. Did you/your child eat any peaches?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 14
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 34
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 14 
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Table 14:  Did you eat any of the following types of peaches? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
Peaches Yellow Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Bagged 
White Purchased: 
☐ Loose ☐ Bagged 
Other, please specify 
34. Did you/your child eat any bananas?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 15
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 35
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 15 
Table 15:  Did you eat any of the following types of banana? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & 
suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
Bananas Regular/Cavendish 
Other, please specify 
35. Did you/your child eat any black pepper?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 16
 No    If No, please proceed Question 36
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 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 16 
Table 16:  Did you eat any of the following types of black pepper? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & 
suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
Black 
pepper 
Whole 
Ground 
Other, please specify 
36. Did you/your child consume any milk?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 17
 No    If No, please proceed Question 37
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 17 
Table 17:  Did you consume any of the following types of milk? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & 
suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
Milk Full cream Purchased: 
☐ Fresh ☐ Long-life (UHT)
Skim Purchased: 
☐ Fresh ☐ Long-life (UHT)
Other, please specify 
37. Did you/your child eat any chicken purchased raw and prepared/cooked at
home? 
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 18
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 38
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 18 
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Table 18:  Did you eat any of the following types of chicken purchased raw and prepared/cooked at home? 
(Please ask about each option and fill out purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
Chicken Whole chicken ☐ Free Range ☐ Organic
☐ Corn Feed   ☐ General
Other details/description: 
Chicken pieces (e.g. 
thigh, wings) 
☐ Free Range ☐ Organic
☐ Corn Feed ☐ General
☐ Pre-packaged:
Brand:_________________ƚ 
☐ From deli
Cut of chicken (e.g. thigh, 
drumstick, wings etc) 
Other, please specify 
38. Did you/your child eat any eggs at home?
 Yes   If Yes, please fill in Table 19
 No    If No, please proceed to Question 39
 Don’t know…..If don’t know, please prompt with items in Table 19 
Table 19:  Did you eat any of the following types of eggs at home? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Purchased  
(store name & suburb) 
Brand 
(if unknown, describe 
packaging e.g. colour) 
Eggs Free range 
Barn laid 
Caged eggs 
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Other, please specify 
39. Did you/your child eat any eggs away from home?
 Yes   If Yes, please specify how the eggs were eaten and where the food was purchased from
_________________________________________________________________________________
 No
 Don’t know
LOYALTY CARD 
To help us in this investigation, we can use information from loyalty cards to collect more precise 
information on the specific foods mentioned during the interview.  
Do you have a loyalty card such as Flybuys, Woolworth Everyday Rewards, etc? ☐Y    ☐N 
If yes, we are seeking your consent to trace your card number with the respective supermarket to check the 
dates of purchases, brand information and expiry dates of the products. We would only follow up on the 
food items listed during this interview and would not access information about other items you may have 
purchased. This would be very useful for our investigation.  
Do consent to share your loyalty card number so we can collect this more precise information? 
☐Y    ☐N
Flybuys  number: 
Woolworth everyday rewards  number: 
Other, specify ___________________  number: 
Did you consistently use this loyalty card for purchases in the 2-3 weeks prior to your illness?  ☐Y    ☐N 
40. Thinking about food eaten outside of the home, did you eat food from:
Food Premise Type Where: 
(Name and 
location of 
premises) 
When: 
(date and time) 
What: 
(did you eat) 
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Cafes, restaurants, 
bars 
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
Bakeries ☐Y
☐N
☐DK
Takeaways, 
including from 
service stations, 
fast food outlets, 
etc. 
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
Social gatherings, 
such as: 
festivals 
weddings 
parties 
religious events 
work 
conferences? 
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
EDUCATION: Preventing Salmonella and other foodborne diseases 
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    Keep clean 
        Wash your hands before handling food and often during food preparation. 
        Wash your hands after going to the toilet, changing the baby or being in contact with animals. 
        Wash and clean all surfaces and equipment used for food preparation or serving. 
        Protect kitchen areas and food from insects, pests and other animals. 
    Separate raw and cooked foods 
        Separate raw meat, poultry, fish and seafood from other foods. 
        Use separate equipment and utensils such as knives and cutting boards for handling raw foods. 
        Store foods in covered containers to avoid contact between raw and cooked foods. 
    Cook thoroughly 
        Cook food thoroughly, especially meat, poultry, eggs, fish and seafood. For meat and poultry, make 
sure juices are clear, not pink. 
        Bring foods like soups and stews to boiling point. 
        Reheat cooked food thoroughly. Bring to the boil or heat until too hot to touch. Stir while re-heating. 
    Keep food at safe temperatures 
        Do not leave cooked food at room temperature for more than two hours. 
 Do not store food too long, even in a refrigerator. 
 Do not thaw frozen food at room temperature. 
        Food for infants and young children and other people with low immune systems should ideally be 
freshly prepared and not stored at all after  cooking. 
    Use safe water and foods 
        Do not use food beyond its expiry date. 
        Wash fruits and vegetables in safe water, especially if eaten raw. 
Hygiene and preventing transmission discussed ☐Y    ☐N
Would you like us to send you a fact sheet with information 
about Salmonella? 
☐Y    ☐N
CONCLUSION 
Thanks for your time today.  
The information you provide in this questionnaire is for the purpose of trying to prevent further cases of 
illness.  
We do this by trying to find out what is likely to have caused your illness and also by providing you with 
information to reduce the spread of illness to others.  
The data collected is kept confidential and identifying information will not be disclosed for any other 
purpose without your consent. 
If we have any further questions, could we contact you again? ☐Y    ☐N
INTERVIEW COMPLETED BY 
Name of Interviewer:      
Date of interview:         Length of 
interview:____________________minutes 
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How well did the case recall the information requested?     ☐ very well       ☐ well      ☐ not well      ☐ not 
at all 
GENERAL NOTES: 
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Raw bean sprouts linked to salmonella outbreak in
South Australia
Posted Thu 21 Apr 2016, 4:09pm
South Australians are being warned not to eat raw bean sprouts after
a significant increase in the number of Salmonella Saintpaul cases,
SA Health says.
SA Health said there had been 108 Salmonella Saintpaul cases reported over the past 11 days.
Since the start of December, SA Health said it had been notified of 233 cases of Salmonella Saintpaul.
Of the 233 cases, 43 people have been hospitalised.
SA Health said there were normally 15 to 20 cases of this particular strain of salmonella in South Australia each year.
Chief public health officer Professor Paddy Phillips said initial investigations held in conjunction with local councils and
food suppliers indicated bean sprouts eaten raw may be responsible for the increased number of cases.
"We are advising South Australians to cook all bean sprouts and avoid eating raw bean sprouts," Professor Phillips said.
"We also want to alert food retailers such as restaurants and cafes not to serve raw bean sprouts until further notice."
Salmonella infection may produce symptoms of fever, diarrhoea, loss of appetite, headache, stomach cramps and
nausea and vomiting.
Topics:  health, diet-and-nutrition, sa, australia
MAP: SA
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Rebecca Sullivan and Vanessa Brown APRIL 22, 2016 3:46PM
SA Health says not to eat raw bean
sprouts after salmonella outbreak
THE Department of Health in SA is warning people not to eat raw bean sprouts
following a jump in salmonella cases.
Bean sprouts are usually sold pre-washed and are used in stir fries and salads. Source:istock
THE Department of Health in South Australia is warning SA residents not to eat raw
bean sprouts following a big jump in the number of reported salmonella cases.
Over the past 11 days there have been 108 salmonella cases reported in South
Australia, which normally sees around 15 to 20 cases each year.
Since the start of December, SA Health has been notified of 233 cases of salmonella.
Of these 233 cases, 43 people have been hospitalised.
“Our investigations have indicated to us that it is likely that the consumption of raw
bean
sprouts is contributing to this increase,” said SA Health’s chief public health officer,
Professor Paddy Phillips.
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Most pho dishes come topped with bean sprouts and herbs. Picture: Stephanie Timotheou Source:News Corp Australia
“As a result we are today advising South Australians to cook all bean sprouts and
avoid
eating raw bean sprouts.
“We also want to alert food retailers such as restaurants and cafes not to serve raw
bean sprouts until further notice. We are working closely with the producers,
suppliers and handlers of the sprouts and are continuing to investigate.
“Salmonella infection may produce symptoms of fever, diarrhoea, loss of appetite,
headache, stomach cramps and nausea and vomiting,” he said.
Bean sprouts - not to be confused with snow pea sprouts - are commonly used in stir
fries, salads and noodle dishes, and are served alongside popular Asian dishes like
pho.
According to the Food Safety Information Council, outbreaks of food-borne illness
both in Australia and overseas have been associated with eating seed sprouts.
In 2005, a Salmonella outbreak in WA of 125 cases was linked to alfalfa sprouts and
a 2006 Salmonella outbreak of 15 cases in Victoria was linked to alfalfa sprouts.
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Beansprouts are being blamed for an outbreak of salmonella in South Australia. Picture: iStock. Source:istock
To eat bean sprouts, the FSIC recommend safely adhereing to the use by date
displayed on seed sprout packaging, follow storage directions and always store seed
sprouts at 5ºC or below.
Consumers should avoid cross contamination from other risky foods such as meat or
poultry. Washing sprouts has been found to be not very effective as laboratory
studies have shown that bacteria can be internalised in the sprouts, making it difficult
to wash off and sanitise, and bacteria can be protected in a biofilm on the sprout
surface.
People in the four vulnerable demographics, such as young children, people over 70,
immune-compromised or pregnant should not eat uncooked sprouts of any kind.
A Woolworths spokesperson said customers shouldn’t be concerned about the supply
available within their stores.
“Woolworths is not supplied by the producer affected. Customers can purchase this
product from our supermarkets with confidence,” their statement said.
News.com.au has contacted Coles for comment.
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Chapter 3  
Multistate outbreak of Salmonella 
Hvittingfoss infections linked to 
rockmelon, Australia, 2016 
Public information notice in supermarket, North Sydney, August 2016 
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Abbreviations used in this chapter 
ACT Australian Capital Territory  
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
CDNA Communicable Diseases Network of Australia  
FSANZ Food Standards Australia and New Zealand  
HGQ Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire  
HPNSW  Health Protection, New South Wales  
ICPMR Institute of Chemical Pathology and Microbiological Research 
MDU Microbiological Diagnostic Unit  
NSW New South Wales  
NT Northern Territory  
QLD Queensland  
SA South Australia 
USA United States of Australia 
VIC Victoria  
WA Western Australia  
WGS Whole Genome Sequencing  
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Prologue 
My role  
This multijurisdictional Salmonella outbreak occurred only a few weeks after the conclusion of the 
Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak described in Chapter 2. This presented an excellent opportunity for me 
as a member of the outbreak team to consolidate the knowledge I had gained previously, and take on 
more responsibility in coordinating the response to this outbreak.  
I coordinated the initial NSW response to the outbreak. This involved maintaining the line list, 
coordinating with public health units (PHUs) to organise interviews, entering and analysing data from 
hypothesis-generating questionnaires, and preparing reports and situation reports to distribute within 
NSW, including to the Health Minister. Once it was identified that the outbreak involved multiple 
jurisdictions, NSW was appointed the lead jurisdiction for the outbreak and I took on the role of lead 
epidemiologist for the outbreak as a whole.  
I collated data from multiple jurisdictions, describing cases by time, place and person and creating 
frequency tables of potential exposures. I also wrote frequent situation reports for dissemination to 
the OzFoodNet network. I participated in regular outbreak teleconferences, which included 
providing an update of the epidemiology succinctly and comprehensively for other members of the 
outbreak team. I also coordinated the case control study that was conducted in three states (South 
Australia, NSW and WA), including developing the draft study protocol (appendix 1) and 
questionnaire (appendix 2) and communicating with epidemiologists in other states to finalise the 
protocol. I completed the initial and final analysis of the case control study for the outbreak and 
prepared reports and presentations. I presented at the OzFoodNet debrief for the outbreak in 
Brisbane in March 2017. I also presented the outbreak at the 2017 Communicable Disease Control 
conference held in Melbourne, Australia in June 2017 (appendix 3) and presented a poster on this 
outbreak at the 9th Global TEPHINET Conference in Chiang Mai, Thailand in August 2017.
I was invited to present an outline of the outbreak to a meeting on rockmelon safety convened by 
the Food Authority for major retailers and horticulture industry representatives. This was very well 
received and I was subsequently invited to present at the Food Standards Australia and New Zealand 
(FSANZ)’s third National Food Safety Incident Response Forum in Melbourne in June 2017. This was 
an extremely fulfilling professional opportunity and I enjoyed the opportunity to communicate the 
results of the epidemiological investigation to a wider lay audience, and participate in discussions on 
how to make the rockmelon industry safer.  
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Lessons learned  
Investigating this outbreak so soon after the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak provided an excellent 
opportunity for me to build on the skills I had learned. I once again appreciated the challenges of 
running multi-jurisdictional outbreak investigations (MJOIs), including the difficulties in maintaining 
communication lines and making sure the correct people have the right information at the right 
time. I also gained a deeper understanding of the complexity of internal and interdisciplinary politics 
and collaboration. Skills I identified to manage this challenge included communicating upward often 
and frequently, being open with information, acknowledging the contribution and knowledge of 
others, and cultivating an environment of trust so that people were willing to collaborate and share 
information. Overall this outbreak was managed across borders effectively, due to the strong 
leadership and trust within the OzFoodNet network.  
I additionally learned that as an epidemiologist, I was not always able or available to discuss or 
explain my findings (including their limitations) and that written reports often travelled more widely 
and to different audiences than was intended. Therefore, it is important that any analysis in written 
or report form can “speak for itself” – this could include outlining clearly the limitations of any 
analysis.  
Public health implications  
This outbreak identified rockmelon from a single farm as the source of the outbreak; subsequently, a 
voluntary trade-level recall of the affected product was initiated by the farm, stopping the outbreak. 
As the recall was underway, information sharing between different agencies identified that a 
shipment of rockmelon from the affected farm was en route to South-East Asia, and the shipment 
was subsequently halted. It is likely that a wider outbreak, potentially involving other countries, was 
subsequently avoided by the prompt public health action that was taken.  
Following this outbreak, the NSW Food authority initiated an education project with rockmelon 
farmers in NSW about the importance of food safety measures and how to implement these in their 
farms. The NSW Food Authority also began a review of the legislation around food safety and 
horticulture with key stakeholders to identify areas where the regulations can be strengthened, a 
process that remains underway.   
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 Abstract 
In July 2016 six states and territories of Australia were affected by a large outbreak of Salmonella 
Hvittingfoss. A coordinated investigation was initiated to identify the source of infection and control 
the outbreak.  A case was defined as isolation of S. Hvittingfoss with the outbreak strain on whole 
genome sequencing in an individual tested in Australia on or after 14 June 2016. Cases were 
interviewed using a hypothesis-generating questionnaire and fresh fruit and vegetable consumption 
frequencies for cases compared with expected community consumption patterns. We conducted a 
case-control study comparing consumption of melons and other fruits and vegetables by S. 
Hvittingfoss cases with S. Typhimurium or Campylobacter controls. Food traceback activities were 
conducted in multiple states and territories, and a selection of case and produce isolates further 
characterised using whole genome sequencing (WGS). During the outbreak period 144 suspected 
and confirmed cases of S. Hvittingfoss were notified Australia-wide. Almost three-quarters of cases 
were aged less than 5 years or over 65 years (51% and 22% respectively). Binomial comparison of 
case consumption patterns with background rates in the community found watermelon and 
rockmelon were consumed at higher frequency among cases. Univariate analysis of the case-control 
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study indicated consumption of rockmelon (OR 7.2, 95%CI 1.9-27.9), fresh fruit salad (OR 5.4, 95% CI 
1.2-27.1), and strawberries (OR 3.3, 95% CI 1.1-10.7) were significantly associated with increased risk 
of S. Hvittingfoss infection.  In multivariate analysis after adjusting for age and sex only rockmelon 
remained significantly associated with illness (OR 5.7, 95%CI 1.5-21.9). Traceback implicated a single 
rockmelon grower who initiated a voluntary trade level recall of affected product. A national media 
alert was issued by government authorities to warn consumers not to consume any rockmelon 
already purchased. WGS identified two separate strains of S. Hvittingfoss amongst outbreak cases. 
Rockmelon is a known high-risk fresh produce and it is important that the community are educated 
about safe preparation and handling, particularly those involved in food provision to children and 
the elderly.   
Introduction  
It is estimated that 4.1 million (90% credible interval 2.3-6.4 million) Australians suffer from an 
episode of foodborne gastroenteritis every year1, 2, at a total cost of $1.25 billion per annum3. The 
bacteria Salmonella is a significant contributor to the burden of foodborne disease in Australia, 
being the second most commonly notified causative agent of diarrheal disease and the most 
commonly identified pathogen in foodborne outbreaks where the aetiology is identified1. The 
identification of risk factors for Salmonella infection provides the opportunity for prevention.    
In Australia, contaminated food is estimated to be the source of approximately 72% of  salmonellosis 
cases, with commonly identified sources including egg, poultry meat, pork, beef, dairy, nuts and 
fresh produce4. Australia has seen an increase in gastroenteritis outbreaks associated with fresh fruit 
and vegetables over recent years, as have other developed countries5. Fresh produce associated 
outbreaks can pose particular challenges due to their ability to be widely and quickly distributed 
geographically, including crossing state and international borders5. 
Salmonella enterica serovar Hvittingfoss is a relatively uncommon serotype in Australia. It is most 
common in the state of Queensland, where it averages approximately 78 notifications per year with 
most notifications occurring in the under 5 age-group (unpublished data).  Foodborne outbreaks due 
to S. Hvittingfoss are very uncommon worldwide with the largest published in the literature being 
associated with the Subway chain of sandwich restaurants in Illinois, USA in 20106. In that outbreak 
no specific food vehicle was identified but lettuce, tomatoes and olives were associated with 
increased risk of infection. Previous clusters of S. Hvittingfoss infection have occurred in multiple 
states throughout Australia in 2005, 2006 and 2010 with no clear source identified7.    
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In July 2016, routine surveillance detected an increase in notifications of S. Hvittingfoss above 
expected levels in four of Australia’s eight jurisdictions – New South Wales (NSW), South Australia 
(SA), Western Australia (WA) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). A coordinated outbreak 
investigation was launched to identify the source and control the outbreak. 
Methods 
Outbreak detection and hypothesis generation  
We defined a confirmed outbreak case as infection with S. Hvittingfoss strain identified as the 
outbreak strain on whole genome sequencing (WGS) in an individual tested in Australia on or after 
14 June 2016. A suspected case was defined as isolation of S. Hvittingfoss in an individual tested in 
Australia on or after 14 June 2016 where a WGS result was unavailable. Salmonella infection is a 
notifiable condition in all states and territories of Australia and cases were identified through routine 
surveillance.  
Cases were interviewed using a national 7-day hypothesis-generating questionnaire to identify 
possible food and environmental risk factors for infection. Food exposure frequencies were 
compared with community consumption rates to generate hypotheses. The data on community 
consumption came from a cross sectional survey conducted in the state of Victoria over the 
preceding two months. We assumed a binomial probability distribution when comparing observed 
versus expected proportions of individuals consumption different foods and p <0.05 was considered 
significant.  
Case-control study  
We conducted a case-control study of cases in South Australia and NSW to test the hypothesis that 
S. Hvittingfoss infection was associated with consumption of melons, and to collect additional
information on rockmelon purchasing, preparation and consumption patterns. Only confirmed
outbreak cases with onset dates between 8 July 2016 and 9 August 2016 were enrolled in the case-
control study. Cases were identified through routine notifications to state-based surveillance
systems. Controls were recruited from notifications of either S. Typhimurium or Campylobacter in
the state from which the case was notified. Controls were frequency matched by age group (<5
years, 5-14 years, 15-54 years and 55+ years) and by geographic location (rural or urban) and the
control with the nearest collection date to the case was selected. Controls were required to have a
specimen collection date within four weeks of the date of collection of the case. We estimated
sample sizes based consumption rates of the suspect product in hypothesis-generating
questionnaires and from estimated population exposure frequency rates as per in the Victorian data.
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The target sample size was 25 cases and 50 controls in total using Kelsey’s formula assuming  45% of 
cases and 15% of controls consumed the food of interest8. 
Staff from South Australia and NSW health departments interviewed the cases and controls residing 
within their jurisdictions. Both groups were asked about symptoms and recent travel, and exposure 
to a number of fresh produce items including carrots, raw tomatoes, raw cucumbers, fresh fruit from 
salads, kebabs or platters, consumption of fresh fruit at a child care centre (for children under 5 
years old), banana, rockmelon, honeydew, strawberries and blueberries They were also asked about 
consumption of sultanas/raisins, desiccated coconut, chicken purchased raw and prepared at home, 
eggs consumed at home, food eaten outside the home, as well as knowledge of the recent recall of 
rockmelon and how watermelon and rockmelon was purchased, prepared, stored and consumed 
(e.g. cut or whole, refrigerated or not).  
Responses were entered into Epi InfoTM version 7.1.  Data was extracted from Epi and univariate 
analysis conducted in Stata version 14.1 Uncorrected 2-tailed p-value was used for calculation of 
significance except for situations where the numerator was less than 5, in which case Fisher’s Exact 
p-value was used. A multivariate analysis was conducted using Stata version 14.1. Included in the
model were all items with an elevated odds ratio and a p-value <0.1 as well as age, sex and
geographic location.
Microbiological investigation 
Patients with S. Hvittingfoss infection were identified by reference public health laboratories in NSW, 
SA, WA, Victoria and QLD. S. Hvittingfoss isolates were identified by serotyping, according to the 
Kauffmann-White-Le Minor scheme9. 189 clinical and food isolates from QLD, Victoria, NSW, SA, 
WA, and ACT were forwarded to the Institute for Clinical Pathology and Medical Research (ICPMR) in 
NSW for WGS to determine whether they were of the outbreak-specific strain. As the number of 
cases increased in Victoria a number of isolates were sequenced at Microbiological Diagnostic Unit in 
Victoria and reads were shared between laboratories.  
Human clinical isolates and food isolates with collection dates during the period March to August 
2016 were sequenced. The genomic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was extracted using Prepito-D 
(PerkinElmer). The DNA sequencing libraries were prepared using the Nextera XT DNA preparation 
kit (Illumina) and the sequencing was performed on the NextSeq 500 (Illumina) with 2 x 150 base-
pairs (bp) paired-end chemistry. Sequencing data quality was checked by FastQC v1.0.0 (BaseSpace 
Labs, Illumina). Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) were identified using CLC Genomics 
Workbench v8.0 (Qiagen) by mapping reads to the reference genome S. Hvittingfoss 16164 
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(sequenced by PacBio technology). The significant thresholds for SNP calling were set for a minimum 
coverage at 20 and a minimum variant frequency at 80%. The distance between mapped genomes 
was examined by phylogeny inferred using a web-based server 
(https://cge.cbs.dtu.dk/services/CSIPhylogeny/). Maximum likelihood trees at 100 bootstraps were 
generated from core genome SNP fastA file using MEGA-610. A cut-off of <=10 SNP difference 
between individual isolates was used to define a SNP cluster.   
Environmental investigation 
On identification of the outbreak, food regulatory agencies in the states of NSW and SA jointly 
triggered the National Food Incident Response Protocol (NFIRP), which coordinates government 
bodies and industry to share information including product flow and industry testing results.11 This 
information was obtained from major supermarket retailers and industry produce associations 
specifically through an established joint industry-government Food Incident Forum.   
As a credible hypothesis emerged, interviewers ascertained information on the places and dates of 
rockmelon purchases to guide trace-back investigations. SA and NSW food authorities conducted 
trace-back activities from common retail premises and wholesalers, and sent product samples for 
testing.  Food authorities in the Northern Territory conducted on farm inspections and undertook 
extensive liaison with the business owners, industry food safety auditors and obtained 
environmental samples from rockmelon farms.  
Ethics  
Participation in the study was voluntary and verbal consent was obtained from participants. As this 
was considered an investigation of acute public health importance, clearance from a Human 
Research Ethics Committee was not obtained. This investigation of a multi-state outbreak of 
infectious disease was carried out using routine State & Territory public health legislation. Each 
jurisdiction ensured that retention of information regarding cases and controls was maintained in 
accordance with relevant privacy legislation. No identifying information was entered into Epi Info for 
cases or controls. 
Results 
Case finding and demographics  
There were 167 cases of infection due to S. Hvittingfoss notified across Australia during the outbreak 
period, with 110 confirmed and 33 suspected cases meeting the case definition (Figure 1). There 
were 24 S. Hvittingfoss cases that were excluded based on WGS results. 
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Figure 1 - Cases of outbreak associated S. Hvittingfoss by date of specimen collection, Australia 
2016 
Among the 144 confirmed and suspected cases, the median age was 4 years (range 3 months to 97 
years). Cases were concentrated among the young and elderly, with 51.4% of cases (74/144) occurring 
in children aged less than 5 years, and 22.9% (33/144) in those aged over 65 years. 57.6 (83/144) % of 
cases were female.  
Identification of food vehicles  
Food exposures commonly reported in the hypothesis-generating phase included carrots (85%), bananas 
(83%), apples (76%), potatoes (74%), pasteurised milk (72%), tomatoes (64%) and onions (61%).  
Rockmelon (also known as cantaloupe) and watermelon consumption were both reported by 55% of 
cases, and 85% of cases reported eating any kind of melon. I utilised the binomial probability worksheet 
from the Oregon foodborne outbreak Investigation toolkit, as developed by epidemiologist Dr William 
Keene17 to calculate whether or not food items appeared to being consumed at frequencies higher than 
expected.  This worksheet uses binomial probability calculations (also known as Bernoulli trials) to 
compare exposure frequencies against background rate estimates, essentially answering the question, 
“by chance alone, how likely are we to find x of n people (or more) eating a product?”18. On binomial 
comparison, foods that were consumed significantly more frequently by cases than expected included 
rockmelon (p<0.01) and watermelon (p<0.01).  
Case control study  
We enrolled 27 cases and 48 controls in the study. Of these, 6 cases and 12 controls were from South 
Australia and 21 cases and 36 controls from NSW. Of the 12 controls from SA, 11 were cases of 
Campylobacter and 1 was a case of S. Typhimurium. Of the 36 controls from NSW, all were cases of S. 
Typhimurium. The characteristics of cases and controls are shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1 - Characteristics of cases and controls recruited into the Salmonella Hvittingfoss study, 
NSW and SA, Australia, 8 July 2016 – 9 August 2016 
Characteristic Cases Controls p-value
N % N % 
Age (years ) 
0-4 13 48.1% 22 45.8% 0.99 
5-14 3 11.1% 6 12.5% 
15-54 5 18.5% 10 20.8% 
55+ 6 36.0% 10 20.8% 
Jurisdiction 
 NSW 21 77.8% 36 75.0% 0.79 
 SA 6 22.7% 12 25.0% 
Geographic location 
 Rural 2   7.4% 4   8.3% 0.88 
 Urban 25 92.6% 44 91.7% 
Sex 
 Female 16 59.2% 30 62.5% 0.78 
 Male 11 40.8% 18 37.5% 
Total 27 48 
Univariate analysis  
Compared with controls, cases were significantly more likely to have consumed rockmelon (OR 
7.2, 95%CI 1.9-27.9), fresh fruit salad (OR 5.4, 95% CI 1.2-27.1) and strawberries (OR 3.33, 95% CI 
1.1-10.7) during the 7-day exposure period (Table 2). Consumption of eggs outside the home, 
bananas, blueberries, raw tomatoes, cucumbers, raw carrots, watermelon, honeydew or eating 
outside the home were not associated with infection.  
Table 2 - Association between food items/risk factors and Salmonella Hvittingfoss infection, 
Australia, July-August 2016 
Exposure Cases Controls OR 95% CI 
N % N % 
Rockmelon  11/20 55.0% 7/48 14.6% 7.2 1.9 - 27.9 
Watermelon  6/18 33.3% 16/45 35.6% 0.9 0.2 - 3.2 
Honeydew 1/24 4.2% 1/48 2.1% 2.0 0.0 - 163.7 
Strawberries  15/24 62.5% 15/45 33.3% 3.3 1.1 - 10.7 
Blueberries  7/25 28.0% 7/48 14.6% 2.3 0.6 - 8.8 
Bananas 17/26 65.4% 30/45 66.7% 0.9 0.3 - 3.0 
Fresh fruit salad  8/24 33.3% 4/47 8.5% 5.4 1.2 - 27.1 
Fresh fruit eaten at child care 
(aged 0-4 only)  
8/13 61.5% 8/19 42.1% 2.2 0.4 - 12.0 
Fresh fruit from a fruit platter 1/24 4.2% 3/46 6.5% 0.6 0.0 - 8.3 
Fresh fruit kebabs 0/26 0.0% 0/48 0.0% . . - . 
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Raw tomatoes  9/24 37.5% 21/46 45.7% 0.7 0.2 - 2.2 
Raw carrots  7/24 29.2% 13/45 28.9% 1.0 0.3 - 3.4 
Sultanas  2/24 8.3% 11/46 23.9% 0.3 0.0 - 1.5 
Raisins  0/26 0.0% 3/48 6.3% 0.0 0.0 - 2.3 
Desiccated coconut  0/27 0.05 1/48 2.1% 0.0 0.0 - . 
Eggs eaten at home  12/24 50.0% 31/44 70.5% 0.4 0.1 - 1.3 
Chicken purchased raw and 
prepared at home  
17/23 73.9% 31/45 68.9% 1.3 0.4 - 4.8 
Food purchased from a bakery 4/25 16.0% 2/42 4.8% 3.8 0.5 - 44.4 
Takeaways, including from service 
stations, fast food outlets etc. 
9/26 34.6% 12/44 27.3% 1.4 0.4 - 4.5 
Food purchased from cafés, 
restaurants and bars  
7/25 28.0% 15/45 33.3% 0.8 0.2 - 2.5 
Food eaten at social gatherings 4/25 16.0% 8/45 17.8% 0.9 0.2 - 3.8 
* OR – odds ratio; CI – confidence interval
There were no significant differences in the food preparation practices of cases consuming 
rockmelon when compared to controls; the majority of rockmelon was purchased already cut and 
unrefrigerated and stored in the fridge at home (Table 3).  
Table 3 - Rockmelon preparation practices and awareness of rockmelon recall among cases and 
controls, Australia, July-August 2016  
Rockmelon preparation and awareness 
of recall  
Cases Controls p-value
Aware of recent rockmelon recall 23/27 85.2% 31/47 66.0% 0.07 
Rockmelon storage prior to purchase (for those who purchased rockmelon) 
    In fridge 1/9 11.1% 0/4 0.0% 0.89 
    Out of fridge 7/9 77.8% 4/4 100.0% 
    Don’t know 1/9 11.1% 0/4 0.0% 
Rockmelon storage at home (for those who purchased rockmelon) 
    In fridge 9/9 100.0% 5/5 100.0% . 
Multivariate analysis  
A logistic regression model was constructed including age, sex, rockmelon, fresh fruit salad and 
strawberries. After adjusting for age and sex, only rockmelon remained significantly associated with 
illness with an odds ratio of 5.7 (95%CI 1.5-21.9, p=0.01).  
Genomic epidemiological investigation 
In total, 189 food and human isolates from SA, NSW, QLD, Victoria, ACT and WA underwent whole 
genome sequencing (Table 4). The initial species inferring analysis from the raw sequences identified 
that all of the isolates belong to Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica serovar Hvittingfoss, except that 
one isolate was identified as a S. Typhimurium. This isolate was excluded from further SNP analysis. 
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A major cluster containing 126 isolates (outbreak strain 1) was identified with genetically related 
isolates (0-10 SNP difference between isolates). 109 of these were isolates belonging to 99 individual 
patients, and 17 isolates were from rockmelons. A second small cluster (outbreak strain 2) contained 
13 isolates (11 isolates belonging to 10 individual patients and 2 isolates from rockmelon). An 
additional 50 human isolates were not clustered or occurred in very small clusters of two cases. One 
case from Victoria had isolation of both outbreak strains in separate specimens collected from the 
same individual. Cases of outbreak strain 1 were from all six affected jurisdictions (NSW, SA, ACT, 
QLD, Victoria and WA). Cases of outbreak strain 2 occurred in all affected jurisdictions except for the 
ACT and WA.   
Table 4 – Results of whole genome sequencing of Salmonella Hvittingfoss isolates from human and 
rockmelon samples, Australia, July-August 2017 
Outbreak strain 1 Outbreak strain 2 Non-outbreak 
strains 
Total 
Human isolates 109 isolates from 99* 
individual patients 
11 isolates from 10* 
individual patients 
50 human 
isolates 
170 
Rockmelon 
isolates 
17 isolates from 
rockmelon from farm A 
2 isolates from 
rockmelon from farm A 
- 19
Total 126 13 50 189 
* One individual patient had isolation of both outbreak strain 1 and outbreak strain 2 on two separate
specimens
Environmental investigation  
Trace-back activities implicated a single farm located in the Northern Territory of Australia. In 
addition, 19 rockmelon samples collected during product testing at the retail level were positive for 
S. Hvittingfoss, (17 of outbreak strain 1 and two of outbreak strain 2). All were produced by the
implicated farm. Environmental testing at the farm level did not isolate S. Hvittingfoss but did
identify a number of other Salmonella serovars that were also found on rockmelons obtained at
retail and wholesale level. Inadequate washing and sanitising procedures were identified at
inspection and a corrective order issued.  This was compounded by a lack of monitoring of sanitiser
levels by the company during the washing process.
Discussion  
This large multi-state outbreak of S. Hvittingfoss associated with rockmelons affected all but one 
Australian state and territory and illustrated the potential risk of foodborne illness associated with 
fresh produce. Although 144 cases were identified as being part of the outbreak it is possible that 
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the total number of infections that occurred could have been in excess of 1000, as it is estimated 
that for every notified case of Salmonella in Australia seven more occur in the community4.  
The results of the analytical study and environmental investigation – including an epidemiological 
study, the convergence of traceback activities to a single farm in the Northern Territory of Australia, 
and isolation of both outbreak strains from rockmelons from this farm on retail produce – implicated 
rockmelon as the major vehicle for infection. Rockmelon contamination likely occurred on the farm; 
S. Hvittingfoss is a known environmental serovar present in northern regions of Australia (including
Queensland and the Northern Territory).
This outbreak investigation highlighted the risks of fresh produce in general, and specifically 
rockmelons as vehicles for food-borne infection.  Instances of the contamination of fresh fruits and 
vegetables with human pathogens and resulting foodborne illness outbreaks have been increasingly 
reported internationally12. Enteric pathogens such as Salmonella can contaminate raw produce at 
any stage of the production process13, with potential contamination routes including via organic 
waste used as fertiliser, contamination of irrigation waters, direct contamination by livestock and 
wildlife, and hygiene errors in handling and processing13. Amongst fresh produce, netted melons 
(melons with an irregular and reticulated surface) such as rockmelon are one of the most significant 
vehicles of widespread foodborne illness outbreaks caused by bacterial pathogens14 –at least 29 
multistate outbreaks of foodborne infections by Salmonella, E. coli and Listeria associated with 
melons have been reported in the US and Canada since 2000, with at least 18 of these being 
Salmonella outbreaks that implicated rockmelon14.  
Rockmelon is a high-risk food for a number of reasons. Traditionally rockmelons were grown on the 
ground in direct contact with soil, increasing the potential for contamination with microogranisms14, 
although in Australia most melons are grown on plastic matting to minimise direct ground contact 
and thus this risk is substantially reduced. In addition, the netted rind of rockmelon with its 
roughness, crevices and pits is thought to favour bacterial attachment as well as providing extra 
protection to microorganisms that are present and reducing the effectiveness of washing with 
chlorinated water and other processing practices14. Cutting through this thick, rough rind can cause 
contamination of the flesh of the rockmelon which is rich in sugars and other nutrients that promote 
the proliferation of bacterial contaminants. For this reason, cut melons must be refrigerated below 
5°C in the United States of America, although not in Australia14, 15. The NSW Food Authority 
recommendation is that fruits should be regularly cut throughout the day using clean and sanitised 
equipment and sold on the day they are cut16.  
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Our findings indicate that children and the elderly, including those institutions such as aged-care 
facilities and day care, were at higher risk of infection. The focus on healthy eating in pre-school has 
meant that children are increasingly consuming fresh fruit and vegetables outside the home. In this 
outbreak, this posed an unanticipated difficulty to the investigation in that food histories for children 
in day-care centres were difficult to obtain, often without details of fruits and vegetables recorded 
on menus. In addition, there were a number of caterers and wholesale suppliers who supplied food 
to aged care facilities and child care workers who were implicated in this outbreak. Childcare 
workers, caterers and food attendants in institutions, particularly those that serve vulnerable 
populations, should be aware of how to ensure that foods are purchased, prepared and served 
safely, particularly with high risk foods such as rockmelon.  
Whole genome sequencing is an emerging technology that is increasingly being used in outbreak 
investigations. Due to S. Hvittingfoss being a rare strain in southern Australia there was a time delay 
at the start of the outbreak whilst a reference genome was developed by the reference laboratory, 
meaning that WGS results were not useful in in identifying the suspected food vehicle prior to the 
recall (which was conducted on the basis of the epidemiological information, environmental trace-
back and samples and serotyping results), although WGS results were useful following the recall in 
differentiating outbreak cases from sporadic cases and confirming the link between outbreak cases 
and the recalled product. It is likely in future outbreaks, as the speed of WGS improves, that this 
information will continue to be utilised as an evidence source during outbreaks.  
In addition, two unique strains of S. Hvittingfoss on WGS strains were implicated in this outbreak, 
leading the investigation team to initially disregard a portion of cases as being ‘unrelated’ to the 
outbreak until sequencing of product from the implicated farm, as well as isolation of both strains in 
a single individual, revealed that two strains were implicated. This is a potential pitfall of utilising 
WGS, and responders should be aware of the need to potentially modify the case definition to 
incorporate all available evidence as an outbreak evolves.  
State/national health and food regulatory agencies, and industry associations released tailored 
public health messaging, aiming to simultaneously protect the public and limit loss of confidence in 
the rockmelon industry by identifying the source farm. Public health messaging included a public 
warning advising vulnerable groups to avoid consuming rockmelon, and for consumers to discard 
any stored rockmelon in the home given the difficulty of identifying its source. The implicated farm 
initiated a national voluntary trade level recall on 3 August 2016.   
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Limitations 
 This investigation had several limitations. Recall bias is a common concern in retrospective case-
control studies. The case-control study occurred concurrently with a national recall that was widely 
publicised in the media, possibly increasing the association between rockmelon and illness in the 
cases’ minds and overestimating the true association. However, the use of Salmonella Typhimurium 
and Campylobacter cases and controls may have reduced the difference in recall between cases and 
controls due to the similar experience of illness and contemplation of potential sources. We also 
asked cases and controls whether they were aware of the recent recall and there was no significant 
difference in awareness of the recall between groups.  
Conclusion  
Epidemiological, microbiological and environmental investigation of this Salmonella Hvittingfoss 
outbreak traced the source to consumption of contaminated rockmelons, a food with known 
potential for pathogenic contamination. WGS was a useful adjunct to the epidemiological 
investigation in this outbreak but as an emerging technology could contribute more with increased 
timeliness; public health professionals should also be mindful of the potential for multiple strains or 
serovars to be involved in large-scale community outbreaks. In this outbreak, the case-case study 
was an effective tool to rapidly identify the implicated food vehicle, allowing for prompt public health 
action in the form of public health advisories for vulnerable groups and a targeted recall of the 
affected product. 
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Study protocol for Salmonella Hvittingfoss Case-Case Study 
Draft Number: 3.1  
Date of Draft:  12/8/16 09:30 
Prepared by: Katherine Todd 
Background 
In early July 2016, a notable increase in Salmonella Hvittingfoss (S. Hvittingfoss) notifications in NSW, 
SA and WA was detected through routine surveillance. Between June 14th and August 3rd a total of 
97 suspected outbreak cases were observed, in all jurisdictions except Tasmania and the Northern 
Territory but most notably in NSW, SA and WA.  
S. Hvittingfoss is a relatively uncommon Salmonella serotype in Australia. It is most common in
Queensland (Figure 1), where it averages approximately 78 notifications per year with most
notifications occurring in the under 5 age-group.
Figure 1: Salmonella Hvittingfoss notifications by month of diagnosis date and jurisdiction of 
residence, Australia, 1 January 2008 – 2 August 2016 
NSW has seen a large increase in S. Hvittingfoss notifications peaking in epi week 26 of 2016, with SA 
peaking in epi week 27 and 28 of 2016 (Figures 2 and 3). 
Appendix 1 - Study protocol for Salmonella Hvittingfoss case-control study 
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Figure 2: Salmonella Hvittingfoss notifications by week of diagnosis date and jurisdiction of 
residence, Australia, 1 January 2016 – 2 August 2016.  
Figure 3: Number of notifications of Salmonella Hvittingfoss by epi week and jurisdiction, epi week 
24 to epi week 29.   
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Figure 4 shows the epidemic curve of cases by collection date. The epidemic curve shows a peak in 
notifications collected on 11th July. Since this date cases have continued to occur in all affected 
jurisdictions.   
Figure 4: Epidemic curve, S. Hvittingfoss notifications by date of onset and jurisdiction, 1 June to 
date.  
Cases within the cluster ranged in age from infants aged under 1 to 89 years (median age 2 years) 
with equal numbers of male and female cases (37 female and 31 male). Cases within the cluster are 
strongly clustered amongst infants aged under 5, with 46 of the 68 cases (67.6%) aged from 0-4 
years.  
Outbreaks with this Salmonella serotype are very uncommon worldwide with largest being 
associated with the Subway chain of sandwich restaurants in Illinois, USA in 2010. In that outbreak 
no specific food vehicle was detected but lettuce, tomatoes and olives were associated with 
increased risk. Previous clusters have occurred in multiple states throughout Australia in 2005, 2006 
and 2010 with no clear source identified.    
Up to the 27th of July 2016, 42 interviews of cases of S. Hvittingfoss have been completed from 4 
jurisdictions. This includes 21 interviews from NSW, 16 from SA, 4 from WA and 1 from ACT. Based 
on these interviews the commonest food and other exposures identified were carrots (86%), apples 
(78%), bananas (78%), any melon (rockmelon, honeydew or watermelon) (76%), pasteurised milk 
(72%), potatoes (72%), tomatoes (66%) yoghurt  (63%) and cucumbers (63%).  
Data were compared to the Hunter New England bank of food consumption data. This contains 
information collated from 346 hypothesis-generating questionnaires conducted with cases of 
Salmonella species, with collection dates ranging from 2006 to 2014 and from all months of the year. 
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Victoria provided data about fresh produce food exposures from their food frequency survey to 
enable a rough comparison of normal eating patterns at this time of year. This included 334 
participants that were interviewed between May and June 2016, stratified by age (in 5-year age 
groups).   
When Victorian food frequency data was compared with Hvittingfoss cases, items with a statistically 
significantly elevated odds ratio included (Table 2): 
Table 2: Food exposures with elevated odds ratios when compared to the Victorian food frequency 
database, stratified by state and by age group, ranked by p-value  
Food exposure Odds ratio 95% confidence 
interval 
p-value**
All cases 
Rockmelon 14.08 6.35-31.22 <0.001 
Watermelon 6.39 3.06-13.36 <0.001 
Pears 3.12 1.53-6.38 0.001 
Blueberries 3.00 1.25-7.20 0.010 
Strawberries 2.42 1.21-4.85 0.011 
NSW only cases 
Rockmelon 8.13 2.74-24.14 <0.001 
Blueberries 6.14 2.24-16.79 <0.001 
Watermelon 5.68 2.04-15.83 <0.001 
Pears 4.63 1.76-12.17 0.001 
Honeydew 12.98 2.03-82.92 0.025 
Strawberries 2.69 1.06-6.83 0.031 
Cucumbers 2.81 0.98-8.06 0.046 
SA only cases 
Rockmelon 26.83 8.2-87.24 <0.001 
Watermelon 7.57 2.52-22.76 <0.001 
Strawberries 3.88 1.24-12.15 0.013 
Honeydew 18.39 2.81-120.47 0.014 
Pears 3.18 1.03-9.75 0.034 
All cases under 5 
Rockmelon 27.08 3.17-231.58 <0.001 
Watermelon 6.96 2.10-23.05 0.001 
Pears 3.98 1.30-12.21 0.014 
All cases aged 5-54 years 
Rockmelon 20.63 3.21-132.46 0.004 
All cases aged 55+ 
Rockmelon 15.25 2.30-101.25 0.011 
Apricots 15.75 1.74-142.89 0.033 
*ranked by p-value 
** for exposures where there were at least 5 cases and/or controls, uncorrected p-value was used. For those less than 5 cases and/or 
controls, Fisher’s exact p-value was used
Study Rationale 
Cases of Salmonella Hvittingfoss continue to occur in multiple jurisdictions. Hypotheses generating 
interviews and information from the Victorian food frequency database indicate that melons, 
specifically rockmelon, watermelon or honeydew, are consumed at a higher frequency in the cases. 
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It is important to determine if there is an association between melons and illness in order to prevent 
further illness and inform future food safety measures. 
Study Hypotheses 
This study is designed to test the hypotheses that there is no association between S. Hvittingfoss 
and: 
1. Rockmelon
2. Watermelon
3. Honeydew
Methods 
The study design is a case-case study, with investigators recruiting two ‘controls’ for every case. 
Investigators will select ‘controls’ from their jurisdictions’ database of Salmonella Typhimurium and 
Campylobacter notifications. Controls will be frequency matched with cases within broad age 
categories: 
- 0-4 years
- 5-14 years
- 15-54 years
- 55+ years
And within broad geographic categories: 
- Rural
- Urban
Cases will be frequency matched by the OzFoodNet epidemiologist. 
Case Definition 
A case is a person who has: 
- Isolation of Salmonella Hvittingfoss with the outbreak strain* on whole genome sequencing
(WGS) from a faecal specimen in an individual tested in South Australia, NSW or Western
Australia 16th July 2016
Given the delay in WGS, suspected cases will be interviewed for the case-case study whilst awaiting 
typing results. If a case is subsequently excluded, a different case will be included and the controls 
from the initial case reallocated to new cases.  
Case Eligibility 
Investigators will recruit cases reported under State and Territory legislation. Cases will be excluded 
from the case-case study if: 
- They cannot be reached after 6 attempts to contact them
- They are unable to recall the date that their illness began (onset date)
- They are not interviewed within 30 days of collection of a faecal specimen.
- There is a period of greater than 2 weeks between collection of a faecal specimen and onset
of their illness
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- Another enteric pathogen other than S. Hvittingfoss was isolated in or detected in their stool
specimen.
- There has been another member of the household who has had an onset of diarrhoea in the
2 weeks prior to the onset of diarrhoea in the laboratory-confirmed case selected for the
study
- They have returned from travelling overseas within the 5 days prior to onset of their illness.
- They have previously been interviewed using the Salmonella hypothesis-generating
questionnaire
- They are unable to answer questions (e.g. dementia) or require an interpreter to complete
the questionnaire
- They are part of a point source outbreak investigation
Control Selection 
Investigators will select cases of either Salmonella Typhimurium or Campylobacter (herein after 
referred to as “controls”), from a list provided by the jurisdictional OzFoodNet (OFN) Epidemiologist. 
Controls will be frequency matched by age group (<5 years, 5-14 years, 15-54 years and 55+ years) 
and by geographic location (rural or urban) to the nearest collection date to the case.  
Controls should have a specimen collection date within four weeks of the case. Controls will be 
interviewed regarding the 5 day exposure period prior to their illness onset.  
Two controls will be interviewed per case. If interviewers are unsuccessful in speaking with a 
potential control after 6 attempts to contact them over 3 days, they should move onto the next 
potential control. 
Control eligibility 
A control will be excluded from the investigation if: 
- They cannot be reached after 6 attempts to contact them
- They are unable to recall the date that their illness began (onset date)
- They are not interviewed within 30 days of collection of a faecal specimen.
- There is a period of greater than 2 weeks between collection of a faecal specimen and onset
of their illness
- Another enteric pathogen other than either Salmonella Typhimurium or Campylobacter was
isolated in or detected in their stool specimen.
- There has been another member of the household who has had an onset of diarrhoea in the
2 weeks prior to the onset of diarrhoea in the laboratory-confirmed case selected for the
study
- They have returned from travelling overseas within the 5 days prior to onset of their illness.
- They are unable to answer questions (e.g. dementia) or require an interpreter to complete
the questionnaire
- They have already been interviewed as part of an outbreak investigation
- They are part of a point source outbreak investigation
Case and control interviews 
Interviewers will follow specific introductions and prompts in the questionnaire taking care not 
interview cases and controls differently. Both cases and controls will be interviewed about their 
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exposures to various foods in the five days prior to onset of their illness. To assist with case and 
control recall all interviewers should recommend to interviewees to have a calendar in front of 
them. 
Interviewers should make 6 attempts to contact both cases and controls for interview. At least 3 
attempts should be made between 9 am and 4 pm, and three attempts between 4 pm and 8 pm. The 
outcomes of case and control interviews should be recorded for quality control assessment. 
Under no circumstance should interviewers give details of specific hypotheses under study, as they 
are only hypotheses. Similarly, if a case implicates a specific product, interviewers should remain 
impartial due to the difficulty of pinpointing sources of infection for individual cases. Any request for 
information regarding Salmonella infection and potential sources should be given at the end of the 
interview. Interviewers may offer to send out standard public health information about Salmonella 
prepared by their local health department.  
As this is an outbreak investigation, results of the study may not be available publicly. If study 
subjects are interested in results, interviewers can inform them that results will be summarised in 
the Australian on-line journal Communicable Diseases Intelligence available on the Australian 
Government Department of Health and Ageing’s website (www.health.gov.au).  
If study subjects request information on the conduct of this study interviewers should indicate that it 
is a multi-state outbreak investigation of Salmonella that OzFoodNet is conducting with State and 
Territory health departments under the auspices of the Communicable Disease Network Australia 
(CDNA). Any complaints from study subjects about the interview or investigation should be 
addressed to the local CDNA member or national investigation coordinator. 
Sample size 
As this investigation relates to an outbreak it is difficult to reliably calculate required sample size for 
this case control study. Estimated sample sizes are based on information obtained from hypothesis-
generating questionnaires and from the Hunter control bank exposure frequency rates. Power is 
calculated at a 95% two-sided confidence level with 80% power and a 2:1 case: control ratio.   
Table 3: Numbers of cases and controls required to observe a statistically significant odds ratio 
Rockmelon Watermelon Honeydew 
Estimated proportion of 
controls with exposure 
15% 30% 5% 
(Hunter control exposure %) 13% 31% 5% 
(Victorian food frequency exposure 
%) 
6% 15% 1% 
Estimated proportion of cases 
with exposure 
45% 50% 13% 
(Exposure rate in HGQ to date) 49% 53% 13.5% 
Least extreme odds ratio to be 
detected  
4.64 2.33 2.84 
Cases 25 69 131 
Controls 50 137 261 
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Public health follow-up 
As part of this case control study, interviewers may identify cases that work in occupations with a 
higher likelihood of transmitting Salmonella to other people, such as health care workers, child-care 
workers or food preparer/food handlers. If cases work in these occupations they should be referred 
to public health staff for follow-up, or advised not to work for a specified time after symptoms 
resolve.  
Interviewers may also identify cases or controls that are part of an outbreak where other people are 
either confirmed or not confirmed as infected with Salmonella or Campylobacter. The source of 
outbreaks identified from interviews should be followed up with local public health staff and food 
enforcement agencies.  
Data Entry & Analysis 
OzFoodNet sites will collect data on cases and controls on paper forms. NSW Health will prepare and 
administer a database in Epi Info version 7. For analytical purposes, the database form on Epi Info 
will be the same for cases and controls and there will be a field to indicate whether the data relates 
to a case or control. Sites will enter these data on to Epi Info on a daily basis and package the data 
for export to the lead jurisdiction. Sites may extract their own data for routine analysis, or request 
the lead epidemiologist to provide regular extracts. 
The lead jurisdiction will analyse exposure histories between cases and controls to generate odds 
ratios with 95% confidence intervals using an unmatched analysis.   
Interim analysis will be required during the conduct of the study to examine potential associations 
requiring public health action. Study Leaders and Master of Applied Epidemiology scholars will 
conduct a final univariate and multivariate analysis once the investigation is complete, which will 
take into account: 
1. Age and sex difference between cases and controls,
2. Variation in data by State,
3. Possible differences due to control selection methods
Ethical considerations 
Participation in the study will be voluntary and verbal consent will be obtained. As this is considered 
an investigation of public health importance, clearance from a Human Research Ethics Committee 
will not be obtained. This investigation of a multi-state outbreak of infectious disease will be carried 
out using routine State & Territory legislation. Each jurisdiction should ensure that retention of 
information regarding cases and controls is maintained in accordance with relevant privacy 
legislation. No identifying information is to be entered onto Epi Info for cases or controls. 
Study outcomes 
One of the main objectives of this study is to identify food-based risk factors for infection that would 
allow intervention to prevent further infections. Options for public health actions will be discussed 
amongst members of the investigating team and CDNA. Summary results of this study will be 
communicated to CDNA and food safety enforcement agencies, along with industry if appropriate. 
Depending on the results, the investigation team will prepare a final report and a manuscript for 
publication. 
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Appendix 1: food exposures considered for inclusion in the case-control 
study  
Food exposures considered for inclusion in case-control study  
Based on frequencies among interviewed cases (frequencies of >45%): 
1. Carrots
2. Apples
3. Bananas
4. Any melon
5. Milk
6. Potatoes
7. Tomatoes
8. Yoghurt
9. Cucumbers
10. Onions
11. Beef mince
12. Eggs
13. Watermelon
14. Broccoli
15. Tasty cheese
16. Strawberries
17. Rockmelon
18. Mandarins
19. Pears
20. Oranges
Based on exposures with elevated odds ratios with a p-value of <0.05 in any of the analyses (all 
cases, only NSW, only SA, under 5s, 5-54 years old and 55+ years old) when compared with the 
Victorian food frequency data:  
1. Honeydew
2. Rockmelon
3. Watermelon
4. Pears
5. Blueberries
6. Strawberries
7. Cucumbers
8. Apricots
Excluded from questionnaire based on biological plausibility/mechanism 
Item Rationale for exclusion 
Beef mince Only beef product that had an elevated frequency 
Unlikely to cause a multijurisdictional outbreak in only some 
jurisdictions  
Eaten cooked  
Not commonly associated with salmonella  
Potatoes Commonly consumed product, and rate of consumption not elevated 
when compared to control groups  
Almost always peeled and cooked 
Milk Commonly consumed product, and rate of consumption not elevated 
when compared to control groups  
No predominance of brand noted in trawler interviews  
Unlikely to cause a multijurisdictional outbreak in only some 
jurisdictions  
Tasty cheese Unlikely to cause a multijurisdictional outbreak in only some 
jurisdictions  
Highly processed product  
Apricots Currently out of season with limited availability in fruit and vegetable 
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shops  
Only significant in one age group (>55 years) and overall food 
frequency low (2/42, 5%)  
Apples Commonly consumed product, and rate of consumption not 
significantly elevated when compared to control groups  
Not commonly associated with salmonella 
Yoghurt Commonly consumed product, and rate of consumption not elevated 
when compared to control groups  
No predominance of brand noted in trawler interviews  
Unlikely to cause a multijurisdictional outbreak in only some 
jurisdictions 
Onions Commonly consumed product, and rate of consumption not 
significantly elevated when compared to control groups  
Broccoli Commonly consumed product, and rate of consumption not 
significantly elevated when compared to control groups  
Mandarins Commonly consumed product, and rate of consumption not 
significantly elevated when compared to control groups  
Not commonly associated with salmonella 
Pears Not commonly associated with salmonella 
Increased frequency of consumption not maintained in all age groups 
Oranges Commonly consumed product, and rate of consumption not 
significantly elevated when compared to control groups  
Not commonly associated with salmonella 
Fish Unlikely to cause a multijurisdictional outbreak in only some 
jurisdictions  
Eaten cooked  
Not commonly associated with salmonella 
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Salmonella Hvittingfoss  
CASE-CONTROL STUDY – version 4.3 
☐ Case (Salmonella Hvittingfoss) ☐ Control (Salmonella Typhimurium)
☐ Control (Campylobacter)
Case Name: 
Case ID: Control ID:  Group ID: 
Contact number: 
Parents Name: 
Age:  
Age bracket: 
☐0-4 years
☐5-14 years
☐15-54 years
☐55+ years
Geographic area: 
☐Rural
☐Urban
Sex: ☐Male ☐Female ☐ Other
State of residence: ☐NSW ☐ SA ☐WA
Attempts to contact: 
Date Time Interviewer Outcome 
Date Time Interviewer OutCome 
Date Time Interviewer OutCome 
Date Time Interviewer OutCome 
Date Time Interviewer OutCome 
Date Time Interviewer OutCome 
Date Time Interviewer OutCome 
Appendix Ϯ - SalmonellaHvittingfoss case-control study Ƌuestionnaire
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1. Introduction
If the case is aged under 15 years you will need to speak to a parent or guardian.  
If the case is aged 15-17 years you will need to obtain parent or guardian consent prior to interview. 
“Hello, my name is Kim and I work for the NSW Department of Health. 
For adults:  May I please speak with <name of case>?  
For children under 18 years:  
May I please speak with the parent or guardian of <name of case>?” 
When the case comes to the phone then repeat the introduction and proceed with the explanatory 
statement.  
If the case is unavailable then arrange an alternative time for the interview. 
“We are currently investigating an outbreak of gastroenteritis. As Salmonella/Campylobacter is a 
notifiable infectious disease, doctors and laboratories are required to notify the Health 
Department of all cases diagnosed in NSW. You/ your child has recently been diagnosed with 
Salmonella/Campylobacter infection and we would like to ask you some questions about your / 
your child’s illness, travel history and foods consumed prior to your / your child’s illness.  
The questions should take about 20 minutes. Your participation is voluntary and all responses are 
totally confidential. 
The information you provide in this questionnaire is for the purpose of trying to prevent further 
cases of illness. We do this by trying to find out what is likely to have caused this outbreak of 
gastroenteritis and also by providing you with information to reduce the spread of illness to 
others. 
Can you assist us in this investigation by participating?”  
Is now a suitable time to ask these questions or is there a more convenient time to contact you?” 
If No, arrange an alternative time to phone back to conduct the interview: 
Date: __/__/____ time: __:__ a.m./p.m. 
Verbal Consent given: 
☐Yes ☐No
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If declining interview, what is the reason for not participating? 
☐No time
☐Not interested
☐Other: Specify
For children 15-17 years  
“Do you give your consent for me to speak directly with <name of case>?” 
Interviewer Note: 
Please note that for cases under the age of 15 years, (and those 15-17 if parent being interviewed) 
questions relate to the case, not the person being interviewed unless specified in the body of the 
questionnaire.  
“Because I will be asking about specific dates around the time of your illness, it may be helpful for 
you to have a calendar or diary in front of you. Do you need a few minutes to get these?” 
2. Clinical information
Interviewer to complete before interview: 
Date of specimen collection:     ___/___/_____ 
1. Which of the following symptoms did you/your child have?
Symptom Yes No DK If yes, date of onset 
Fever ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Vomiting ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Abdominal pain ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Headache ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Diarrhoea ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tiredness/lethargy ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Nausea ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Muscle/body ache ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Any other symptoms? ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Details: 
2. What date did you have you/your child first have symptoms? ___/___/_____
If unsure, prompt with date of specimen collection
If case is unable to recall onset date, END INTERVIEW with  
“Since you cannot recall exactly when your illness started, we will not be able to include you in our 
study; however thank you very much for your time today.  
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Are there any questions you would like to ask me?   
Would you like some information about Salmonella/Campylobacter? 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.” 
3. How long were you/your child unwell for?  days 
If case reported diarrhoea:
4. How long did you/your child have diarrhoea for?  days 
5. Did you/your child present to an emergency department for this illness?
☐Yes
☐No (go to question 8)
☐Don’t know/unsure
6. Were you/your child hospitalised?
☐Yes
☐No (go to question 8)
☐Don’t know/unsure
7. For how many nights were you/your child hospitalised?     nights  
8. When your symptoms began, were you employed as a health care worker, child-care
worker or food preparer/food handler?
☐Yes (ensure to discuss exclusions at the end of the interview)
☐No
☐Don’t know/unsure
9. In the two weeks before your/your child’s illness began, did anyone in your household
have diarrhoea or a stool test that was positive for Salmonella/Campylobacter?
☐Yes (END INTERVIEW; see below)
☐No
☐Don’t know/unsure
If there was someone in the case’s household with diarrhoea in the 2 weeks before illness onset – 
END INTERVIEW with:  
“Since there was someone else in your household who was unwell with diarrhoea before you, we 
will not be able to include you in our study. It is possible that you may have caught the 
123
Salmonella/Campylobacter infection from them. However, we would still like to know where you 
ate outside the home”. Go to question 35.  
Interviewer note: if the case response yes to the above questions (8 & 9) you will need to ensure 
that this is followed up with the relevant public health action  
3. Travel information
10. In the 5 days before your illness began, did you/your child travel outside of Australia?
☐Yes (END INTERVIEW; see below)
☐No (go to question 13)
☐Don’t know/unsure
11. To which country or countries did you/your child travel?
12. What date did you/your child return to Australia? ___/___/_____ 
If the case was overseas for any of the exposure period (5 days prior to onset date) – end the 
interview for the case control study.   
Please state: “Since you were overseas during the exposure period, we will not be able to include 
you in our investigation. Thank you for your assistance today.”  
13. In the 5 days before your illness began, did (you/your child) travel interstate or within the
state?
☐Yes (complete questions below to confirm eligibility)
☐No (go to next section)
☐Don’t know
14. Where did you travel to?
15. What was your date of departure?     ___/___/_____
16. What was your date of return?      ___/___/_____
If the case was not in SA, NSW, or WA for all the exposure period (entire 5 days prior to onset date) – 
END INTERVIEW for case control study:  
Please state: “Since you were interstate during the exposure period, we will not be able to include 
you in our investigation however thank you very much for your time today.  
Are there any questions you would like to ask me? 
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Would you like some information about Salmonella/Campylobacter? 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.” 
 
4. Food exposures  
Interviewer Note:  
Refer to your calendar to determine the interval from the DATE 5 DAYS BEFORE ILLNESS ONSET to the 
DAY OF ILLNESS ONSET. Please note that this exposure period means that the person should include 
the five whole days prior to onset of illness and the part of the day when their illness began. PLEASE 
ENSURE THAT YOU CLARIFY THE DATES WITH THE PERSON BEING INTERVIEWED AND RECORD THE 
DATES OF INTEREST HERE.  
EXPOSURE PERIOD IS BETWEEN ___/___/_____(illness onset date minus 5 days) and 
 ___/___/_____ (illness onset date) 
 
“For the rest of the questions, I would like to ask you about foods that you/your child may have 
consumed in the 5 days before [your / your child’s] illness began, and the day that your/your 
child/s illness began. We are interested in food that you ate inside the home and outside of the 
home” 
 
17. Did you/your child eat any raw carrots?  
☐Yes (if yes, please fill in table 1) 
☐No (go to question 18) 
☐Don’t know (if don’t know, prompt with the items in Table 1)  
Table 1: did you eat any of the following types of carrots? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t know Place of purchase or consumption  
Carrots Bagged ☐ ☐ ☐   
Loose ☐ ☐ ☐  
Other  ☐ ☐ ☐  
 
18. Did you/your child eat any raw tomatoes?  
☐Yes (if yes, please fill in table 2) 
☐No (go to question 19) 
☐Don’t know (if don’t know, prompt with the items in Table 2)  
Table 2: did you eat any of the following types of tomato? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details). 
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Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Place of purchase or 
consumption 
Tomatoes Truss (vine attached) ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Roma ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Cherry ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Grape ☐ ☐ ☐ 
General ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Other, please specify ☐ ☐ ☐ 
19. Did you/your child eat any raw cucumbers?
☐Yes (if yes, please fill in table 3)
☐No (go to question 20)
☐Don’t know (if don’t know, prompt with the items in Table 3)
Table 3: did you eat any of the following types of cucumber? (Please ask about each option and fill 
out purchasing and brand details). 
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Place of purchase or 
consumption 
Cucumbers Lebanese ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Continental/telegraph ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Other, please describe ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20. Did you/your child eat any fresh fruit salad?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Contents of fruit salad if 
recalled:  
Place of purchase or 
consumption 
Fresh fruit salad 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
21. Did you/your child eat any fresh fruit kebabs?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Ingredients of fruit kebabs 
if recalled:  
Place of purchase and/or 
brand  
Fruit kebabs 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
22. Did you/your child eat any fruit from a fruit platter?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Contents of fruit platter if 
recalled:  
Place of purchase and/or 
brand  
Fruit platter 
☐ ☐ ☐
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For cases aged under 5 only: 
23. Did your child eat fresh fruit whilst at a child-care centre?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
If yes, What days did your child 
attend childcare in the 5 days 
prior to illness   
Name/address of 
childcare centre   
Fresh fruit from 
child care centre ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐Mon☐Tues☐Wed☐Thurs☐Fri 
24. Did you/your child eat any bananas?
☐Yes (if yes, please fill in table 4)
☐No (go to question 25)
☐Don’t know (if don’t know, prompt with the items in table 4)
Table 4: did you eat any of the following types of banana? (Please ask about each option and fill out 
purchasing and brand details).  
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Place of purchase or 
consumption 
Bananas Regular/Cavendish  ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Lady fingers ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Red-tipped eco ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Other (please provide 
details)   
☐ ☐ ☐ 
25. Did you/your child eat any rockmelon (also known as cantaloupe)?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
If yes, was it 
purchased: 
Place of purchase or 
consumption 
Rockmelon  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐Whole  
☐Cut/ Sliced 
☐In pieces 
☐Don’t know
☐Other
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26. Did you/your child eat any watermelon?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
If yes, was it 
purchased: 
Place of purchase or 
consumption 
Watermelon ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐Whole  
☐Cut/ Sliced 
☐In pieces 
☐Don’t know
☐Other
☐Seeded 
☐Seedless 
27. Did you/your child eat any honeydew?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
If yes, was it 
purchased: 
Place of purchase or 
consumption 
Honeydew ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐Whole  
☐Cut/ Sliced 
☐In pieces 
☐Don’t know
☐Other
28. Did you/your child eat any fresh strawberries?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Place of purchase or 
consumption 
Strawberries ☐ ☐ ☐ 
29. Did you/your child eat any fresh blueberries?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Place of purchase or 
consumption 
Blueberries ☐ ☐ ☐ 
30. Did you/your child eat any sultanas?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Place of purchase 
and/or brand  
Sultanas ☐ ☐ ☐ 
31. Did you/your child eat any raisins?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Place of purchase 
and/or brand  
Raisins ☐ ☐ ☐
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32. Did you/your child eat any desiccated coconut?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Place of purchase 
and/or brand  
Desiccated coconut ☐ ☐ ☐ 
33. Did you/your child eat any chicken purchased raw and prepared at home?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Date of 
purchase 
Place of purchase and/or 
brand  
Chicken purchased raw and 
prepared at home 
☐ ☐ ☐ Date 
☐ D/K 
☐Prepacked   Brand:
☐Deli 
Place of purchase:
Cut/s: 
34. Did you/your child eat any eggs at home?
Food item Yes No Don’t 
know 
Date of 
purchase 
Place of purchase and/or 
brand  
Eggs eaten at home ☐ ☐ ☐ Date 
☐ D/K
Place of purchase: 
Brand:
35. Thinking about food eaten outside of the home, did you eat food from?
Food premise type Where? 
(Name and 
location of 
premises) 
When? 
(date and 
time) 
What? 
(What did you 
eat?)  
Were any 
other diners 
unwell? 
Cafés, 
restaurants and 
bars  
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
Bakeries ☐Y
☐N
☐DK
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
Takeaways, 
including from 
service stations, 
fast food outlets 
etc.  
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
Social gatherings, 
such as festivals, 
weddings, 
parties, religious 
events, work 
conferences  
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
☐Y
☐N
☐DK
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36. Are you aware of the recent recall of rockmelon?
☐Yes (go to question 37)
☐No (go to question 38)
☐Don’t know/unsure
37. Where did you first learn about the recall of rockmelon?
Newspaper ☐Yes ☐No ☐Don’t know/unsure
Website ☐Yes ☐No ☐Don’t know/unsure
Facebook ☐Yes ☐No ☐Don’t know/unsure
Twitter ☐Yes ☐No ☐Don’t know/unsure
Television  ☐Yes ☐No ☐Don’t know/unsure
Radio ☐Yes ☐No ☐Don’t know/unsure
Company web ☐Yes ☐No ☐Don’t know/unsure
Friends ☐Yes ☐No ☐Don’t know/unsure
Other  ☐Yes ☐No ☐Don’t know/unsure
If the interviewee answered yes to question 25, 26 or 27 (rockmelon, honeydew or watermelon 
consumption), complete questions 38 to 45. Otherwise, skip to EDUCATION section on page 13  
For those who answered yes to watermelon in question 26, go to next question; otherwise skip to 
question 39: 
38. Did you eat watermelon with the skin on?
☐Yes
☐No
☐Don’t know/unsure
For those who answered yes to rockmelon in question 25, go to next question; otherwise skip to 
EDUCATION section: 
39. Did you eat the rockmelon with the skin on?
☐Yes
☐No
☐Don’t know/unsure
40. When you purchased the rockmelon you ate before you became unwell,
how was it stored? 
☐Refrigerated
☐Out of the fridge
130
☐Don’t know/not sure
41. For the rockmelon that you ate before you became unwell, how was it
stored at home prior to eating? 
☐Refrigerated
☐Out of the fridge
☐Don’t know/not sure
42. After cutting the rockmelon, how long was it out of the fridge prior to
either be consumed or being refrigerated? (minutes/hours) 
F F  (☐minutes/☐hours) 
43. Did you wash your hands after cutting the rockmelon?
☐Yes
☐No
☐Don’t know/unsure
44. Did you wash the cutting utensils (cutting board, knife) you used to cut the
rockmelon prior to using them on other items? 
☐Yes
☐No
☐Don’t know/unsure
45. How long did your store the rockmelon prior to eating? (Hours/days)
F F (☐Hours/☐days)
131
EDUCATION: Preventing Salmonella and other foodborne diseases 
Keep clean 
Wash your hands before handling food and often during food preparation. 
Wash your hands after going to the toilet, changing the baby or being in contact with animals. 
Wash and clean all surfaces and equipment used for food preparation or serving. 
Protect kitchen areas and food from insects, pests and other animals. 
Separate raw and cooked foods 
Separate raw meat, poultry, fish and seafood from other foods. 
Use separate equipment and utensils such as knives and cutting boards for handling raw foods. 
Store foods in covered containers to avoid contact between raw and cooked foods. 
Cook thoroughly 
Cook food thoroughly, especially meat, poultry, eggs, fish and seafood. For meat and poultry, make sure 
juices are clear, not pink. 
Bring foods like soups and stews to boiling point. 
Reheat cooked food thoroughly. Bring to the boil or heat until too hot to touch. Stir while re-heating. 
Keep food at safe temperatures 
Do not leave cooked food at room temperature for more than two hours. 
Do not store food too long, even in a refrigerator. 
Do not thaw frozen food at room temperature. 
Food for infants and young children and other people with low immune systems should ideally be freshly 
prepared and not stored at all after cooking. 
Use safe water and foods 
Do not use food beyond its expiry date. 
Wash fruits and vegetables in safe water, especially if eaten raw. 
Hygiene and preventing transmission discussed ☐Y    ☐N
Would you like us to send you a fact sheet with information 
about Salmonella? 
☐Y    ☐N
CONCLUSION 
“Thanks for your time today. 
The information you provide in this questionnaire is for the purpose of trying to prevent further cases of 
illness.  
We do this by trying to find out what is likely to have caused your illness and also by providing you with 
information to reduce the spread of illness to others.  
The data collected is kept confidential and identifying information will not be disclosed for any other 
purpose without your consent. 
If we have any further questions, could we contact you again?” ☐Y    ☐N
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INTERVIEW COMPLETED BY 
Name of Interviewer:  Interviewer  
Date of interview:        ___/___/_____    
Length of interview:                  minutes 
How well did the case recall the information requested?  ☐ very well    ☐ well   ☐ not well   ☐ not at all 
GENERAL NOTES: 
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Easton, Russell Stafford, Ann Koehler, Jeremy 
McAnulty, Vitali Sintchenko, Peter Howard, Qinning 
Wang, Deborah Williamson and Kirsty Hope
Dr Katherine Todd
Health Protection, NSW 
Australian National University (ANU)
Background
• Salmonellosis is a common cause of infectious
gastroenteritis
• Salmonella serotyping is essential for public
health surveillance and action
• Whole genome sequencing (WGS) is increasingly
being used to subtype Salmonella
Identification of the outbreak
• Friday 8 July
– 5 Salmonella Hvittingfoss notifications in 28 days
• Tuesday 12 July
– 16 notifications in 28 days
Number of Salmonella Hvittingfoss notifications by specimen collection date 
NSW, 2016
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8 July - Outbreak detected in NSW 
Number of Salmonella Hvittingfoss notifications by specimen collection date 
NSW, 2016
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12 July – MJOI initiated
2 August – High-risk groups advised not to 
consume rockmelon 
3 August – Rockmelon from farm X recalled 
8 July - Outbreak detected in NSW 
Methods 
• Epidemiological investigation
– Hypothesis generation and descriptive epidemiology 
– Case-control study 
• Microbiological investigation
– WGS of historical and current isolates
– Required construction of a reference genome 
• Environmental investigation
– Traceback of product from retail premises
– Sampling of products, premises and environment 
Appendix ϯ - Wresentation at tŚe oŵŵunicaďle isease ontrol conference͕ 
Delďourne͕ Australia͕ :une ϮϬ1ϳ
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Hypothesis generation - methods
• Confirmed outbreak case:
– Isolation of Salmonella Hvittingfoss with the outbreak 
strain on whole genome sequencing (WGS) in an 
individual tested in Australia on or after 14 June 2016 
• Interviewed confirmed and suspected cases
• Compared consumption patterns for fresh produce
items to Victorian data for community controls
Case-control study - methods
• 28 cases and 48 controls from NSW and SA
• Controls selected from cases of Salmonella
Typhimurium and Campylobacter
• Frequency matched by age and geographic area
Hypothesis generation - results 
Exposure 
Proportion of cases 
exposed
Background rate 
(estimated) P-value
carrots 25/30 (83%) 80% 0.43
apples 23/30 (77%) 70% 0.28
bananas 22/29 (76%) 75% 0.56
cucumbers 17/29 (59%) 50% 0.23
watermelon 14/27 (52%) 15% <0.01
rockmelon 13/28 (46%) 10% <0.01
strawberries 13/29 (45%) 30% 0.07
Univariate analysis
Case exposures Control exposures Odds ratio
Rockmelon 11/20 (55.0%) 7/48 (14.6%) 7.16 (1.87-27.93)
Fresh fruit salad 8/25 (32.0%) 4/47 (8.5%) 5.06 (1.14-25.45)
Strawberries 16/25 (64.0%) 15/45 (33.3%) 3.56 (1.14-11.33)
Honeydew 1/24 (4.2%) 1/48 (2.1%) 2.04 (0.02-163.75)
Watermelon 6/18 (33.3%) 16/45 (35.6%) 0.91 (0.23-3.25)
Multivariate analysis
 _cons  .0876022  .0613069 -3.48  0.001  .0222237  .3453136
 honeydew  .590351  .9642276 -0.32  0.747  .0240343  14.50068
 watermelon  .9111443  .6948658 -0.12  0.903  .2043786  4.06199
 blueberries  .6745908  .672492 -0.39  0.693  .0956064  4.759855
 strawberries  3.122617  2.414639  1.47  0.141  .6859723  14.21448
freshfruitsalad  1.997958  1.909418  0.72  0.469  .3069769  13.0037
 rockmelon  9.425444  7.538836  2.80  0.005  1.965521  45.19869
 casecontrol  Odds Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval]
Log likelihood = -24.241152  Pseudo R2  =  0.2621
 Prob > chi2  =  0.0085
 LR chi2(6)  =  17.22
Logistic regression  Number of obs  =  57
Whole genome sequencing
• 168 probable cases identified 
• 24 excluded 
• 34 cases not sequenced 
• 110 cases confirmed on WGS
– 99 cases of outbreak strain 1
(OC1)
– 10 cases of outbreak strain 2 
(OC2)
– 1 case with isolation of both
strains on separate samples 
(OC1 & OC2)
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0
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Environmental investigation 
• Approximately 50 melon growers in Australia
• Traceback based on common suppliers and
distribution patterns
• Traceback consistently implicated a single
farm
Other serovars?
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Epi week, 2016
Number of notifications of Salmonella by selected serovars in NSW children aged 0-4, Epi 
weeks 1 to 32, 2016
Hvittingfoss Mgulani ser 16:l,v:- Virchow Zanzibar
Number of Salmonella Hvittingfoss notifications by specimen collection date NSW, 2016
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Date
12 July – multi-jurisdictional outbreak 
investigation initiated 
2 August – High-risk groups advised not to 
consume rockmelon 
3 August – Rockmelon from farm X recalled 
8 July - Outbreak detected
Discussion
• WGS is a new and rapidly evolving technology 
• Advantages of WGS
– Can differentiate between linked and non-linked cases 
– Allows exclusion of non-outbreak cases
• Disadvantages of WGS
– Cost 
– Timeliness
– Utility in outbreaks of uncommon serovars
• Epidemiological links and evidence can exist independently 
of the WGS result and provide valuable information
Summary 
• This outbreak involved an unusual type of Salmonella
and disproportionately affected children under 5 and
the elderly
• The epidemiological, environmental and
microbiological investigation implicated rockmelon
• WGS identified two different strains of Salmonella
Hvittingfoss implicated in the outbreak
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Questions?
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For more information visit
www.sahealth.sa.gov.au
IF YOU HAVE 
ROCKMELON IN YOUR 
HOME, DISCARD IT
AVOID CONSUMING 
ROCKMELON UNTIL 
FURTHER NOTICE
WASHING THE 
ROCKMELON WILL 
NOT REMOVE 
SALMONELLA
Current advice on ROCKMELONS
SA Health is advising South Australians not to consume 
rockmelon after a national outbreak of Salmonella.
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Part II: 
Environmental Health 
Blood Lead Surveillance in 
New South Wales 
Lead makes the mind give way 
Dioscorides – 2nd century BC 
Minime fistulis plumbeis aqua duci videtur, si voumus eam habere salubrem 
(Water should on no account be conducted in leaden pipes if we are desirous that it should be 
wholesome)  
Vitruvius, “De architectura” – 15 BC 
I found myself near to certain ‘Lead-Mills’ and resolved to have a look at them… it was explained that 
the precaution of frequently changing the women employed in the worst parts of the work (a 
precaution originating in their own experience or apprehension of its ill effects) was found salutary. 
The philosophy of the matter of lead-poisoning and workpeople seems to me to have been pretty 
fairly summed up by the Irishwoman whom I quoted in my former paper: “Some of them gets lead-
poisoned soon, and some of them gets lead-poisoned later, and some, but not many, never”. 
Charles Dickens, “The Uncommercial Traveller” – 1861 
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Chapter 4 
The epidemiology of elevated blood lead 
levels in NSW, 1997–2016   
Photo of Central mine, Broken Hill taken in the early 1900s: Copyright: State Records NSW1 
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Prologue 
My role  
Elevated blood lead levels (also known as “lead poisoning”) have been notifiable in NSW since 
December 1996. In this time there has not been a consistent practice of reviewing the epidemiology 
of notifications of elevated blood lead levels at the state level. I completed a review of the 
epidemiology of notifications in NSW to provide a snapshot of elevated blood lead levels in NSW and 
to inform my evaluation of the NSW elevated blood lead surveillance system, discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 5.  
I conceived the project with the assistance of my field supervisors Jeremy McAnulty and Ben Scalley. 
I wrote the project plan and identified key datasets. I accessed NSW notification data via the 
Notifiable Condition Information Management System (NCIMS) and SAPHARI, the NSW Health data 
analytics warehouse, to analyse data on elevated blood lead levels. I performed the data analysis 
using Microsoft Excel, SAS version 6.1 and STATA version 14.1. To disseminate the results, I wrote up 
the results as a report and managed contributions from co-authors. Ben Scalley, Jeremy McAnulty 
and Martyn Kirk supervised the process through conception, execution and analysis, as well as 
assisting significantly with the write-up and preparation of the final chapter, conference 
presentations and journal articles; an editing process which required many iterations.    
Lessons learned  
I learned several skills throughout the course of this project. These included data manipulation skills 
in Stata 14.1 such as identifying duplicates, merging datasets, reshaping data, management of string 
data (including forced destring and cutting strings), using do files, cleaning and collapsing 
population data, calculating rates and constructing graphs.   
I also gained a greater understanding of the challenges of data management including the difficulties 
with completeness and the challenges of managing large datasets with wide variation in data entry 
methods. With regards to surveillance data, I learned the importance of a database being designed 
with analysis in mind as well as process documentation – particularly if this is one of the goals of the 
surveillance system.  
As well as practical skills in data analysis I learned a significant amount about managing the process – 
this included accurately documenting the methods used including writing methodology as-you-go, 
the importance of file and version management, and the value of a data analysis plan.  
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Public health implications  
Through completing this project, I identified that changes to the case definition have increased both 
the number and rate of notifications of elevated blood lead levels in NSW, and that notifications are 
distributed disproportionately between different geographical areas. This has implications for policy, 
particularly in a context where the notification level has been consistently revised downwards, as 
well as in resourcing public health units. In addition, completing the project allowed me to 
recommend changes to how data is collected, stored and retrieved in NCIMS to allow for ongoing 
and more frequent analysis of the epidemiology of elevated blood lead levels in NSW. 
An early draft of this report was submitted to the Australasian Faculty of Public Health Medicine 
(AFPHM) as a workplace report to meet assessment requirements for fellowship of the faculty. 
Versions of this report were also presented as oral presentations at the 9th Global TEPHINET 
conference in Chiang Mai, Thailand in August 2017 (Appendix 4); and at the International Society for 
Environmental Epidemiology (ISEE) Conference in Sydney, Australia in September 2017 (Appendix 5). 
A journal article is also being prepared for submission to Public Health Research and Practice.  
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Abstract 
Background/Aim:  
Elevated blood lead levels (formerly classified as “lead poisoning”) have been notifiable in New 
South Wales (NSW), Australia since December 1996. In that time the notifiable blood lead level has 
been reduced twice, from 15µg/dL to 10µg/dL in 2012 and to 5µg/dL in 2016. We reviewed the 
epidemiology of notifications from January 1997 to December 2016 and evaluated the impact of 
these changes to the case definition on notification rates in NSW, and assessed the characteristics 
and quality of surveillance data. 
Methods:  
We analysed notification data for 1997-2016 by age, sex, geographic area, exposure and occupation. 
We calculated notification rates and compared these over time and between geographic regions. 
We also described the characteristics of the surveillance dataset and made recommendations for 
improvement. We used Stata version 14.1 for all analyses. 
Results:   
There were 9,486 notifications from 1997–2016, with an average annual notification rate of 6.9 per 
100,000. In 2016 the notification rate of 13.0 per 100,000 was double the average rate for the 
preceding five years. When only notifications of blood lead levels above 15µg/dL were considered, 
the notification rate for 2016 was 1.8 per 100,000, the lowest rate during the 20-year study period. 
Notification rates in rural regions where lead mining has occurred, and where there is systematic 
screening, were significantly higher than in other regions. Key limitations of the data included the 
lack of a single comprehensive data source, high rates of missing data, and the presence of free-text 
responses in the dataset. These limitations made it difficult to analyse notification rates, particularly 
by risk and exposure history.  
Conclusions:  
Changes to the case definition increased notification rates of elevated blood lead. However, when 
considering only notifications above 15µg/dL, rates are at their lowest since state-wide surveillance 
began. It is important to improve data completeness in the blood lead surveillance system to 
enhance understanding of the epidemiology of elevated blood lead levels in NSW and factors which 
lead to increased risk, particularly as area demographics and risk profiles may change over time.  
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Background 
Lead was one of the first metals smelted and used by humans, due to its low melting point and high 
malleability, and today is the most widely used non-ferrous metal2. It has a variety of uses including 
waterproofing, electrical and radiation shielding, and the production of ammunitions, paints, 
plastics, ceramics, glass, and explosives2. The legacy of industrial lead use has been persistence of 
lead in the environment due to these human activities (mining, smelting, refining and recycling lead 
products) as well as due to the use of lead in paint, petrol and water systems.  
Lead acts as a cumulative toxicant, with effects on multiple body systems. Lead exposure in adults 
can cause anaemia, renal damage and hypertension, and at levels above 80µg/dL, cause 
encephalopathy and death. Chronic low-level exposure (such as occupationally) has been shown to 
be associated with subtle cognitive deterioration and brain matter loss3. Children are much more 
vulnerable to lead poisoning than adults, partly because they absorb four times more lead than 
adults and also because they are more likely to be exposed to lead from crawling on floors and hand-
to-mouth activity4. Effects in children occur at lower levels than adults, and population-level studies 
have shown that even among asymptomatic children exposure to lead can have significant effects on 
the developing brain including a reduction in IQ and behavioural disturbances3.  
The toxicity of lead has been recognised since antiquity5 and Australia has played a significant role in 
recognising the toxicity of lead in children – the first international clinical reports of lead poisoning 
among children (described then as “plumbism”) were made in Brisbane, Australia in 1890s, with the 
source ultimately identified as paint on rails in the children’s homes5-7. In 1922 Queensland was one 
of the first jurisdictions in the world to pass legislation regulating the use of lead paint in households, 
nearly 57 years before similar legislation was introduced in the United States5, 7.  
Infants, young children and pregnant women are most susceptible to the toxic effects of lead. 
Children are particularly at-risk due to their higher absorption of lead from the gastrointestinal and 
respiratory tract, and their smaller proportional size. The most significant impact in children is due to 
the neurotoxicity of lead, which can cause serious and potentially irreversible neurological damage2. 
Preventing and reducing exposure to environmental lead is the single most effective intervention 
against lead poisoning8, 9.  
In Australia, blood lead levels have declined significantly since lead was removed from petrol, 
significantly reduced in household paint, and regulations were introduced to restrict or prevent the 
use of lead in consumer goods, medicines and imported products 10. The regulation of lead has been 
significantly strengthened over the last three decades in response to research that has reported 
health effects of lead at levels that had previously been regarded as safe 11. Meta analyses have 
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demonstrated an inverse association between lead exposure and IQ, and the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) has consistently revised downward the definition of a “normal” blood 
ůĞĂĚ ůĞǀĞů ;>>Ϳ ŝŶ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ͕ ĨƌŽŵ ϲϬʅŐͬĚ> ŝŶ ƚŚĞ 19ϲϬƐ ƚŽ фϱʅŐͬĚ> ŝŶ 2Ϭ122.  
A person with elevated lead levels may be asymptomatic, and when symptoms do occur they are 
often relatively non-specific. Laboratory investigations are the only reliable way to diagnose lead-
exposed individuals.  Blood lead testing is therefore used for surveillance of lead poisoning and in 
the assessment of occupational and environmental lead exposure 9. 
Blood lead surveillance in NSW 
The NSW Ministry of Health governs the NSW public health system, operating health services 
through a network of Local Health Districts (LHDs). There are 15 LHDs (Figure 1) throughout NSW; 
each LHD is served by one or more Public Health Units (PHUs) that are responsible for responding to 
reports of notifiable diseases within their jurisdictions. Centrally within the NSW Ministry of Health, 
Health Protection NSW is responsible for overarching surveillance and public health response 
including monitoring the incidence of notifiable diseases at a state-wide level12. 
Figure 1 – Local Health Districts in New South Wales 
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The NSW blood lead surveillance system was established in the early 1990s and has two main 
objectives13, 14: 
1. To identify cases and recommend appropriate risk reduction measures
2. To monitor the epidemiology of elevated blood lead levels to inform the development of
better risk reduction strategies
Under the NSW Public Health Act 2010, pathology laboratories are required to notify cases of 
elevated blood levels to their local PHU on identification13.  The case definition of an elevated blood 
lead level has changed over time – under the current case definition, a confirmed case is: 
A person with a venous blood lead level of ≥5 μg/dL (0.24μmol/L) 
Prior to February 2016 thĞ ůĞǀĞů ĨŽƌ ŶŽƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ш1Ϭ ʅŐͬĚ> ;Ϭ.48ʅŵŽůͬ>Ϳ͕ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝŽƌ ƚŽ DĂǇ 2Ϭ12 
ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ш1ϱ ʅŐͬĚ> ;Ϭ.ϳ2ʅŵŽůͬ>Ϳ13.  
Notifications are entered into the online Notifiable Conditions Information Management System 
(NCIMS), which has been in use since 201014. NCIMS is a confidential application that provides state-
wide data capture, management and reporting of scheduled medical conditions notifiable under the 
NSW Public Health Act 2010 from pathology laboratories, general practitioners and hospitals15. 
NCIMS is routinely used as a tool to follow-up and manage individual notifications rather than for 
wider analysis; however, it does have the function to export aggregate data in spreadsheet form. 
Surveillance data entered in NCIMS is stored in the Secure Analytics for Population Health Research 
and Intelligence (SAPHaRI) digital warehouse. SAPHaRI is designed to provide data in a format that is 
ready to be analysed and reported for the purposes of epidemiology and surveillance, and contains 
databases of health, demographic population and geographic data16. The SAPHaRI analytics system 
does not typically export all information recorded in NCIMS: the NCIMS export dataset contains 551 
variables (Appendix 1) compared to the 300 core variables routinely extracted in SAPHaRI (Appendix 
2). 
Response to a notification of an elevated blood lead level is done at the LHD level by the PHU. The 
response protocol following a notification involves the PHU: 
1. Confirming with the treating doctor any symptoms associated with exposure, including the
onset date
2. Contacting the case (with permission of the notifying doctor) to interview the case or their
parent/guardian
3. Identifying household contacts who may also be at risk of elevated blood lead levels
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Actions that should be taken are determined by the age of the case and the blood lead level (Table 
1). If the source of the exposure is not clear after the initial investigation has taken place, the PHU 
arranges an environmental assessment of the residential area if the case's blood lead level is in 
ĞǆĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ 2ϱ ʅŐͬĚ> ;1.2 ʅŵŽůͬ>Ϳ ĂŶĚͬŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŵĂǇ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ13. 
SafeWork NSW, the state workplace health and safety regulator, is consulted if there is any suspicion 
of a cluster of occupationally exposed cases occurring or if blood lead levels of >25µg/dL are notified 
in an adult who may have been exposed in the workplace.  
Table 1 - Blood lead levels and corresponding actions taken by PHU according to age 
Blood lead range шϱ ďƵƚ 1ϬфʅŐͬd> ш1Ϭ ďƵƚ ϮϱфʅŐͬd> шϮϱ ďƵƚ ϰϱфʅŐͬd> шϰϱʅŐͬd> 
ф ϱ ǇĞĂƌƐ Consult doctor 
Standard letter 
May need to test 
household 
members 
Consult doctor 
Standard letter 
Offer 
counselling/risk 
assessment  
May need to test 
household 
members 
Retest BLL after 6 
months  
As for level 2 
plus: 
Preliminary 
environmental 
assessment 
including home 
visit, exposure 
pathways and 
sampling  
Expert advice re: 
BLL retest  
As for level 3 
plus: 
Ensure treating 
doctor aware of 
result as levels 
ш4ϱ ʅŐͬĚ> ŵĂǇ 
require chelation 
шϱ ǇĞĂƌƐ Consult doctor 
Standard letter 
May need to test 
household 
members 
Consult doctor 
Standard letter 
Advise to discuss 
with employer  
Inform Safe work 
if cluster of cases 
Offer 
counselling/risk 
assessment  
May need to test 
household 
members 
As for level 2 
plus: 
Preliminary 
environmental 
assessment 
including home 
visit, exposure 
pathways and 
sampling  
Strongly suggest 
consultation with 
SafeWork NSW 
As for level 3 
plus: 
Ensure treating 
doctor aware of 
result as levels 
шϳϬ ʅŐͬĚ> ŵĂǇ 
require chelation 
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Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this review was to look at how the epidemiology of elevated blood lead notifications had 
changed in NSW over time. The objectives  were to: 
1. Describe the characteristics of notified cases including age, gender, and potential exposures
in NSW between 1997 and 2016
2. Describe how notifications have changed over time, including the impact of changes to the
case definition on notification rates of elevated blood lead level
3. Assess the quality of data present in NCIMS and SAPHaRI, including describing how data is
recorded, stored and retrieved and its characteristics.
Methods  
Notification data 
Surveillance data for the condition “lead poisoning” for the period 1997-2016 were extracted from 
SAPHaRI using SAS 61 and exported as a Microsoft Excel file. This was imported into Stata version 
14.1. The initial dataset included 300 variables; those variables that contained no data were 
removed.   
Blood lead levels  
NCIMS is a person-based rather than an event-based surveillance system; thus, although it is 
possible for an individual to have multiple notifications of an elevated blood lead at different points 
in time, these will all be identified in the system as a single individual (and therefore notification) 
with multiple blood lead levels recorded. SAPHaRI only provided the first 5 lab results from all the 
available lab results; these varied between representing the 5 most recent blood lead results and the 
5 earliest blood lead results due to idiosyncracies of data entry.  A data export containing all 
laboratory results was extracted from NCIMS and merged onto the core dataset to ensure inclusion 
of all laboratory results recorded throughout the life of the surveillance system, rather than just the 
five most recent results. The earliest notified lead level for each individual was used to represent 
that notification regardless of any later blood lead levels notified.  
Blood lead levels had been entered as free-text, leading to significant variation in the format and 
syntax of entries. Variations included numbers, letters, symbols and indication of units in the values 
field. Examples included:  
• Pb=11.4
• 4.11 miumol/L (sic)
• umol/L 8.81 µg/dL 16.8”.
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To convert these to numerical values, the destring and force commands were used iteratively 
in Stata by length of response, with a small number of results re-entered manually. An example of 
the process for destringing, cleaning and checking each individual lab results for biological 
plausibility is illustrated in Appendix 1.  In addition, a new variable was created based on the 
category of the earliest blood lead level notified. First notifications were categorised ĂƐ ͞<10µg/
dL”, “10-15µg/dL” and “>15 µg/dL”. 
Date 
A date variable was generated based on the date of the first lab test. The “calculated onset date” 
variable was used for date if there was no lab test date available.   This variable is automatically 
generated by NCIMS is based on a simple earliest date formula, taking the earliest date of:  
1. Diagnosis date
2. Symptom Onset Date
3. Specimen Date
4. Notification Sent Date
5. Notification Received Date
6. Event create date
Results were analysed by year of onset. 
Geographical location 
NCIMS and SAPHaRI automatically generate multiple options for geographical location based on the 
address of the person at the time of notification. If this address is inadequate, the geographical 
location is assigned based on the doctor’s address. The geographical borders of local health 
districts have changed over time in NSW. The current LHD borders (defined in 2010) were chosen as 
the unit for geographical analysis. 
Aboriginal status  
There were initially 5 options for Aboriginal status: “Aboriginal”, “Both Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander”, “Not Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander”, “Not stated or unknown”, and “Missing”. For 
clarity and in line with accepted NSW Health terminology these were condensed into three 
variables as follows:  
• Aboriginal - includes "Aboriginal," and "Both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander"
• Non-Aboriginal - includes "Not Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander"
• Missing - includes "Not stated or unknown" and "Missing"
Occupation  
There were three variables initially available for occupation – occupation, high risk occupation, 
and high-risk occupation – other (description).  
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• Occupation included 176 unique variables with entries for 4836 individuals
• High risk occupation included 22 unique variables with entries for 1758 individuals
• High risk occupation – other (description) included 202 unique variables with entries for 280
individuals
The 22 categories of occupation from high risk occupation were reduced to 14 by combining similar 
categories (e.g. ‘lead miner” and “miner” were combined into single category) and classifying some 
non-relevant occupations as “other” (e.g. sex worker). All categories of occupation with greater than 
50 results were created a new variable within high risk occupation or absorbed into existing high-
risk categories. All children aged 14 and under were categorised as “no high-risk occupation”.  
Exposure  
The details of lead exposure are not contained in SAPHaRI, however this information is routinely 
collected in NCIMS. To obtain this information, data was extracted from NCIMS  as an Excel 
spreadsheet for the period 1/1/1997-31/12/2016 by “Calculated Onset Date” for the condition 
“Lead Poisoning”. This was imported into Stata and merged onto the core dataset on the variables 
of eventid and personid present in both datasets.  
Risk factors  
15 separate risk factors categories were asked about in the NCIMS question package. In the exported 
dataset, a separate field had been generated for those who had multiple risk factors ticked (i.e. a 
child who had the risk factors of “Pica” and “a sibling with a positive blood test” would be included 
in a risk category of their own labelled “Pica/Sibling with a positive blood test”). The initial table with 
36 variables was exported into Microsoft Excel and aggregate counts done manually for the 15 
separate risk category options.  
Population data 
Denominator data to calculate rates by age, sex, jurisdiction and year were obtained from the 
SAPHaRI portal and exported as a Microsoft Excel worksheet. These data were generated by the 
Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence within the NSW Ministry of Health. Age- and sex-specific 
estimated resident populations (ERPs) for NSW Statistical Areas (Levels 1 and 2) (SA1 and SA2) at 30 
June were obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) for use with calendar year data. 
Populations of NSW Local Health Districts (LHDs) were derived by aggregating the appropriate Local 
Government Area (LGA) or SLA-level ERPs where possible. When LHD populations could not be 
calculated using LGA or SLA-level ERPs, these populations were calculated using either SA1 or CD 
(census collection district) estimates.  
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Projected populations were produced by the NSW Department of Planning and Environment. The 
projections are based on the 2011 estimated resident population as published by the ABS. The 
projections result from assumptions about future trends in fertility, mortality and migration and 
incorporate information from the ABS, Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Border 
Control and the NSW Ministry of Health. The inter-census year projections from 2012-2015 were 
produced by the Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence by interpolating the census-year (2016) 
projection provided by Department of Planning and Environment.  
Ethics 
Ethics committee approval was not required for this project as the data is collected mandatorily 
under the auspices of the NSW Public Health Act (2010), and for this project was used for the 
primary purpose for which it was collected, namely: 
“To identify cases of elevated blood lead levels and recommend appropriate risk reduction 
measures and to monitor the epidemiology of elevated blood lead levels to inform the 
development of better risk reduction strategies”.  
Standard NSW Health guidelines were followed with regards to the protection of potentially 
identifying data.  
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Results 
There were 9486 cases notified in NSW residents in the study period, with an average overall 
notification rate of 6.9 cases per 100,000 people. Following an initial peak in the year 2000 of 14.2 
notifications per 100,000, notification rates remained static at between 2 and 4 per 100,000 
between 2005-2011, until changes were made to the case definition. Reductions in the notifiable 
blood lead level increased the notification rate in 2012, and again in 2016 (Figure 2).  
Figure Ϯ – EŽƚiĨiĐĂƚiŽn ƌĂƚe ŽĨ eůeǀĂƚed ďůŽŽd ůeĂd ůeǀeůƐ in E^t peƌ 1ϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ pŽpƵůĂƚiŽn͕ 1ϵϵϳ-
ϮϬ1ϲ 
Of the 9486 notifications, 8104 (85.43%) had a blood lead level recorded on NCIMS and met the case 
definition in the year they were notified (Figure 3). The number of notifications of ш15µg/dL trended 
down over the study period, and the increase in the number of notifications between 2012-2016 
was accounted for by changes in the case definition – particularly in 2016 where more than half of 
ŶŽƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ф1ϬђŐͬĚ>. &Žƌ ďůŽŽĚ ůĞĂĚ ůĞǀĞůƐ ŽĨ 15µg/dL or above, the notification rate 
remained at between 2 and 4 per 100,000 for the period 2012 to 2015, and in 2016 it fell to its 
lowest point of 1.8 per 100,000. 
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Figure 3 - Number of notifications by range of first lead level nŽƚiĨied Ănd ǇeĂƌ͕ E^t͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ 
Data completeness - blood lead levels  
Data completeness improved during the study period. The number of notifications for which a 
corresponding blood lead level was recorded ranged from a low of 62.8% in 1998 to a high of 99.8% 
in 2015. Reasons for this improvement could include the increased proportion of results transmitted 
via electronic laboratory reporting (ELR) and the change of system from the Notifiable Diseases 
Database (NDD) to NCIMS in 2010, although the improvement appears steady over the entire study 
period.   
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Figure ϰ - Proportion of notifications who have a blood lead level recorded following data 
ĐůeĂninŐ͕ E^t͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ 
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Characteristics of notifications 
Age 
The greatest number of notifications during the study period came from children aged 0-4 years, 
with a second peak in young adults aged 25-34 years. This corresponds with the two known risk 
categories for lead exposure of young children and industrial workers (who are more likely to be 
younger adults of working age).  In 2012, and again in 2016, there was an increase in the notification 
rate for all age groups, particularly amongst young children aged 0-4 years (Figure 5).  
Figure ϱ - EŽƚiĨiĐĂƚiŽn ƌĂƚe peƌ 1ϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ ďǇ ĂŐe ŐƌŽƵp͕ E^t͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ 
Sex  
Sex was recorded for 99.7% (9458/9586) of notifications. Of those with sex recorded, 90.2% were 
male. Men had higher notification rates than women in every year (Figure 6), although between 
2004 and 2011 the notification rate among men was substantially lower than in other years. In the 0-
4 year age group where the notification rate amongst females was highest, females represented 
42.1% of notifications. The lowest proportion of females occurred in the 15-19 year age group, with 
females representing 2.5% of notifications.    
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Figure ϲ – EŽƚiĨiĐĂƚiŽn ƌĂƚe peƌ 1ϬϬ͕ϬϬϬ pŽpƵůĂƚiŽnƐ ďǇ Ɛex Ănd ǇeĂƌ͕ E^t͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ 
Aboriginal status  
Aboriginal status was recorded for 26.9% (2551/9486) of notifications. The LHD with the greatest 
proportion of notifications that were identified as Aboriginal among notifications where this 
field was completed was Far West NSW at 26.4%, followed by the Illawarra Shoalhaven at 14.3% 
and Sydney LHD at 11.8%. This was higher than might be expected given the Aboriginal 
populations in these locations in 2011 were  11.7%, 2.4% and  1.1% respectively16a.  
Aboriginal status was recorded to varying levels of completeness across the LHDs. The lowest 
completion rates were in Northern Sydney LHD, with 232 of 233 notifications (99.6%) having 
Aboriginal status recorded as “(blank)” or “unknown/not stated”. Highest completion rates were 
in Far West LHD with only 281 of 1790 (26.9%) missing. 
Appendix 2 shows data completeness for the Aboriginal status field by LHD for the study period.  
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Geographic location 
The largest number of notifications came from Far West Local Health District. Far West LHD is the 
smallest LHD in terms of population; its resident population in 2016 was 30,740, representing 0.4% 
of the total population of NSW. Figure 7 compares the relative contribution of Far West to the 
overall notification rate for NSW, and shows that from 2012 Far West LHD contributed increasing 
proportions of the overall notification rate.  
Figure ϳ – Relative contribution ŽĨ &Ăƌ teƐƚ >, ƚŽ ƚŚe ŽǀeƌĂůů nŽƚiĨiĐĂƚiŽn ƌĂƚe͕ E^t͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ 
Further information about notification rates by LHD is included in Table 5 and Figure 9 and Figure 10 
in Appendix 3, which shows notification rates per 100,000 for the 15 LHDs in NSW by year. The 
lowest average notification rates over the study period was 1.4 per 100,000 in Northern Sydney LHD, 
whilst the highest was 278.0 per 100,000 in Far West LHD.  In the early years of the surveillance 
system Hunter New England LHD had the second highest rates of notifications, replaced in recent 
years by Western NSW LHD. Apart from Far West LHD, with an average notification rate of 278.0 per 
100,000, no other LHD exceeded a notification rate of 60 per 100,000 in any year. The next highest 
average notification rate was Hunter New England with 13.3 per 100,000.  
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xpŽƐƵƌe 
Information on exposure history was present for 539 notifications. There were 15 different exposure 
options available (Table 2). 539 of the 9486 notifications (5.7%) had at least one documented risk 
exposure, with 1127 total exposures identified for these 539 individuals. The most frequently 
indicated risk exposure category was “Recent demolition of houses nearby" (31.4%), followed by 
“Lives in a house... with recent renovations” (24.0%).  
Table Ϯ – &ƌeƋƵenĐǇ ŽĨ ƌiƐŬ expŽƐƵƌe ĐĂƚeŐŽƌieƐ ĨŽƌ nŽƚiĨiĐĂƚiŽnƐ in E^t͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ 
ZiƐŬ expŽƐƵƌe ĐĂƚeŐŽƌǇ Number of times noted 
Car batteries dismantled at place of residence 1 
Alternative medicines 3 
Chews/sucks on painted toys 2 
>ŝǀĞ ŚŽƵƐĞ ďƵŝůƚ ф 19ϳϬ - peeling paint 7 
>ŝǀĞ ŚŽƵƐĞ ďƵŝůƚ ф 19ϳϬ - recent painting 5 
>ŝǀĞ ŚŽƵƐĞ ďƵŝůƚ ф 19ϳϬ - recent renovations 270 
Lives in an area where there is a lead industry 7 
Live in or near a house built before 1970 9 
Lives near main road/highway  85 
Participates in risk hobbies 20 
Person suffers from Pica 11 
Recent demolition of houses nearby 354 
Sibling/other household member with elevated blood lead 46 
No identifiable risk 42 
Other 265 
TOTAL 1127 
A risk exposure category was recorded for 38 of the 1389 children notified (2.7%), with 49 exposures 
identified for these 38 children. The most common exposure categories for children were “Person 
suffers from Pica” and “Other”; both occurred 24.5% of the time.   
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Occupation 
Occupation was recorded for 6200 of the 9486 notifications. The most frequent risk exposure 
category was “Miner”, followed by “Smelter Worker”.  Table 3 lists the high-risk exposure categories 
in descending order of frequency. Two categories, “Plumber” and “Stained Glass Manufacturer” 
occurred less than 10 times over the twenty-year study period.  
Table 3 – High risk occupations by frequency of reporting 
High risk occupation Total Total percentage 
No high risk occupation 1528 16.1 
Miner 615 6.5 
Smelter Worker 548 5.8 
Contractor 396 4.2 
Factory Worker 209 2.2 
Metal Worker 205 2.2 
Lead Miner 182 1.9 
Painter 132 1.4 
Automotive Worker 61 0.6 
Foundry Worker 26 0.3 
Metal Recycler 18 0.2 
Demolisher 10 0.1 
Plumber 7 0.1 
Stained Glass Manufacturer 2 0.02 
Other/Unknown  2261 23.8 
MISSING 3286 34.6 
Total 9486 100.0 
Data quality 
The data exhibited considerable variation in quality. A variety of strategies were required to extract 
the best data for different variables. In general, demographic data was for the most part complete 
particularly for the key variables of age, date of birth and notifying jurisdiction.  
Laboratory data was generally disorganized and sometimes of poor quality. Electronically 
transmitted data was of better quality than manually entered data. Blood lead levels were reported 
in µg/dL only slightly more frequently than µmol/L, with a significant number of notifications 
reported in both. Frequently the units corresponding with the reported level were not indicated and 
could only be inferred. The data entry field for blood lead levels in NCIMS was free-text, leading to 
significant variation in the format and syntax of entries and making analysis difficult. Variations 
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included numbers, letters, symbols and indication of units in the values field. This data was neither 
easily cleaned nor analysed.  
There were also several apparent idiosyncratic entries for blood lead level, where the same 
individual had multiple notifications from the same date and the same laboratory accession number, 
but different values – in one individual five very different blood lead levels were reported for the 
same laboratory accession number on the same day.  
Overall the data was difficult to access and analyse. That multiple methods and data sources were 
required to export, clean and merge the relevant data led to difficulties analysing the data, 
particularly when essential numbers such as case count were different when using different export 
methods. There was a significant amount of missing data, particularly for occupation and exposure. 
Additionally, “occupational exposure” was not a listed risk exposure category, and it is likely that 
many of those without a risk category identified had an occupational exposure.  
Discussion 
Changes to the case definition for elevated blood lead levels in recent years have led to increases in 
notifications, both in terms of crude numbers and population rates. However, notifications in the 
highest range of >15µg/dL have declined, with levels in 2016 at their lowest since elevated blood 
lead became notifiable in NSW. This mirrors trends seen worldwide that have shown reductions not 
only in the total number of cases of elevated blood lead but also to population-level mean blood 
lead concentration, following reductions in the use of lead in petrol, paint and other industrial 
processes17. In Australia exposure to lead has fallen significantly due to public health measures 
restricting the use of lead in manufactured products as well as the shutdown of previous sites of lead 
industry18.  
Notification rates were highest in children aged 0-4 years, reflecting the findings of Freeman et al14 
in their previous review of blood lead levels in NSW. This likely represents higher levels of testing in 
this age group and awareness that children under 4 are more vulnerable to elevated blood 19, as well 
as the existence of screening programs in specific locations where is environmental lead is endemic 
such as Broken Hill20, and because testing is recommended for children with a new diagnosis of 
behavioural problems21. Notification rates in older children were very low.  
Among adults, a noteworthy proportion of the increase in notifications following changes to the case 
definition in 2016 appeared to be among older adults aged 55+ years. In 2016 the notification rate 
among ages 55-59 years was higher than for 25-29 years, which represented a significant deviation 
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from trends over the previous five years. This could potentially reflect findings in the literature that 
older people generally have higher blood and bone levels than younger adults both due to their 
accumulated exposure to lead over time, particularly in historical periods of less-stringent 
regulation, as well as the mobilisation of lead from bone due to conditions such as osteoporosis22, 23. 
This apparent disproportionate rise in the notification rate among older adults warrants further 
investigation with regards to whether it is geographically clustered, for example in regions of high 
historic lead exposure such as Hunter New England. It may also represent increased testing in older 
adults who are undergoing screening of cognitive changes such as dementia, as the population ages. 
In line with historic trends14, notification rates were highest in the rural local health districts of 
Western NSW and Far West, areas with a history of lead mining activity. The notification rate in Far 
West LHD in 2016 was 884.84 cases per 100,000 population, more than 16 times the rate of Western 
NSW with 53.01 notifications per 100,000. No other LHD exceeded 14.0 per 100,000. The elevated 
notification rate in Broken Hill occurs against a backdrop of high community awareness and 
voluntary screening of all children in Broken Hill linked with existing routine health programs20, and 
thus may represent higher levels of testing as well as higher levels generally. Overall all PHUs saw an 
increase in notifications in 2016 following changes to the case definition. This has implications 
regarding the resourcing of PHUs, particularly if there are any further changes to the case definition. 
It was challenging in this analysis to analyse risk factors and exposure as they were generally poorly 
recorded. This means that potential newly-emerging exposures may not be identified. This could be 
problematic for ongoing surveillance as many cases of severe lead toxicity in adults are actually not 
associated with occupational exposures but rather with more exotic exposures, such as ingestion of 
Ayurvedic medicines, imported foods, use of imported cosmetics and exposure to unusual hobbies 
(such as shooting and lead lighting)2.  
Recommendations 
The quality of data collected could be improved significantly with simple changes to the data entry 
mechanism on NCIMS – this could include updating and/or clarifying the potential list of exposures, 
including occupation as a potential exposure, converting the entry field for “blood lead level” to a 
numerical field, and creating a drop-down box for the units for which the level was recorded. There 
could also be a note reporting that only one unit was required to be recorded, or a mechanism for 
automatically converting all lead levels to a single measure (i.e. µg/dL). In addition, the analysis 
function in NCIMS could be significantly improved, particularly if a regular reporting form in NCIMS, 
such as that utilised in Communicable Disease Branch which generates a standardised “MMWR” 
style report, was used. This could allow for regular analysis to be conducted within NCIMS and 
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negate the need for regular data exports and complex data transformation and analysis methods. 
This could enable the identification of missing data early and allow for comparisons of data 
completeness between different PHUs.  
A future ideal database would have a single dataset that was able to be extracted easily, that was 
complete and accurate, that was reasonably easy to analyse with simple software (e.g. Microsoft 
Excel) and that contained numerical blood lead levels.   
Limitations 
This data analysis had many significant limitations, owing particularly to challenges in the data set. 
There was a significant volume of missing data, particularly surrounding occupation and exposure, 
which meant that interesting and potentially useful analyses that could have led to public health 
interventions was not able to be undertaken. The frequency of missing data remained relatively 
static over time, suggesting that the changes to the case definition have not had a significant impact 
on data completeness. This volume of missing data meant that detection of possible trends in 
exposure, or meaningful conclusions – such as, for example, that exposures due to lead mining in the 
area have decreased over time – were not able to be made.  
However, identification of these limitations provided key information on the attributes and 
usefulness of the surveillance system as it currently stands. Both simple and more complex changes 
that could be made, in data collection, storage and analyses, were identified that were useful to the 
evaluation of the blood lead surveillance system discussed in Chapter 5, and are incorporated into 
recommendations regarding future improvements to the surveillance system.   
Conclusion 
Changes to the case definition have increased the number and rate of notifications of elevated blood 
lead levels in NSW, which are distributed disproportionately between LHDs. There were significant 
volumes of missing data regarding risk factors for exposure, which meant that meaningful 
conclusions about whether risk factors had changed over time could not be drawn. It is 
recommended that changes be made to how data is collected, stored and retrieved in NCIMS to 
allow for ongoing and more frequent analysis of the epidemiology of elevated blood lead levels in 
NSW. 
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Figure 1 –Example data cleaning process required for blood lead levels in field “lab result 1” 
Lab result 1
9543 results
1286 missing results 8257 non-numeric results 
6986 numeric results 1271 non-numeric results 
1st iteration – 372 
numeric results 
2nd iteration – 82 
numeric results
3rd iteration – 647 
numeric results 
4th iteration – 126 
numeric results 
40 non-numeric 
results remain
2437 results in range from 
0.027-4.15 (likely µmol/L )
5807 results in range from 
5-127 (likely µg/dL)
8 results reclassified 
as “missing” as <0.24
2429 results multiplied 
by 20.71
8244 numeric 
values 
8236 numeric results 
In range 5-127ug/dL 
27 results entered 
numerically by hand 
13 results reclassified 
as “missing” as no 
logical numeric value
Destring and replace 
Cut strings 
and forced 
destring 
Data entered 
by hand   
Inference of appropriate 
units    
Conversion to µg/dL 
ƉƉendiǆ ϭ - ata cleaning Ɖrocess
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Table ϰ – Data completeness for Aboriginal status among elevated blood lead level notifications by 
>,͕ E^t͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ 
LHD Missing Total % complete 
Northern Sydney 232 233 0.4 
Illawarra Shoalhaven 376 383 1.8 
Western Sydney 676 698 3.1 
Sydney 414 431 3.9 
Hunter New England 2010 2167 7.2 
Murrumbidgee 320 364 12.1 
South Eastern Sydney 355 411 13.6 
Nepean Blue Mountains 301 351 14.2 
Western NSW 747 1043 28.4 
Northern NSW 130 191 31.9 
Central Coast 108 160 32.5 
Southern NSW 65 98 33.7 
South Western Sydney 686 1086 36.8 
Network with Vic 14 23 39.1 
Mid North Coast 20 57 64.9 
Far West 481 1790 73.1 
Total 6935 9486 26.9 
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Table ϱ – EŽƚiĨiĐĂƚiŽn ƌĂƚeƐ ďǇ E^t >ŽĐĂů ,eĂůƚŚ iƐƚƌiĐƚ Ănd zeĂƌ͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ 
1ϵϵϳ 1ϵϵϴ 1ϵϵϵ ϮϬϬϬ ϮϬϬ1 ϮϬϬϮ ϮϬϬϯ ϮϬϬϰ ϮϬϬϱ ϮϬϬϲ ϮϬϬϳ ϮϬϬϴ ϮϬϬϵ ϮϬ1Ϭ ϮϬ11 ϮϬ1Ϯ ϮϬ1ϯ ϮϬ1ϰ ϮϬ1ϱ ϮϬ1ϲ MEAN 
Sydney 2.68 17.87 9.78 6.48 3.63 5.00 2.37 2.34 1.73 2.84 2.41 1.81 0.71 1.39 2.41 1.86 3.82 2.93 3.04 6.25 4.07 
South Western 
Sydney 
11.29 25.15 11.71 17.76 6.69 4.76 4.11 4.61 3.72 4.30 1.94 2.62 2.11 1.50 2.85 5.40 3.65 4.34 2.77 12.00 6.66 
South Eastern 
Sydney 
3.49 4.80 3.30 4.85 2.09 2.85 1.16 0.90 1.40 4.18 1.62 1.47 0.84 0.95 1.41 2.68 2.76 2.04 1.57 6.36 2.54 
Illawarra 
Shoalhaven 
8.25 5.54 13.55 4.83 9.88 10.90 2.50 4.98 0.28 3.03 5.72 1.35 3.45 0.52 1.30 2.06 9.96 4.04 3.25 9.14 5.23 
Western Sydney 5.96 13.06 4.87 9.98 7.98 6.45 4.30 4.51 3.76 2.91 2.59 1.51 1.47 1.56 2.48 4.86 4.41 3.09 1.94 5.17 4.64 
Nepean Blue 
Mountains 
7.68 10.37 3.62 8.37 4.47 5.35 2.68 2.69 4.49 2.40 1.79 4.11 2.33 2.31 2.58 7.97 9.56 5.00 1.10 13.03 5.09 
Northern Sydney 1.05 3.67 2.99 2.19 1.28 2.04 2.16 1.27 0.89 1.26 0.74 0.49 1.32 0.59 0.23 1.16 1.14 1.12 1.32 1.87 1.44 
Central Coast 1.81 14.64 1.75 1.72 2.38 2.35 0.33 2.67 2.65 0.66 0.65 0.96 0.32 0.94 2.17 2.46 4.57 2.72 2.40 4.42 2.63 
Hunter New 
England 
46.41 19.86 19.83 55.20 22.92 19.06 14.18 9.13 6.54 4.95 2.63 4.37 5.61 2.31 1.37 5.31 5.36 4.98 3.51 11.63 13.26 
Northern NSW 3.58 5.88 6.19 4.20 1.14 3.00 1.11 4.42 0.37 1.45 1.08 2.49 2.82 1.05 0.69 3.46 3.43 4.78 4.73 12.60 3.42 
Mid North Coast 0.57 3.93 2.76 1.63 1.62 4.25 4.20 0.52 0.00 0.51 1.01 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.95 2.36 0.47 3.21 1.47 
Southern NSW 4.89 2.42 2.98 2.34 1.73 1.13 1.12 1.66 4.37 2.70 1.60 0.53 0.52 2.05 2.03 2.52 1.00 2.98 3.95 9.58 2.60 
Murrumbidgee 2.99 2.56 3.41 2.97 3.40 1.70 2.14 0.86 0.43 1.71 1.71 4.68 3.81 15.19 25.70 25.62 25.57 9.57 5.80 13.23 7.65 
Western NSW 3.05 7.96 3.02 4.88 6.39 5.65 8.34 8.77 8.42 25.29 24.08 30.35 8.26 15.24 14.77 33.28 31.91 34.14 57.21 53.01 19.20 
Far West 181.64 349.92 464.13 275.39 152.43 288.58 129.93 79.76 0.00 12.53 106.64 44.11 25.38 121.28 131.72 537.32 851.67 579.39 343.03 884.84 277.98 
Network with Vic 4.57 2.26 0.00 0.00 6.62 2.18 0.00 0.00 2.12 2.10 2.07 2.06 0.00 6.09 0.00 0.00 9.94 5.87 1.93 0.00 2.39 
NSW COMBINED 11͘Ϭ1 1ϯ͘ϱϬ 1Ϭ͘Ϭϲ 1ϰ͘ϮϬ ϳ͘ϰ1 ϳ͘ϲ1 ϰ͘ϴϯ ϰ͘1ϱ Ϯ͘ϵϯ ϯ͘ϴϵ ϯ͘ϯϱ ϯ͘ϯϲ Ϯ͘ϰϰ Ϯ͘ϴϳ ϯ͘ϱϯ ϳ͘ϲϲ ϵ͘ϰ1 ϳ͘Ϭϯ ϱ͘ϵ1 1Ϯ͘ϵϳ 6.91 
ƉƉendiǆ ϯ - notification rates bǇ >, 
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Figure ϵ - EŽƚiĨiĐĂƚiŽn ƌĂƚe ďǇ E^t >ŽĐĂů ,eĂůƚŚ iƐƚƌiĐƚ͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ 
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Figure 1Ϭ - EŽƚiĨiĐĂƚiŽn ƌĂƚe ďǇ E^t >ŽĐĂů ,eĂůƚŚ iƐƚƌiĐƚ͕ 1ϵϵϳ-ϮϬ1ϲ ;&Ăƌ teƐƚ >, exĐůƵdedͿ 
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Dr Katherine Todd
Australian FETP 
The epidemiology of elevated blood 
lead level notifications in New South 
Wales, Australia, 2011-2016
Introduction 
• Lead is a metal that persists in the environment
• Results from human activities
• Acts a cumulative toxicant
• 0.6% of the global burden of disease (2004)
New South Wales 
• Highest population
• Population ≈ 7.7 million
• 15 local health districts
Blood lead surveillance in NSW
• Increased regulation of lead since 1970s
• Removal of lead from petrol and paint
• Notifiable in NSW since 1996
• Case definition changed over time
Project aims
1. Describe how recent changes to the case
definition have affected notification rates in
NSW
2. Evaluate the quality of data in the NSW blood
lead surveillance system
Methods 
• Data extracted from surveillance system
• Two separate datasets linked
• Rates calculated using census data for 2011
• STATA version 14.1
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Results 
• In NSW between 2011-2016:
– 3490 notifications
– M:F ratio of 6:1
– 18.2% aged under 5 years
– Average notification rate 7.7 per 100,000
Trends in notifications, NSW
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Notification rate by age group 
Age group 2011-2015
Average rate per 100,000
2016 
Rate per 100,000
Rate rise
0-4 years 17.9 39.2 219%
5-19 years 1.4 2.5 179%
20-54 years 9.4 15.5 164%
55+ years 2.9 9.3 320%
TOTAL 6.7 12.9 193%
NSW Local Health District 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Far West 131.7 537.3 851.7 579.4 343.0 884.8
Western NSW 14.8 33.3 31.9 34.1 57.2 53.0
Murrumbidgee 25.7 25.6 25.6 9.6 5.8 13.2
Nepean Blue Mountains 2.6 8.0 9.6 5.0 1.1 13.0
Northern NSW 0.7 3.5 3.4 4.8 4.7 12.6
South Western Sydney 2.9 5.4 3.6 4.3 2.8 12.0
Hunter New England 1.4 5.3 5.4 5.0 3.5 11.6
Southern NSW 2.0 2.5 1.0 3.0 3.9 9.6
Illawarra Shoalhaven 1.3 2.1 10.0 4.0 3.2 9.1
South Eastern Sydney 1.4 2.7 2.8 2.0 1.6 6.4
Sydney 2.4 1.9 3.8 2.9 3.0 6.3
Western Sydney 2.5 4.9 4.4 3.1 1.9 5.2
Central Coast 2.2 2.5 4.6 2.7 2.4 4.4
Mid North Coast 0.0 0.5 1.0 2.4 0.5 3.2
Northern Sydney 0.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.9
Network with Victoria 0.0 0.0 9.9 5.9 1.9 0.0
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Data Quality Issues 
• Database structure
• Lack of a single comprehensive data set
• Large quantities of free-text data
• Missing data
• Systematic differences in data quality
Discussion
• Higher notification rates in children reflects increased
rates of testing and existence of screening programs
• Disproportionate rise in rates among older adults
warrants further investigation
• Concentration of notifications rurally has resourcing
implications
• Current system makes reviewing and reporting
epidemiology challenging
Conclusion and recommendations 
• Notifications of elevated blood lead have increased over
time in NSW line with changes to the case definition
• Recommend system improvements to improve data
quality 
• Consider resource implications prior to any further 
changes to the case definition
Acknowledgements 
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Katherine Todd, Ben Scalley, Martyn Kirk, Jeremy McAnulty
Environmental Health, Health Protection NSW
Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology), Australian National 
University
The epidemiology of elevated blood 
lead level notifications in New South 
Wales, Australia, 1997-2016
Background
• Lead is a naturally occurring metal that is widely used in 
manufacturing  processes
• Lead accumulates in the environment over time
• Populations can be exposed to lead in a variety of ways 
Health effects of lead
• Exposure to lead can cause health impacts 
• 0.6% of the global burden of disease (2004)
• The average background exposure in the Australian 
population is not known but the average blood lead 
level is estimated to be less than 5µg/dL 
Health effects of lead
10 20 30 40 60 80 100 120
Adults
Children
Hearing and cognitive 
impairment (reduced IQ) Gastrointestinal disturbance 
Death
Behavioural changes
Anaemia 
Lead encephalopathy 
Increased blood pressure
Abnormal kidney function 
Poor balance, reduced nerve conduction
Altered production of sex hormones 
Anaemia 
Lead encephalopathy 
Death
Neurobehavioural effects, cognitive 
impairment, gastrointestinal disturbance  
New South Wales 
• Largest population in Australia
• Population ≈ 7.7 million 
• 15 local health districts 
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Blood lead surveillance in NSW
• Increased regulation of lead since 1970s
• Notifiable in NSW since December 1996
• Case definition changed over time in line with NHMRC
recommendations
– 1996 –2011: ≥15 μg/dL
– 2012-2015: ≥10 μg/dL
– 2016 onwards: ≥5 μg/dL 
Project aims
Describe trends in lead notification rates in NSW since 
1996 
Methods 
• Data extracted from surveillance system
• Population rates calculated using information from the
Australian census
• Data analysis STATA version 14.1
Results 
• In NSW between 1997-2016: 
– 9,486 notifications 
– M:F ratio of 9:1
– 13% aged under 5 years 
– Average notification rate 6.9 per 100,000
Trends in notifications, NSW
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Notifications by sex, NSW, 1997-2016
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Notification rate by Local Health District
Far West NSW 
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Murrumbidgee
4.9
Hunter New 
England 
15.6
Northern NSW 
2.6
Mid North Coast 
1.5
Southern NSW 
2.1
Metropolitan Sydney
4.0
Notification rate per 100,000
2011-2015
Far West NSW 
577.9
Western NSW 
39.1
Murrumbidgee
16.6
Hunter New 
England 
4.8
Northern NSW 
4.1
Mid North Coast 
1.1
Southern NSW 
2.6
Metropolitan Sydney
3.5
Notification rate per 100,000
2016
Far West NSW 
885.0
Western NSW 
53.0
Murrumbidgee
13.2
Hunter New 
England 
11.6
Northern NSW 
12.6
Mid North Coast 
3.2
Southern NSW 
9.6
Metropolitan Sydney
7.3
Notification rate per 100,000
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Limitations of the analysis
• Large quantities of free-text data 
• Missing data 
• Lack of data regarding exposure 
• Systematic differences in data quality
Summary
• Notifications of elevated blood lead have increased over time in NSW line 
with changes to the case definition
• Notifications over 15μg/dL have declined over time 
• Notification rates are highest in children aged 0-4 years and in Far West
NSW Local Health District
• Current data capturing system makes reviewing and reporting 
epidemiology challenging 
Conclusion and recommendations 
• Decline in notification rates over 15 μg/dL
• Highest rates in age 0-4 year group likely represents increased rates of testing 
• Disproportionate rise in rates among older adults warrants further investigation
• High rates in Far West LHD represent both environmental exposure and
existence of screening program
• Recommend system improvements to improve data quality 
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Chapter 5 
An evaluation of the NSW elevated blood 
lead surveillance system  
View of the Broken Hill Line of Lode and Miner’s Memorial, as seen from the window of the Broken 
Hill Public Health Unit, August, 2017 
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Prologue 
My role  
I spent the period from November 2016 to July 2017 within Environmental Health Branch of Health 
Protection NSW. The surveillance of elevated blood lead levels was identified as a key area within 
the branch where improvements could be made. The evaluation of the lead surveillance system was 
going to be my first project conducted during my placement in environmental health; however, as I 
gained an understanding of the complexities of the database and the data (consisting of surveillance 
data for over 20 years, from December 1996), the analysis of the database became my first project, 
and the evaluation became my second project.  
I took the lead role in this project, supervised by Dr Ben Scalley, the Director of Environmental 
Health Branch, as well as my field and academic supervisors Dr Jeremy McAnulty and Associate 
Professor Martyn Kirk. I wrote the initial protocol outlining the project plan and objectives of the 
evaluation. I designed the semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix 3), which I consulted on in draft 
form with key stakeholders to incorporate their comments into the final questionnaire.  
I conducted all interviews. This involved travelling to several public health units (PHUs) in NSW 
(including Liverpool in Sydney’s southwest, Newcastle, and Broken Hill) as well as speaking with key 
people in Health Protection NSW.  
The majority of information collected was qualitative. I analysed the interview notes thematically 
and identified key trends and concerns. I had originally planned to conduct further consultation as 
required, but key themes emerged early on and were consistent between key stakeholders, and thus 
I felt I had achieved thematic saturation. Some information gaps were identified during the analysis 
and writing process and thus PHUS were further consulted via the dissemination of a short 
questionnaire (Appendix 4).  
I wrote the final report of the evaluation, and will report a summarised version of the results back to 
key stakeholders within Health Protection NSW and the Public Health Unit network.  
Lessons learned  
I learned several lessons during the execution of the project. In many ways, this was the most 
challenging project of my MAE as it was so unlike anything I had completed before.  
In retrospect, although I consulted with key people in the development and completion of this 
project, I would have found it useful to have conducted more extensive consultation earlier. I 
identified many “unknown unknowns” via speaking with key people, such as nuances in how the 
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system worked or people with key knowledge of the system that I hadn’t identified, that would have 
been very useful information earlier in the process. Overall, I think I persisted too long on my own 
without appreciating the knowledge others could provide.  
It was also challenging to strike a balance between quantitive and qualitative information gathering. 
I identified many specific questions I wished I had asked as I wrote the report, for example average 
time frames for notification response by PHU. In future evaluations, I would have focused more 
evenly on quantitative and qualitative data rather than taking such a heavy focus on qualitative 
information, I would also have allowed for more time to complete the process iteratively to allow for 
emerging issues to explored more fully during the analysis process, either by a secondary survey or 
subsequent interview. 
I learned to be flexible and to take the lead in this project. When we travelled to Broken Hill, 
although it was intended that a delegation from Environmental Health Branch of myself, Ben and 
Jeremy would go, flight delays meant that at the last minute only I was able to make the trip. I had to 
represent NSW Health, establish relationships rapidly and identify key people to speak with during 
my limited time there. I was proud of how I met the challenge and found this a great learning 
experience.  
If I were to do this project again I would have approached it quite differently, allowing more time for 
iterative information gathering, undertaking earlier and more comprehensive formal and informal 
consultation, as well as appreciating the value of a team-based approach more. Nevertheless, I feel 
that the knowledge gained from this project will be valuable for improving the lead surveillance 
program in NSW and making it more effective and useful for users and the community.  
Public health implications  
Many weaknesses of the lead surveillance system were identified during this evaluation. Systems 
can accumulate a complex legacy over time and via incremental changes, and periodic evaluation is 
essential to ensure their effective ongoing operation. I also identified that surveillance systems can 
be ineffective if the surveillance cycle (of dissemination of results) is not completed; this can also 
lead to a perception that the surveillance system is not useful or indeed necessary.  
191 
Abstract 
Introduction  
Surveillance is an essential feature of epidemiological and public health practice, providing 
information about health events and outcomes and supporting policy development and research. 
Lead is a metal widely used in human activities, and lead exposure can cause acute and chronic 
health effects. Lead surveillance systems are in place in NSW to monitor blood lead levels and 
facilitate case management, and take appropriate public health action to minimise exposure. I 
evaluated the surveillance system for elevated blood lead in NSW to see whether it was meeting its 
aims and objectives, and to gain perspectives from users on its data quality, simplicity, flexibility, 
acceptability, representativeness, timeliness, stability and sensitivity.   
Methods  
I used the United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention  (CDC) guidelines for evaluating 
surveillance systems. I conducted 16 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders 
from across NSW Health, including in Health Protection NSW and Public Health Units. I distributed 
a short questionnaire to public health units to gather further information. I also incorporated the 
results of a review of the data stored in the system, described in further detail in Chapter 5.   
Results  
Elevated blood lead poses a unique challenge in NSW, as the only non-infectious notifiable 
condition under surveillance. Weaknesses in the data collection system and poor-quality data have 
led to a lack of regular review and reporting of surveillance information, meaning that the cycle of 
surveillance is not complete. Key barriers to the effective use of the surveillance system included 
the use of alternative databases in parallel with the system in some public health units, confusion 
around and heterogeneity in application of the response protocol, differences in thresholds for 
notification of elevated blood lead between NSW Health and Safe Work NSW, and a lack of 
information about how risk factors for lead exposure have changed over time. I made a number of 
recommendations to improve blood lead surveillance system in NSW, with those pertaining to data 
entry and data quality deemed most urgent for rectification.  
Conclusions  
The surveillance cycle is incomplete as there is no regular dissemination of surveillance data to 
those who need to know, nor coordinated public health action rising from this. Improvements 
should be made to the response protocol and NCIMS database to streamline collection and analysis 
of data, and promote a uniform response to notifications across the state.  
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Background 
Introduction  
Public health surveillance involves the systematic and continuous collection, analysis, interpretation 
and dissemination of data. Surveillance is an essential feature of epidemiological and public health 
practice and provides the evidence-base required for informed decision-making and to conduct 
public health prevention and control programs. Surveillance data should not only provide 
information about the health events and outcomes under surveillance but also lead to policy 
development and research, by identifying issues requiring action or further information needs1-3.  
Periodic evaluation of surveillance systems is essential in order to ensure their ongoing usefulness 
and cost-effectiveness4. Evaluation of public health surveillance systems should include 
consideration of: 
1. The public health importance of the event
2. The usefulness and cost of the surveillance system (e.g. whether it is meeting its goals and at
what cost)
3. The explicit attributes of the quality of the surveillance system, including sensitivity,
specificity, representativeness, timeliness, simplicity, flexibility, and acceptability1.
In addition, the timely dissemination of surveillance data to those who need to know, including 
regular publication of the data together with interpretation and analysis, is an essential component 
of a useful surveillance system1.  
The public health importance of lead exposure 
Lead is a naturally occurring metal whose physical properties (including low melting temperature 
and malleability) and relative abundance make it useful for a wide range of human applications. 
These include the production of solder, batteries, x-ray shielding, ceramic glazes, and ammunition. 
Some historical applications of lead compounds such as use in leaded paints and petrol have been 
reduced or eliminated in much of the developed world due to evidence of adverse health effects 
from lead; nevertheless lead remains ubiquitous in the environment5, 6.  
The toxic effects of lead have been known since antiquity, and in the 19th century with the Industrial 
Revolution lead poisoning became a common occupational disease6. Lead poisoning in Australian 
children was first recognised in the late 1890s, in a case series of 10 children with clinical symptoms 
of lead poisoning later connected to exposure to weathered lead-based paint on veranda rails. This 
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led in in 1922 to one of the first acts of legislation in the world regulating the use of lead, when lead-
based house-paints were banned in Queensland7.  
Lead accumulates in the body over time and affects many body systems (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 - Health effects of lead at various blood lead levels (in µg/dL) for adults and children8 
Lead exposure in adults can cause anaemia, renal damage and hypertension, and at levels above 
8ϬʅŐͬĚ>͕ ĐĂƵƐĞ ĞŶĐĞƉŚĂůŽƉĂƚŚǇ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĂƚŚ. ŚƌŽŶŝĐ ůŽǁ-level exposure (such as occupationally) has 
been shown to be associated with subtle cognitive deterioration and brain matter loss5. Children are 
much more vulnerable to lead poisoning than adults, partly because they absorb four times more 
lead than adults and also because they are more likely to be exposed to lead from crawling on floors 
and hand-to-mouth activity7. Effects in children occur at lower levels than adults, and population-
level studies have shown that even among asymptomatic children exposure to lead can have 
significant effects on the developing brain including a reduction in IQ and behavioural disturbances.  
The Australian Government National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) evaluated two 
moderate-quality systematic reviews on the health effects of lead and drew the following 
conclusions: 
1. Blood lead levels <5ʅŐͬĚ> ĂƌĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĂĚǀĞƌƐĞ ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŝŶ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ͕ ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ
literature suggests uncontrolled confounding may play an important role in the findings
regarding IQ
2. ůŽŽĚ ůĞĂĚ ůĞǀĞůƐ ф1ϬʅŐͬĚ> ĂƌĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ͗
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• Adverse behavioural effects among children
• Delay in sexual maturation or puberty onset in adolescents
• Increased blood pressure and risk of hypertension among adults and pregnant
women (although there is uncertainty regarding the clinical significance of this)5.
The management of elevated blood lead levels in individuals involves identifying the source of 
exposure (including consideration of multiple lead sources in the environment), and then 
interrupting the exposure pathway9. General interventions depend on the route of exposure. The 
renovation of houses built before 1970 remains a significant potential risk for lead exposure10. 
Renovation of old houses may involve scraping and burning of lead-based paints off walls and 
window frames – a typical house built in 1900 may contain anywhere between 200 and 600 
kilograms of lead in the paint layers11. If the source is renovation of older homes, sealing of the 
affected area during home renovations, thorough cleaning of homes using a HEPA filtered vacuum 
cleaner, and wet mopping prior to reoccupation is recommended. Those who participate in lead-
related hobbies (such as lead-lighting or shooting) should utilise personal protective equipment and 
restrict access by children to areas the hobbies are carried out. People should avoid purchasing and 
using lead-containing products, particularly those purchased overseas such as cosmetics and 
Ayurvedic medicines. Those who work in lead industry should keep clothing that may be 
contaminated with lead separate from other clothes (ideally at the workplace) and not comingle 
these in family washing. Those who live in lead-endemic areas should be provided with education 
about preventative strategies such as frequent vacuuming, mopping, providing appropriate grass 
cover for outdoor areas, and the importance of hand washing. In some instances complete removal 
of the source of lead exposure may not be possible or practical9.  
Lead surveillance in NSW  
In Australia, public health surveillance for elevated blood lead occurs at the state level. Not every 
state has elevated blood lead as a notifiable condition, and the level at which an elevated blood lead 
level is notifiable also varies (Table 1). 
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Table 1 – Lead surveillance within Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand in 2017 
Jurisdiction Notifiable? Notifiable blood lead level 
New South Wales Yes A person with a venous blood lead level of шϱʅŐͬĚ> 
Tasmania  Yes фϱʅŐͬĚ> ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ŚĂƐ ŶŽƚ ďĞĞŶ 
occupationally exposed to lead 
Queensland  Yes Blood lead level of ш1ϬʅŐͬĚ> 
Victoria  Yes ůŽŽĚ ůĞĂĚ хϱʅŐͬĚ>  
Australian Capital Territory No - 
South Australia No - 
Northern Territory  Yes ůŽŽĚ ůĞĂĚ хϱʅŐͬĚ>  
Western Australia Yes Concentration of lead in a person’s whole blood at or 
ĂďŽǀĞ ϱʅŐͬĚ>  
New Zealand Yes Whole blood lead level ш1ϬʅŐͬĚ>. ƚ ƚŚŝƐ ůĞǀĞů͕ ƉƵďůŝĐ 
health interventions are required for children and 
non-occupationally exposed adults 
Significant community-wide lead exposure in children is now uncommon in Australia, and is limited 
to towns where exposure results from mining, processing or transporting lead. These towns include  
Broken Hill (New South Wales), one of the largest lead mine ore sites in the world, Port Pirie (South 
Australia) where there is a major lead smelter, and Mount Isa (Queensland), a site of extensive lead, 
sliver and zinc mining7. All of these communities have ongoing targeted monitoring and intervention 
programs that have been successful in reducing the lead exposure of children7.  
The NSW public health system is governed by the central Ministry of Health, which purchases health 
services through a network of Local Health Districts (LHDs). There are fifteen LHDs throughout NSW, 
each served by one or more Public Health Units (PHUs) that are responsible for responding to 
reports of notifiable diseases within their jurisdictions. Centrally, Health Protection NSW is 
responsible for coordinating surveillance and public health response including monitoring the 
incidence of notifiable diseases at a state-wide level12. 
Elevated blood lead levels (also known as “lead poisoning”) have been notifiable in NSW since 
December 1996, one of a number of surveillance systems managed by NSW Health13.The NSW blood 
lead surveillance has two main objectives14, 15: 
1. To identify cases and recommend appropriate risk reduction measures
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2. To monitor the epidemiology of elevated blood lead levels to inform the development of
better risk reduction strategies
Under the NSW Public Health Act2010, pathology laboratories are required to notify cases of 
elevated blood levels to their local PHU on identification14.  The case definition of an elevated blood 
lead level has changed over time – under the current case definition, a confirmed case is: 
A person with a venous blood lead level of ≥5 μg/dL (0.24μmol/L) 
Prior to February 2Ϭ1ϲ ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞů ĨŽƌ ŶŽƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ш1Ϭ ʅŐͬĚ> ;Ϭ.48ʅŵŽůͬ>Ϳ͕ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝŽƌ ƚŽ DĂǇ 2Ϭ12 
ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ш1ϱʅŐͬĚ> ;Ϭ.ϳ2ʅŵŽůͬ>Ϳ14. These changes to the notification level were made on the basis of 
NHMRC recommendations, which found based on a review of the literature that a blood lead level of 
greater than five micrograms per decilitre suggests that a person has been or continues to be 
exposed to lead at a level above what is considered the average “background” exposure in Australia, 
and that therefore the source of exposure should be investigated and reduced16. These changes 
closely mirror changes made in the United States of America by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶ 2Ϭ12 ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ƚŽ ш1ϬђŐͬĚ> ŝŶ ďůŽŽĚ͕ ĂŶĚ ŝŶ 2Ϭ1ϲ 
changed the threshold to 5µg/dL based on the 97.5th percentile of the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey (NHANES) which measured the distribution of blood lead values in children. The 
CDC also changed the terminology to remove the descriptor “level of concern”, reflecting evidence 
from population-wide surveys that suggest there is no “safe” level of lead17.  
In NSW, pathology laboratories are required to notify a positive result for a specified notifiable 
disease using the specified form (Appendix 2) either in writing by fax or mail to the local PHU, or by 
electronic laboratory notification directly to the Notifiable Conditions Information System (NCIMS)18. 
NCIMS has been in use since 2010 and is a confidential application that provides state-wide data 
capture, management and reporting of scheduled medical conditions notifiable under the NSW 
Public Health Act 2010 from pathology laboratories, general practitioners and hospitals15, 19. NCIMS is 
routinely used as a case-management tool rather than an analysis tool; however, it does have the 
function to export aggregate data as a spreadsheet.  
Surveillance data entered in NCIMS are stored in the Secure Analytics for Population Health 
Research and Intelligence (SAPHaRI) digital warehouse. SAPHaRI is designed to provide data in a 
format that is ready to be analysed and reported for the purposes of epidemiology and surveillance, 
and contains databases of health, demographic population and geographic data20. The SAPHaRI 
analytics system does not typically export all information recorded in NCIMS: the NCIMS export 
dataset contains 551 variables, compared to the 300 core variables routinely extracted in SAPHaRI. 
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Response to a notification of an elevated blood lead level is done at the LHD level by the PHU. The 
response protocol (Appendix 1) following a notification involves the PHU: 
1. Confirming with the treating doctor any symptoms associated with exposure, including the
onset date
2. Contacting the case (with permission of the notifying doctor) to interview the case or their
parent/guardian
3. Identifying household contacts who may also be at risk of elevated blood lead levels
Actions that should be taken are determined by the age of the case and the blood lead level (Table 
2).  
Table 2 - Blood lead levels and corresponding actions taken by PHU according to age 
Age Blood lead range 
шϱ ďƵƚ 1ϬфʅŐͬĚ> ш1Ϭ ďƵƚ 2ϱфʅŐͬĚ> ш2ϱ ďƵƚ 4ϱфʅŐͬĚ> ш4ϱʅŐͬĚ> 
< 5 years Consult doctor 
Standard letter  
May need to test 
household 
members 
Consult doctor 
Standard letter  
Offer 
counselling/risk 
assessment  
May need to test 
household 
members 
Retest BLL after 6 
months  
As for level 2 
plus: 
Preliminary 
environmental 
assessment 
including home 
visit, exposure 
pathways and 
sampling  
Expert advice re: 
BLL retest 
As for level 3 
plus: 
Ensure treating 
doctor aware of 
result as levels 
ш4ϱ ʅŐͬĚ> ŵĂǇ 
require chelation 
шϱ ǇĞĂƌƐ Consult doctor 
Standard letter  
May need to test 
household 
members 
Consult doctor 
Standard letter  
Advise to discuss 
with employer  
Inform Safe work 
if cluster of cases 
Offer 
counselling/risk 
assessment  
May need to test 
household 
members 
As for level 2 
plus: 
Preliminary 
environmental 
assessment 
including home 
visit, exposure 
pathways and 
sampling  
Strongly suggest 
consultation with 
SafeWork NSW 
As for level 3 
plus: 
Ensure treating 
doctor aware of 
result as levels 
шϳϬ ʅŐͬĚ> ŵĂǇ 
require chelation 
If the source of the exposure is not clear after the initial investigation has taken place, the PHU 
arranges an environmental assessment of the residential area if the case's blood lead level is in 
ĞǆĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ 2ϱʅŐͬĚ> ;1.2ʅŵŽůͬ>Ϳ ĂŶĚͬŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ Ɛource may affect the broader community14. 
SafeWork NSW, the state workplace health and safety regulator, is consulted if there is any suspicion 
of a cluster of occupationally exposed cases occurring or if blood lead levels of >25µg/dL are notified 
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in an adult who may have been exposed in the workplace. Figure 2 illustrates the Surveillance 
system in full.  
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Figure 2 - Blood lead surveillance system in NSW: flow chart 
ΎEoƚĂllƉƌŝǀĂƚĞlĂďoƌĂƚoƌŝĞƐŝŶE^tĂƌĞĞŶĂďlĞĚĨoƌĞlĞĐƚƌoŶŝĐlĂďoƌĂƚoƌǇƌĞƉoƌƚŝŶŐ(LZ).dŚoƐĞƚŚĂƚ
are not send manual notifications to the PHU by mail or fax 
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Aims of the evaluation  
The aims of this evaluation were to systematically evaluate the attributes of the current surveillance 
system in use for elevated blood lead levels in NSW and highlight areas for improvement.   
Methods 
I used the United States Centre for Disease Control guidelines for evaluating surveillance systems for 
this evaluation21. The evaluation focused on the both the framework around which the surveillance 
system operates (such as protocols, data repositories and stored data) as well as the value gained 
from surveillance and whether the surveillance system is meetings its objectives. This included 
stakeholder consultation as well as analysis of the database that houses the notification data, 
analysis interpretation of the collated data and the feedback mechanisms to stakeholders.  
The assessment of quantitative system attributes (timeliness, data quality and representativeness) 
was conducted by an analysis of NCIMS data including an analysis of data completeness of sex, 
Aboriginal status, and blood lead level data fields. Qualitative system attributes (simplicity, flexibility 
and acceptability) were assessed through semi-structured in-person interviews with stakeholders. 
Additional information was obtained via an email survey of public health unit staff.  
It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to evaluate processes used by SafeWork NSW in assessing 
and managing occupational lead exposures, however the results from this evaluation will be 
important for SafeWork NSW and a collaborative approach by both agencies going forward will 
ensure that occupationally exposed persons with elevated blood lead levels are identified and 
managed appropriately.  
Stakeholders  
The main stakeholder groups and methods of consultation are described below: 
• Health Protection NSW staff
o Environmental Health Branch staff
 Executive
 Policy officers
o Communicable Disease Branch staff
 Surveillance staff
 Laboratory liaison staff 
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• Public Health Unit staff
o Public health nurses
o Environmental health officers
o Directors
o Epidemiologists
o Public health physicians
o Administrative staff
• Additional stakeholders
o Health Service directors
o Community health nurse
o Aboriginal health nurse
Data collection and analysis 
Sampling  
Semi-structured interviews  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key personnel using the questions outlined in 
Appendix 3. I conducted all interviews, which lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Approximately half 
of interviews had notes taken by hand during the interview which were then analysed for themes. 
The other half of interviews were recorded and then transcribed and analysed for themes.  
Questionnaire  
A short questionnaire was disseminated to public health unit directors, requesting that they provide 
it to the key person responsible for managing lead notifications in their unit for comment and return. 
It contained a series of yes/no questions with additional room for comment on: the usefulness of 
NCIMS; whether the PHU used any additional database to collect and store data; whether the PHU 
utilised a dedicated questionnaire; who at the PHU routinely followed up notifications; whether the 
PHU routinely produced reports describing the epidemiology of elevated blood lead levels; how the 
PHU sourced aggregate data, and whether the person completing the questionnaire had any 
suggestions for improving the surveillance system or other comment.  
Results 
A total of 16 face-to-face interviews were conducted with key stakeholders. Everyone who was 
approached for interview agreed to be interviewed (100% response rate). Nine short questionnaires 
were received back from 16 Public Health Units (56% response rate). Several non-responders to the 
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questionnaire had previously been interviewed during the face-to-face interview stage, so that only 
two of the 16 Public Health Units did not provide any feedback to the evaluation.  
Objectives and utility  
The lead surveillance system has the objectives of: 
1. Identification of cases and recommendation of appropriate risk reduction measures
2. Monitoring the epidemiology of elevated blood lead levels to inform the development of
better risk reduction strategies
In practice, the first objective was well achieved. All consulted PHUs followed up lead notifications to 
some degree, although the time frame this was done in varied. For some PHUs if there were more 
pressing issues, lead was treated as less of a priority:  
“In general sense, we try and respond within a week or two… if we are short on resources it 
can get left [longer]”.   
The degree of response varied by where the case was notified (with some PHUs following up more 
than others) and on the lead level notified (the higher the blood lead level of the case, the greater 
the response from the PHU). There was some disagreement about whether the lead surveillance 
system was useful or indeed necessary:   
͞dŚĞǀĂlƵĞoĨlĞĂĚŶoƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶƐŶĞĞĚƐƚoďĞƋƵĞƐƚŝoŶĞĚ͟. 
“Lead is a less significant issue now that it has been in the past”.  
“Certain PHUs are more reactive than others – some don’t see lead as a problem.” 
PHUs identified a lack of clarity around the protocol and guidelines, as well as a lack of visibility of 
lead generally and unclear understanding of what was wanted from the system, as barriers to the 
system being useful for them. Front-line staff were willing to follow up lead notifications but 
sometimes felt their efforts were a waste of time, and they felt they didn’t understand exactly what 
was wanted from the state health department.  
“[It would be good to] clarify the guidelines and ensure they make sense, and for there to be 
feedback to PHUS about what we want to know about, particularly risk factors.  
͞dŚĞƉƌoƚoĐolƐƐŚoƵlĚďĞmoƌĞƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ.͟ 
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The monitoring of epidemiology occurred less consistently across the network, with only 56% of 
surveyed PHUs producing reports on the epidemiology lead notifications within their LHD. These 
reports were solely for internal use apart from Far West LHD, which produces an annual report 
describing the Lead Health Program including discussion of the epidemiology of elevated lead 
notifications annually22. At the state level, the number of notifications of elevated blood lead 
annually was reported in the Health Protection Annual Report with other notifiable disease counts, 
but not elsewhere. Challenges in using the dataset and a low perceived importance of lead as a 
public health issues were two of the key limitations identified in reviewing the epidemiology of lead. 
If I could improve one thing about lead notifications, it would be the ĚĂƚĂƋƵĂlŝƚǇĂŶĚ
completeness, to better enable us to do centralised analysis and reporting [at the state level] 
A general theme among stakeholders was that elevated blood lead was an overlooked and 
challenging notifiable disease, particularly as it is unique among notifiable conditions as being a 
marker of potential disease rather than an acute problem, usually asymptomatic, and non-
infectious. There was a sense of a lack of strong ownership of lead surveillance by any one body or 
group.  
͞dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŝƐƐƵĞs with usability [of the system] due to a lack of strong ownership… there is 
no-one driving the agenda for lead.”  
The decentralised nature of public health in NSW further made it difficult for any one person to have 
an overarching grasp of lead as a public health issue. This lack of ownership had impacted on the 
usability of the system as it was used to satisfy legislative requirements and for individual case follow 
up but not for ongoing research, evaluation or systematic public health action. 
 “ClarifyinŐƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞmĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĂŝmƐoĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞmǁoƵlĚďĞƵƐĞĨƵl͕ĂŶĚmĂŬŝŶŐŝƚĐlĞĂƌĞƌ
who ultimately owns the issue.”  
RECOMMENDATION: 
1. Review the lead response protocol to ensure the response required from PHUs is clear, both
in terms of case follow-up and information collection and reporting requirements
2. State explicitly in the response protocol who has responsibility for specific actions, including
clarification of the roles of PHUs and of Environmental Health Branch
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Uses of data  
Data collected from notifications is primarily used to follow-up individual cases. On a state level, 
aggregate data in the form of number of notifications is reported in the annual report by local health 
district, but there is no regular analysis or further breakdown by age, sex, or exposure.  
Reasons that the data was not further utilised for the purposes of surveillance were primarily due to 
weaknesses in the data collection system, including significant volumes of missing data and 
challenges in extracting and cleaning it to allow it to be analysed in aggregate. 
“I feel [lead] is falling through the gaps a bit as there is no real reporting or analysis.” 
“Extracting the data can be challenging and the system is difficult to use. It is sometimes difficult 
ƚoĂŶƐǁĞƌďĂƐŝĐƋƵĞƐƚŝoŶƐ– ƚŚŝƐŝƐĚƵĞƚoďoƚŚƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞmĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĂƚĂƋƵĂlŝƚǇ./ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶ
of the system leads ƚoƉooƌƋƵĂlŝƚǇ.͟ 
͞dŚĞĚĂƚĂĐollĞĐƚĞĚŝƐŐooĚĨoƌŐĞŶĞƌĂlƚŚŝŶŐƐ͖ƚŝmĞ͕ƉlĂĐĞĂŶĚƉĞƌƐoŶ΀ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŶoƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶƐ΁ŝƐ
somewhat covered. However, go anything beyond basic information (such as trying to look at 
lĞǀĞlƐoƌĞǆƉoƐƵƌĞ)ĂŶĚŝƚĂllĨĂllƐĂƉĂƌƚ.͟
In addition, Environmental Health has responsibility for elevated blood lead, but the data collection 
and management is overseen by the Surveillance team in the Communicable Disease Branch. 
Environmental Health staff identified that they lacked experience in this area and that surveillance is 
not typically part of their core business.   
͞dŚĞ^ƵƌǀĞŝllĂŶĐĞƚĞĂmmĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞmƚŚĂƚĐollĂƚĞƐƚŚĞĚĂƚĂ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞǇĚoŶ͛ƚ do anything 
with it – Environmental Health are responsible for monitoring.” 
“Environmental Health don’t usually do surveillance… it is not our core business, we have skills in 
other areas that are not necessarily surveillance.” 
Overall the surveillance data wasn’t being used to its full potential, both due to the complexity and 
weaknesses of the dataset and because the custodians of the data did not have primary 
responsibility for its analysis.  
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RECOMMENDATION 
3. Introduction of regular reporting requirements for lead (such as a quarterly or annual review
of the epidemiology and of data completeness) would lead to timely identification of
challenges with the dataset and provide information for ongoing improvements to the
system
4. Continuing education for Environmental Health branch staff in the collection and analysis of
surveillance system data and in the use of NCIMS and SAPHARI would lead to improved
confidence of the staff in owning the lead surveillance system
5. Regular data review meetings between the Surveillance team and the Environmental Health
team would enable both groups to have a greater understanding of the current state of lead
surveillance in NSW
System operation 
Legislation  
In NSW, notifiable conditions are legislated under the Public Health Act 2010. The Act has the 
following objectives: to promote, protect and improve public health; to control risks to public health; 
promote the control and prevent the spread of infectious diseases; and to recognise the role of local 
government in protecting public health.  
Schedule 1 of the Public Health Act lists elevated lead as a scheduled medical condition in category 
3, with the following definition:  
>ĞĂĚ ŝŶ ďůŽŽĚ ;ĂƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďǇ Ă ďůŽŽĚ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ Žƌ ĂďŽǀĞ ϱʅŐͬĚ>Ϳ 
For items in category 3, the Public Health Act requires pathology laboratories to notify the Secretary 
or delegate if: 
1) A pathology test is carried out at the request of a registered medical practitioner for the
purpose of determining whether a person has a category 3 condition, and
2) The test has a positive result.
In these circumstances, the person who certifies the test results (the certifier) must send to the 
Secretary (or delegate) a report, in the approved form, as to those results as soon as practicable. 
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Notifications to the system depend on laboratories being aware of their obligations and reporting 
the results to Public Health Units; this can lead to challenges when new, inexperienced or 
unaccredited laboratories are used, particularly when these are chemical and not pathological 
laboratories.  
͞dŚĞWƵďlŝĐ,ĞĂlƚŚĐƚŚĂƐƐomĞlooƉŚolĞƐ͙ŶĞǁlĂďƐĂƌĞŶ͛ƚĂlǁĂǇƐĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞmĞŶƚĨoƌŶoƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶ.tĞŶĞĞĚƚoĞŶƐƵƌĞlĂďƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌoďlŝŐĂƚŝoŶƐ͟ 
Under SafeWork legislation, laboratories performing occupational surveillance of elevated blood 
lead need to be accredited by NATA, the National Association of Testing Authorities Australia. 
However, in practice use of NATA-accredited laboratories did not always occur: 
“In the case I was involved with, the company (a heavy metal recyĐlŝŶŐĨĂĐŝlŝƚǇ)ǁĂƐŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞƌĞƐƵlƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĐomƉĂŶǇǁĂƐƐĂĐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞm΀ŝĨƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŚŝŐŚ΁.dŚĞƌĞƐƵlƚƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶ
coded by the company and the lab initially refused to release the results so that we could do 
follow-up – they classified them as ‘commercial in confidence’.”  
͞΀dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ΁ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŚoǁŝƚǁĂƐŶoƚŝĨŝĞĚ– e.g. biochemistry labs may not have been 
ŶoƚŝĨǇŝŶŐĂlƚŚoƵŐŚƉĂƚŚoloŐǇlĂďƐmŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ͖ƚŚŝƐŝƐĂŐĂƉƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞPublic Health 
Act”.    
In October 2017, the legislation was amended to the following: 
1) A pathology test is carried out at the request of a registered medical practitioner or other
person of a class prescribed by the regulations for the purpose of determining whether a
person has a category 3 condition, and
2) The test has a positive result.
This was done to close the loophole by which non-medical personnel were requesting blood lead 
levels from biochemical laboratories and then not notifying them. This amendment strengthens the 
legislation around surveillance of elevated blood lead in NSW.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
6. NSW Health and Safe Work NSW should collaborate to regularly communicate with
laboratories (NSW health) and workplaces (Safe Work NSW) to provide education about
blood lead and remind of them of their testing and notification obligations
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Data sources and information collected  
The initial data source for notifications is laboratories, including any detail included by the doctor on 
the request form when ordering the test. The key information collected from the laboratory is 
shown in the laboratory notification form in Appendix 2. In practice, not all the information is 
routinely collected or included. Following notification of an elevated blood lead level, additional 
information about symptoms, exposure, occupation and risk factors is collected by either 
environmental health officers, surveillance officers, public health nurses, administrative officers or 
community health workers depending on the PHU and added to NCIMS. The data stored in NCIMS is 
secured using a username and password, and access is audited.  
͞E/D^ŝƐƋƵŝƚĞƐoƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚ./ƚŝƐǁĞď-based and secure. It is internet accessible so this does 
ŝƚĞǆƉoƐĞŝƚƐomĞǁŚĂƚ͖ŚoǁĞǀĞƌ͕ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝƐĂƵĚŝƚĞĚ͟. 
A further layer of security via two-factor authentication is anticipated to be added in the coming 
months for the entirety of surveillance in NSW. This will involve users outside of the Health 
Network (for example, the access NCIMS over the internet) to supplement their user name and 
password with a code sent via SMS. This will make data protections even stronger.  
Challenges included classifying notifications by address vs place of exposure, particularly for 
occupational exposures. Some PHUs reported issues with the address recorded as being the 
workplace rather than the home, which had implications for coding of the notification.  
“Quite often we will get worker notifications – it takes a lot of time to get their residential 
address. Often the employer will be reluctant to provide this͖ƚŚŝƐĐĂŶƚĂŬĞĂloƚoĨƚŝmĞƚo
follow-up.” 
“Different PHUs enter the data differently – for example some list the address where the 
individual was exposed and other list the home addreƐƐ.dŚŝƐmŝŐŚƚŚŝĚĞĐlƵƐƚĞƌƐ.͟ 
Transfer and management of information  
As outlined earlier, information is transferred either electronically or via mail or fax from the 
laboratory to the public health unit. The laboratory notification system, specifically ELR (electronic 
laboratory reporting) was identified as a strength of the system; however, a lack of awareness 
among some laboratories was a weakness.  
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Information sharing between Safe Work NSW and NSW Health was identified as a particularly 
unclear component of the system with a lot of uncertainty about what information could be shared 
and when.  
“[We would like] written clarity of the mechanisms by which we can contact SafeWork and 
identify a workplace or a staff member with elevated lead issues or concerns”. 
͞lĂƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶŝŶƚŚĞoŶƚƌol'ƵŝĚĞlŝŶĞƐŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚoĐlĂƌŝĨǇǁŚĂƚŝŶĨoƌmĂƚŝoŶĐĂŶlĞŐĂllǇďĞ
ĚŝƐĐloƐĞĚƚo^ĂĨĞtoƌŬE^tĂŶĚƚoĂŶĞmƉloǇĞƌďǇƚŚĞW,h.EoƚĂllĞmƉloǇĞƌƐĂƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐ
their staff to undertake blood lead test, so an employee may find out they have an elevated 
blood lead level without their employer’s knowledge of the test being conducted. dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ
potential risks to the privacy of individuals and their continued employment, particularly with 
smĂllĞmƉloǇĞƌƐĂŶĚ/oƌƐmĂllĐommƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ͕ŝĨŶoƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶoĨĂƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚoĐĐƵƉĂƚŝoŶĂl
exposure to SafeWork results in workplace inspections.” 
͞dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶoƚmƵĐŚƐŚĂƌŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂŶǇoƚŚĞƌĂŐĞŶĐǇ./ĨǁĞǁĞƌĞƚoƐŚĂƌĞǁŝƚŚ^ĂĨĞtoƌŬƚŚĞƌĞ
would be significant legal challenges [to overcome] – although workplaces and Safe Work 
are interested [in sharing information].”  
PHUs identified potential risks to the privacy of individuals and their continued employment, 
particularly with small employers 
and/or small communities, if 
notification of a perceived 
occupational exposure to SafeWork 
results in workplace inspections. 
GPs were also concerned about data 
sharing (see Box 1).  
Occasionally, who “owned” the 
information reported to the 
surveillance system was unclear – 
some workplaces felt they owned 
the health information of their 
employees rather than any treating 
doctor. This in a few cases led to 
non-notification of the result, but more frequently complicated the follow-up by the PHU. 
BOX 1 – Challenges of managing occupational cases 
A case is aged in his/her early 30’s and is an employee at a small 
electroplating company (approximately 15 employees) in a small town.  
With symptoms of gross fatigue & lethargy, the case has had significant 
time off work on sick leave and has a blood lead level of twice the 
NHMRC recommended level.  The case believes that the other workers 
have far greater exposure to lead than s/he, yet is aware of no other 
staff having had blood tests.  The premises next door is also an 
electroplating company and case believes none of those staff have 
blood tests either. 
The case’s GP contacted the PHU and advised that he expected that 
PHU would notify SafeWork as it is a notifiable condition.  The GP did 
not feel that he could contact SafeWork or the employer, as that would 
be a breach of patient confidentiality.  The case was not comfortable 
discussing this with the employer or WorkCover, as s/he felt that it could 
jeopardise their employment. 
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“[In one case] the results had been coded by the company and the lab initially refused to 
release the results so that we could not do follow-up – they classified them as ‘commercial in 
confidence’.”  
This is a unique complication of lead notifications and one that merits greater scrutiny, particularly if 
workers perceive lead testing to be a punitive measure that may jeopardise their employment rather 
than an action taken to protect them from health effects from workplace exposure.   
RECOMMENDATION 
7. Provide written clarity within the protocol about data sharing provisions with Safe Work
NSW, including what information can be shared and when, and who to ask if they have
uncertainty (e.g. Environmental Health Branch)
8. Clarify with Safe Work NSW what information is provided to employees and employers
about blood lead testing and public health follow up, and if deficiencies are identified work
with Safe Work NSW to ensure that information is provided that is clear and comprehensive
(e.g. a brochure that outlines to workers that they should be having blood lead testing
regularly if they are employed in a high-risk occupation, and that they can expect contact
from the PHU if their level is high)
Analysis, interpretation, reporting and dissemination of data    
Regular reporting of surveillance data was limited, primarily due to issues with data quality and 
usability. The changes to the notification level have also meant that comparing trends over time is 
made more challenging, particularly the data has been entered in a format that makes it nearly 
impossible to obtain easily interpretable information without significant cleaning.  
͞dŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚoƚŚĞŶoƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶlĞǀĞlŚĂǀĞmĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚĐomƉĂƌŝƐoŶƐĐĂŶŶoƚďĞmĂĚĞĞĂƐŝlǇ
over time.”  
͞ĂƚĂƋƵĂlŝƚǇĂŶĚĨolloǁ-up is missing from the system.”  
“Data is noƚĞĂƐŝlǇĂŶĂlǇƐĂďlĞĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞlĞǀĞlĚƵĞƚoƚŚĞǀĂƌǇŝŶŐƋƵĂlŝƚǇ.͟ 
“Centralised analysis and reporting capability is not currently occurring.”  
Challenges include lack of sufficient detail and numbers not agreeing with each other across 
different data sets (for example, an export from SAPHARI will yield different case counts than an 
export from NCIMS). Data analyses are not done regularly at the state level, with the most recent 
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published report based on lead notification data was a review published in 200815. This means that 
trends over time or changes in the epidemiology of notifications are difficult to monitor.  
Overall, apart from the annual report and any individual PHU activities (which were limited), there 
is no dissemination of the results of surveillance, a key attribute of surveillance systems.  
“I haven’t seen any robust analysis of the data.” 
͞dŚĞĐǇĐlĞoĨƐƵƌǀĞŝllĂŶĐĞŝƐŶoƚcomplete in terms of analysis, interpretation and 
dissemination.” 
This has limited the ability of the surveillance system to provide evidence to guide prevention 
activities.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
9. Implement regular reporting of surveillance data, both centrally and from PHUs, on a regular
basis (e.g. quarterly or annually). This may require the development of a reporting template
Evaluation of system attributes 
Simplicity 
The protocol for lead surveillance in NSW is relatively short and simple; complexity arises in the 
variation in the application of the protocol in different PHUs and in different population groups 
(children are typically managed differently to occupational exposures).  
“We try to make it as simple as possible, however there are complexities in lead as a whole 
which make it difficult [to design a simple system] – it is hard to be clear in a complex 
issue.” 
The amount of follow-up that PHUs felt they were required to do varied. Some PHUS investigated 
extensively with home visits and environmental testing even for low lead levels, whilst others did no 
follow-up at all on notifications in the range 5-10µg/dL. Some PHUs had adapted or changed the 
existing protocol to better align with their own processes and/or resource limitations. This was often 
done in accordance with the importance the unit attached to elevated blood lead as a public health 
issue (which varied from being seen as an important problem, to an issue of little significance). 
 “Due to increased numbers [of notifications] since the decrease in the notifiable lead level, 
we have determined our own protocol to determine what notifications to investigate.” 
“We address lead investigations for all minors as if they were children under 5 (as 16 or 17 is 
still a young age aŶĚŶoƚĂŶoĐĐƵƉĂƚŝoŶĂlĞǆƉoƐƵƌĞ)͕ using the precautionary principle.” 
211 
“LĞĂĚŝƐŝŶĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚlǇƚĞƐƚĞĚĨoƌoƌƌĞƉoƌƚĞĚin --------.dŚĞW,hĐommƵŶŝĐĂďlĞĚŝƐĞĂƐĞƐ team 
liaise with the EHO team, who undertake inspections and sampling if the patient is agreeable 
and it is warranted, and discuss with the GP follow-up testing.” 
The entry of data into the surveillance system via laboratories was straightforward. Collecting other 
data could be challenging, for example, following up with GPs to gather information on occupational 
exposure. In addition, identifying the LHD to case belongs to – some are notified from the workplace 
and others from the home address so it is not always clear who should be doing follow up.  
“Similar to follow up of other types of notifications, the medical practitioners who look after 
ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƐĂƌĞƋƵŝƚĞďƵƐǇĂŶĚƐomĞmĂǇŶoƚƌĞƚƵƌŶƚĞlĞƉŚoŶĞĐĂllƐ͕ĞǀĞŶĂĨƚĞƌlĞĂving 
ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚmĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ.dŚŝƐŝƐmĂŬŝŶŐŝƚƋƵŝƚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵlƚƚoĨolloǁƵƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŝĨƚŚĞ'WŚĂƐ
not provided permission to contact the case (and to advise the case that the PHU will be 
contacting them”. 
Managing data and entering in the system was identified as having improved over time. 
͞dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞlĞĐƚƌoŶŝĐĂŶĚmĂŶƵĂlŶoƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶƐ͖it’s definitely getting 
easier with ELR.”  
Electronic lab notifications had significantly reduced the workload but some of the fields in NCIMS 
were thought to be irrelevant or not useful. This was reflected in the number of PHUs (44%) who 
maintained a separate data collection system (typically an excel spreadsheet) alongside NCIMS.  
“We record information in a ŐĞŶĞƌĂl,ŝŶƐƉĞĐƚŝoŶ/ĐomƉlĂŝŶƚĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞ”. 
͞dŚĞĚĂƚĂŝƐƌĞĂllǇmĞƐƐǇǁŚĞŶǇoƵĚoǁŶloĂĚŝƚ͊tĞƚƌŝĞĚƚoĚoǁŶloĂĚŝƚĂŶĚŝƚ͛ƐŶoƚŐƌĞĂƚ͕
particularly when you put “other” and we write about the hobbies. Which you can tick, but it 
doesn’t really help you as it doesn’t indicate which hobby it is. It’s ĐlƵŶŬǇ͊͟ 
͞/ĐĂŶ͛ƚƚĞllŝĨƚŚĞĚĂƚĂŝƐĐomƉlĞƚĞoƌoĨŐooĚƋƵĂlŝƚǇ͟. 
Methods for analysing and disseminating the data were scant. Several stakeholders commented on 
the difficulty of extracting data from the system, particularly for some fields such as risk exposure. 
Some PHUs had developed their own methods (e.g. a SAS file that they ran weekly) but others 
simply never reviewed the data. At the state level, review of data was a complex process that had 
not been carried out for some years. Part of the reason for this was that the data sits between 
Environmental Health Branch and the surveillance team, and so no single person that was across all 
aspects of the system.  
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͞dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂlĂĐŬoĨǀŝƐŝďŝlŝƚǇoĨƐomĞƉĂƌƚƐoĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞmĂŶĚǁĂǇƐƚoĞǆƚƌĂĐƚƚŚĞĚĂƚĂĐĂŶ be 
ĐŚĂllĞŶŐŝŶŐ΀ĂŶĚ΁ĂƌĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵlƚƚoƵƐĞ./ƚĐĂŶďĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵlƚƚoĂŶƐǁĞƌďĂƐŝĐƋƵĞƐƚŝoŶ– due to both 
ƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞmĂŶĚĚĂƚĂƋƵĂlŝƚǇ͖ďƵƚƐomĞƚŝmĞƐƚŚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶoĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞmĂlƐolĞĂĚƐƚoƉooƌĚĂƚĂ
ƋƵĂlŝƚǇ.͟ 
A familiarity with NCIMS or SAPHARI was also required to be able to analyse and understand the 
data.  
͞dŚĞƐǇƐƚĞmŝƐĞĂƐǇƚoƵƐĞŝĨǇoƵŬŶoǁE/D^.” 
Overall the system was relatively simple to input data into but not always particularly useful (see 
acceptability, below), and it was very difficult to extract data from the system quickly.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
10. Make the lead response protocol more explicit to promote a uniform response to elevated
blood lead level notifications across PHUs
11. Identify key data fields in NCIMS that are challenging for data entry and extraction (such as
blood lead level and exposure) and address these as a matter of urgency to improve the
usability of the system for data analysis (discussed in more detail in recommendations
12-14, below)
Flexibility  
Changes to the surveillance system that have occurred over time include changes to the notification 
level and changes to the data storage system. The Public Health Act was amended in October 2017 
to close a loophole regarding laboratory reporting as discussed previously. Potential future changes 
to the case definition that have been proposed include introducing a “possible” case as determined 
by capillary blood lead level testing.  
One of the strengths of the NSW blood lead surveillance system is the ease with which changes to 
the case definition can be implemented – this included at the laboratory reporting level and 
operational public health unit level.  
This was highlighted particularly with regards to laboratory notifications: 
 ͞dŚĞƐǇƐƚĞmŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĚĂƉƚĂďlĞƚoĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŶoƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶ level and can change data 
fields reasonably easily “  
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“When a change happens to the case definition it is easy to inform labs – we just tell the labs 
via email and ĐommƵŶŝĐĂƚĞǁŝƚŚĐŚĞmŝĐĂlƉĂƚŚoloŐŝƐƚƐ.dŚĞlĂďƐĐĂŶƚŚĞŶũƵƐƚĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞ
flag in their system”  
“When we changed to NCIMS [from the NDDs] we moved from event-based surveillance to 
person-based surveillance, which has been a good change”  
The ease with which changes to the surveillance system were made and implemented likely 
reflected the strength of surveillance systems in NSW generally, and the position of lead surveillance 
as a component within a larger surveillance system.  
Some drawbacks to changes to the surveillance system over time included the accumulation of a 
“legacy” of changes, particularly missing or poor-quality data that had migrated from older to newer 
systems. Another drawback was a lack of awareness or confusion around the meaning of changes to 
the surveillance system among PHUs and the inability to gain an overarching perspective of the 
function of blood lead surveillance at the state level.  
“I feel a lot of features [of the system] aren’t relevant” 
“NCIMS has a lot of pages – ĚoǁĞƌĞĂllǇŶĞĞĚĂllƚŚĂƚŝŶĨoƌmĂƚŝoŶ͍dŚĞŝŶĨoƌmĂƚŝoŶ
collected needs to be useful and helpful on the ground, it doesn’t need to be cumbersome” 
“I’m not really sure how information is collected and used”  
The system is also not very flexible in terms of getting data out of the system to analyse. 
͞dŚĞĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚĚĂƚĂ͕ĨoƌĞǆĂmƉlĞĞǆƉoƐƵƌĞ͕ŝƐŶoƚĞĂƐŝlǇĂccessible.” 
Changes to the case definition to incorporate capillary testing are planned; implementation of these 
will be simple and involve adding a field to NCIMS and changing the protocol.  
Data quality and completeness  
As previously outlined in Chapter 4, there was considerable variation in data quality within the 
blood lead surveillance system. Some key variables were of very poor quality with a significant 
volume of missing data. In general, demographic data was for the most part complete particularly 
for the key variables of age, date of birth and notifying jurisdiction.  
Laboratory data was generally disorganized and sometimes of poor quality. Electronically 
transmitted data was of better quality than data that had been manually entered by PHU staff. The 
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data entry field for blood lead levels in NCIMS was free-text, leading to significant variation in the 
format and syntax of entries and making analysis very difficult. Variations included numbers, letters, 
symbols and indication of units in the values field. Examples of this idiosyncratic data entry include 
“Pb=11.4”, “4.11 miumol/L” (sic) and “umol/L 8.81 ʅŐͬdL 16.8”. This data was neither easily cleaned 
nor analysed. There were also several apparent duplications, where the same individual had multiple 
notifications from the same date and the same laboratory accession number.  
Overall the data were difficult to access and analyse. Multiple methods were required to export the 
relevant data, which lead to difficulties in analysis, particularly when essential numbers such as case 
count were different when exporting from NCIMS as opposed to SAPHARI. Data for geographical 
area was organised by PHU office location, rather than by LHD – this was particularly troublesome 
for local health districts that are served by multiple public health units, as in the case of Dubbo and 
Bathurst (both located in Far West LHD) and made drawing conclusions about the rates in different 
LHDS a more complicated process.  
There was a significant amount of missing data, particularly for occupation and exposure. Exposure 
was only recorded for 12.9% of notifications. Additionally, “occupational exposure” was not a listed 
exposure category, and it is likely that many of the blank exposures had an occupational exposure. It 
is likely that a lot of information missing from NCIMS had been collected in the parallel data systems 
(such as excel spreadsheets) that several of the PHUs maintained. The volume of missing data meant 
that detection of possible trends in exposure, or meaningful conclusions – such as, for example, that 
exposures due to lead mining in the area have decreased over time – were not able to be made with 
the system as it currently stands.  
͞dŚĞĚĂƚĂŝƐoĨlŝmŝƚĞĚƵƐĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞlĂƌŐĞŶƵmďĞƌƐoĨmŝƐƐŝŶŐǀĂlƵĞƐ.” 
The quality of data collected could be improved significantly with simple changes to the data entry 
mechanism on NCIMS – this could include updating and/or clarifying the potential list of exposures, 
including occupation as a potential exposure, converting the entry field for “blood lead level” to a 
numerical field, and creating a drop-down box for the units for which the level was recorded. There 
could also be a note reporting that only one unit was required to be recorded, or a mechanism for 
automatically converting all lead levels to a single measure (i.e. µg/dL). In addition, the analysis 
function in NCIMS could be significantly improved, particularly if a regular reporting form, such as 
that utilised in Communicable Disease Branch which generates a standardised “MMWR” style 
report, was used. This could allow for regular analysis to be conducted within NCIMS and negate the 
need for regular data exports and complex data transformation and analysis methods. This could 
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enable the identification of missing data early and allow for comparisons of data completeness 
between different PHUs.  
A future ideal database would have a single dataset that was able to be extracted easily, that was 
complete and accurate, that was reasonably easy to analyse with simple software (e.g. Microsoft 
Excel) and that contained numerical blood lead levels.   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
12. Convert the entry field for blood lead level to a numerical field and create a drop-down box
to record the units (or alternatively require all blood lead levels to be entered in a single
type of units, e.g. µg/dL)
13. Create within NCIMS a standardised reporting form that is automatically generated and can
be reviewed regularly (such as weekly or fortnightly) to allow ongoing monitoring of trends
and identify problems with data quality or timeliness as they occur
14. Further explore with PHUs what parallel systems they use for data collection and what these
offer that is missing from NCIMS to make NCIMS more acceptable to PHUs for the collection
and recording of surveillance data
Acceptability 
Generally, follow-up of lead notifications was thought to be of some public health importance, but 
was also seen as unwieldy with variable perspectives on whether following up notifications at low 
levels was useful and an appropriate use of limited public health resources.  
͞dŚĞǀĂlƵĞoĨlĞĂĚŶoƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶƐŶĞĞĚƐƚoďĞƋƵĞƐƚŝoŶĞĚ͟ 
Some public health units (typically those with legacy sites of industrial lead use or ongoing lead 
concerns) invested significant resources including time and manpower to follow up every 
notification, whilst others limited their follow up to young children and to adults above a particular 
level.  
The differences between the limits for notification to PHUs under the NSW Public Health Act and to 
Safe Work NSW under occupational legislation was a concern. The notification level under the Public 
,ĞĂůƚŚ Đƚ ŝƐ шϱђŐͬĚ>͕ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ blood lead levels for removal from the workplace for 
occupationally-exposed workers under Work Health and Safety Regulation 2017 are: 
• >50ug/dL for females not of reproductive capacity and males
• >20ug/dL for females of reproductive capacity
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• >15ug/dL for females who are pregnant or breastfeeding
The significant difference between the two levels was felt to undermine the efforts of PHUs to 
follow-up notifications in occupationally exposed adults, as these individuals would continue to be 
exposed in their workplace regardless of any PHU action, and led to PHUs feeling that their efforts in 
following up these notifications were futile.  
 ͞dŚĞƌĞ͛ƐŶoƚmƵĐŚƉoŝŶƚŝŶƐĞŶĚŝŶŐlĞƚƚĞƌƐoƵƚƚoƚŚĞƐĂmĞƉĞƌƐoŶ͙oĨĂllƚŚĞlĞƚƚĞƌƐǁĞƐĞŶĚ
out to the occupational ones, we never get anything back. No one ever rings us. I don’t think 
everyone appreciates our intervention – the see us perhaps as a nuisance at times rather 
than letting them get on with what they are doing”.  
“[We should be] aligning SafeWork NSW and NSW Health notification levels and intervention 
protocols as much as possible.” 
“We need to identify a more robust mechanisms for occupational reporting to SafeWork 
regarding exposures, and clarify investigative limits to align more closely with occupational 
safety limits.” 
Parents of young children were typically well engaged with the system and amenable to follow up. 
For occupational exposures, where follow up typically consisted of a letter, there was usually never a 
response.  
“For employees with workplaces exposures – the level under the Safe Work legislation is very 
ŚŝŐŚĂŶĚƚŚŝƐmĞĂŶƐŝƚŝƐŶoƚƉŝĐŬĞĚƵƉoƌƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐmƵĐŚĂƐŝƚĐoƵlĚďĞ.dŚŝƐƉoƐĞƐ
legislation and collaboration challenges with Safe Work. Also, this age group is nonchalant 
about risk.”  
The use of alternative databases by public health units indicated that the NCIMS system was not 
particularly acceptable in terms of being a useful way to collect and store data. The use of local dual 
systems also lead to the loss of granular data in NCIMS as there was frequently information stored 
either in a separate system at the public health unit level or as free text, which meant the loss of this 
data when it came to being able to analyse epidemiology and trends.  
“I don’t have a lot of trust in the information in the system given it hasn’t been evaluated for 
some time.”  
“It’s not great when you put down “other” and write about the [exposure]… it’s not very 
ƵƐĞĨƵlŝŶƚŚĂƚǁĂǇ.dŚĞƌĞ͛ƐŶoƌĞĂlĂďŝlŝƚǇƚoƐŚĂƌĞŝŶĨoƌmĂƚŝoŶĂďoƵƚŶoǀĞlĞǆƉoƐƵƌĞƐ.͟ 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
15. Work in partnership with Safe Work NSW to more closely align notification levels for
occupationally exposed adults
16. Review the fields in NCIMS to ensure they are capturing information that is relevant and
useful in a form that is easy to analyse – this could include changing some of the risk
categories and making selection of options (such as hobbies) from a drop-down list
Representativeness  
Overall the representativeness was thought to be variable with some groups very well represented 
(or over-represented), and others underrepresented.  
Key groups thought to be very well represented were those who were occupationally exposed and 
those living in Broken Hill; both these groups have programs in place for systematic screening of 
elevated blood lead levels.  
“΀dŚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ΁ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐoŶĂƌĞĂ– i.e. in Broken Hill surveillance is much more 
ƐǇƐƚĞmĂƚŝĐ͖ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚĞƐƚŝŶŐĂlĂƌŐĞƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞoĨƚŚĞƉoƉƵlĂƚŝoŶ.”  
“Our surveillance is a bit two-ƐƚƌĞĂmĞĚ(ĂĐƚŝǀĞǀƐ.ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ)ĂŶĚǀĞƌǇƐŬĞǁĞĚƚoǁĂƌĚƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
groups. In essence, there are two streams: active surveillance for workplace exposures and 
kids at higher risk and then passive surveillance for everyone else.” 
The over-representativeness of these two groups was thought to be appropriate given their higher 
risk profile; however, there was some concern that groups who may also be at risk for elevated 
blood levels are not being captured. These included home renovators, and those from culturally and 
linguistically diverse backgrounds. Stakeholders relied on their experience and anecdotal reports for 
these views. It was suggested by several stakeholders that those from culturally and linguistically 
diverse backgrounds may be under-represented among notifications, particularly given that subsets 
of this population may be at increased risk due to the use of Ayurvedic medicines and cosmetics 
purchased from overseas where regulation about lead content in products is not as stringent as in 
Australia. It was suggested that targeted messaging to these groups to make them aware of the risk 
of lead poisoning would be useful.  
͞ĞƌƚĂŝŶĞƚŚŶŝĐŐƌoƵƉƐǁŚoďĞlŝĞǀĞŝŶ/ƵƐĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝoŶĂlmĞĚŝĐŝŶĞƐ– we don’t really have a 
handle on traditional medicines as they are not regulated at all. If we knew more about these 
groups we could provide education and risk information in their own languages.”  
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“Cases from taking medications (e.g. Ayurvedic mĞĚŝĐŝŶĞƐ)ĂŶĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞƚŚŶŝĐŐƌoƵƉƐmĂǇďĞ
moƌĞĂƚƌŝƐŬ./ĨǁĞĂƌĞƚŚoƌoƵŐŚǁĞƐŚoƵlĚĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƚŚŝƐĂŶĚĐoƵlĚƚŚĞŶlŝĂŝƐĞǁŝƚŚd'ĂŶĚ
regulatory ďoĚŝĞƐ(ĨĂŝƌƚƌĂĚŝŶŐ)ĞƚĐ.͟ 
“We are pƌoďĂďlǇŶoƚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐE^͖this group seems less likely to seek help and more at 
risk.”  
“dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶoĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚoƐƵŐŐĞƐƚǁĞĂƌĞmŝƐƐŝŶŐĂŶy particular groups, however I suspect we 
are missing young adults and non-oĐĐƵƉĂƚŝoŶĂlĞǆƉoƐƵƌĞƐ(ŝ.Ğ.ŚomĞƌĞŶoǀĂƚoƌƐ)͕ĂƐǁĞllĂƐ
possibly the elderly.”  
“We may not be capturing home renovation type people.” 
The main limitation to representativeness was thought to be lack of awareness among treating 
clinicians of the potential for lead exposure (discussed further below), as well as the fact that 
elevated blood lead is typically asymptomatic at notifiable levels (or alternatively presents with non-
specific symptoms).  
RECOMMENDATION 
17. Develop targeted messaging towards populations of culturally and linguistically diverse
backgrounds regarding risk factors for lead exposure, including those of particular relevance
to specific groups (such as Ayurvedic medicines)
18. Make information and fact sheets about elevated blood lead levels available in a variety of
languages
Timeliness  
No specific data on timeliness was collected. In general, notifications of elevated blood lead at low 
levels were not considered urgent by PHUs. 
“Lead is often a lower priority at times” 
“It is very administrative now with lots of letters, and following up a notification can be time 
consuming… if we are short on resources it can get left. In a general sense, we try and 
respond in a week or two.” 
“I think response times are reasonable – lead is not as time critical an issue as infectious 
disease notifications” 
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The move from manual- to electronic transfer of information was seen to have greatly increased the 
timeliness of notifications being received by PHUs.  
͞lĞĐƚƌoŶŝĐŶoƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝoŶƐĐomĞƚŚƌoƵŐŚĐoŶƚŝŶƵoƵƐlǇ͖ǁŚĞƌĞmĂŶƵĂlĚĂƚĂĞŶƚƌǇŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ
there could be a delay”  
Several factors affecting timeliness of follow-up were noted. These included delays in being able to 
contact the ordering doctor (or even the lack of an ordering doctor, particularly for occupational 
notifications), and the fact that lead was often a low priority in a busy public health unit, meaning 
that if there were more pressing matters it was deprioritised.   
“Due to increased numbers since [the] decrease in lead level for notification, we have 
determined our own protocol to determine what notifications to investigate” 
“Quite often we will get occupational notifications –it takes a lot of time to get their 
residential address. Often the employer will be reluctant to provide ƚŚŝƐ͖ƚŚŝƐĐĂŶƚĂŬĞa lot of 
time to follow-up” 
“Our current issue is the non-reporting of blood lead from one local lead recycling plant that 
uses a non-accredited laboratory for testing and test results are not overseen by a medical 
officer” 
“It would be very useful if the doctors would put the occupation in the clinical notes” 
One possible solution to reduce the time taken for follow-up could be that the request form for 
blood lead requires the ordering clinician to indicate whether the notification represents an 
occupational exposure, and if so to indicate the occupation.  However, changes to the laboratory 
request forms require complex processes to implement. 
͞dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĐŚĂllĞŶŐĞƐŝŶǀolǀĞĚŝŶŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĨoƌmƐĐŚĂŶŐĞĚďǇlĂďoƌĂƚoƌŝĞƐ.tĞŚĂǀĞƚƌŝĞĚŝƚ
before and it was nearly impossible.” 
Stability  
As a component of NCIMS, the lead surveillance system is very stable. It is very well supported in 
terms of manpower and electronic resourcing with dedicated staff working full-time to maintain it. 
This is a strength of the lead surveillance system.  
The increasing use of electronic lab notifications has significantly reduced the amount of time 
needed to be spent entering data into the system as well as reduced the delay between collection of 
a specimen and receipt of information regarding that individual into the system.  
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However, the complexity of the system, particularly the difficulties of extracting all relevant data 
from the system, was a limitation of the system. This could be improved by training Environmental 
Health staff on how to extract and analyse data from the system.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
19. Provide training to Environmental Health staff in how to extract and analyse data from the
system to build capacity within EHB and increase confidence in use and oversight of the
system
Sensitivity  
Given that at the level of blood lead included in the case definition cases are likely to be 
asymptomatic, the sensitivity of the system in terms of the proportion of actual cases of elevated 
blood lead in the community that are detected is likely to be low. The exception to this would be in 
areas like Broken Hill where there is systematic screening, and among occupationally exposed adults 
working in high risk industries where monthly screening is required under industrial law. The lead 
evaluation system in NSW is a mix of active and passive surveillance. A series of flow charts showing 
the differential way in which cases can be notified and how this may influence case ascertainment 
and notification to the system is shown in Figure 3-Figure 6, below.  
Figure 3 - Surveillance of elevated blood lead in the community 
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Figure 4 - Surveillance of elevated blood lead in those working in high risk occupations 
Figure 5 - Surveillance of elevated blood lead in children under 5 years in Broken Hill, NSW 
This lack of sensitivity was well recognised by users of the system. 
“We are not identifying all levels of 5 or less. As the levels get higher the sensitivity gets 
better and better [however] now that we are at low levels, there is no way of capturing all of 
it”.  
“/ĂmŶoƚƐƵƌĞǁĞĂƌĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐmoƐƚ/ĂllĐĂƐĞƐ.dŚĞƌĞŝƐǁoƌŬƉlĂĐĞƐĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐƚĂƌŐĞƚŝŶŐŚŝŐŚ
risk workers and programs to monitor children, [however] we miss people outside these two 
groups and the system relies on someone presenting to a GP.”  
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A key identified weakness of case ascertainment was lack of understanding of GPs about lead testing 
and lead surveillance, and particularly the need to consider lead exposure in at-risk groups.  
͞΀dŚĞƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇoĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞm΁ƌĞĂllǇĚĞƉĞŶĚƐoŶ'WƐĚoŝŶŐƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ– GPs need to consider 
lead an issue and then ask for a test. In endemic areas where we know it is a problem we do 
ŐooĚƐƵƌǀĞŝllĂŶĐĞ͖ŝŶŶoŶ-endemic areas, it is up to GPs.” 
“We need Improved awareness of physicians of when to test: this includes both in endemic 
ĂƌĞĂƐĂŶĚoĨĂƚƌŝƐŬŐƌoƵƉƐ/ĂƌĞĂƐ.͟ 
“We need to Identify where high-risk areas are and ensure awareness among doctors about 
when to test.”  
An additional challenge to the sensitivity of the system is the use in Broken Hill of capillary testing to 
test children under 5 years old, which is not used elsewhere in the state. This tool has not been 
validated at the state level, although in Broken Hill they have completed their own validation 
process and have strict protocols for testing. The capillary test is known to be less specific than 
venous blood testing23. Thus, its use may be over-estimating the burden of disease in Broken Hill 
when compared with other PHUs.  
The system was thought to do poorly at identifying clusters unless there was a clear epidemiological 
link and the cases were tightly clustered in time and place. There was no documentation maintained 
of clusters that had been detected by the system.  
“dŚĞŝŶĂďŝlŝƚǇoĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞmďĞŝŶŐĂďlĞƚoĚĞƚĞĐƚĐlƵƐƚĞƌƐŝƐĂmĂũoƌŝƐƐƵĞ.tĞcan look 
centrally but could be missing clusters both in the workplace and geographically. It would be 
good if there was some kind of alert system in NCIMS.” 
͞/ƚŚŝŶŬĂĐlƵƐƚĞƌoĨƌĞĂƐoŶĂďlĞƐŝǌĞƚŚĂƚŝƐĞĂƐŝlǇlŝŶŬĞĚ(ŝ.Ğ.oĐĐƵƉĂƚŝoŶĂl)ǁoƵlĚďĞĚĞƚĞĐƚĞĚ͕
however any that are more geographically dispersed would be much harder.”  
Key limitations in the ability to detect clusters was the lack of a clear mechanism for identifying or 
recording occupational exposures that may be linked, and the decentralised nature of the Public 
Health system in NSW. This meant that if employees of a single workplace resided in different PHUs 
there is a possibility that the link between cases will not be identified. An additional limitation is the 
staffing arrangements at PHU’s and the fact that multiple people may be following up one or more 
notifications.   
“How do you know you have a cluster if four different people are following-up a blood lead?” 
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“I don’t think we are able to detect clusters very well – it depends on a PHU identifying more 
than one related case”.  
Suggestions to improve the ability of the system to detect clusters included mapping. 
͞dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ͛ƚƌĞĂllǇĂmĞĐŚĂŶŝƐmƚoĚĞƚĞĐƚĐlƵƐƚĞƌƐ͖ƚŚŝƐǁoƵlĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐomĞoŶĞƚolooŬĂƚoƌ
map it. It could be mapped as the notifications are geocoded”  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
20. Update the case definition to include capillary testing (perhaps as “probable” case) to reduce
misclassification bias in the system, with clear requirements about when confirmatory
testing is required. This may also increase testing among younger children and lead to
increased sensitivity of the system as a whole
21. Develop a mechanism by which clusters could be more easily detected – this could include a
requirement to record workplace in NCIMS or an automated mapping process that
generates maps based on home or workplace address periodically.
Discussion 
Lead surveillance poses a unique challenge for public health systems. A person with an elevated 
blood lead level at the lower range (5-10µg/dL) will typically be asymptomatic. Elevated blood lead 
levels can be chronic and persistent, and the individual can be re-exposed in the future. 
Management of elevated blood lead focuses on removing the exposure. Within NSW, lead is the only 
non-infectious notifiable condition, as well as the only notifiable condition for which Environmental 
Health Branch has responsibility.  
Blood lead levels in the community, as well as risk factors for exposure, have changed over the last 
two decades in NSW. Chronic environmental exposure has been reduced due to legislation barring 
leaded petrol and paint and is now mainly limited to those living in lead-endemic areas and those 
participating in lead-exposure occupations. The breadth and range of potential exposures appears to 
have changed. Anecdotally, lead-exposed individuals are increasingly exposed from a diverse range 
of potential exposures, ranging from home renovation to consumption of Ayurvedic medicines or 
use of imported cosmetics. Unfortunately, weaknesses in the lead surveillance system and data 
collection mean that although it is perceived that exposure categories are changing, the data is not 
available to support this assertion.  
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The system utilised in NSW has elements that both promote and hinder surveillance. Two key 
components, the use of electronic lab reporting and the use of the NCIMS information management 
system, help integrate lead surveillance into wider surveillance in NSW. NCIMS is well established 
and there is sufficient expertise and resources available to support its use. However, lead as a 
notifiable condition has several idiosyncrasies that have introduced some challenges. These include 
the need for the blood lead level to be recorded and monitored over time, and the fact that 
exposure category is difficult to record and export from NCIMS. Deficiencies in the quality of data 
recorded about blood lead level, especially the fact that it is recorded as free-text rather than a 
numeric field, is the single most important barrier to effective, monitoring of blood lead levels in 
NSW.  
In addition, lead surveillance involves several different bodies – not only within NSW Health 
(including the Surveillance team and Environmental Health Branch as well as PHUs), but also with 
other agencies including SafeWork NSW, general practitioners, and occupational health physicians. 
This introduces complexity into the system and has resulted in gaps where parallel systems differ. 
One of these is the significantly different notifiable levels under Work Health and Safety regulation 
when compared to the NSW Public Health Act. Prior to October 2017 there were also loopholes with 
the NSW Public Health Act that, that meant that responsibility for notification of laboratory test was 
unclear.  
Overall the system is meeting some but not all its goals and objectives. Cases are all managed by 
PHUs to varying degrees, although this varies from simply entering cases into NCIMS (either 
electronically or by hand) with no further follow-up, through to a full response involving home visits 
and environmental testing. The response varies both by blood lead level and by PHU responsible. 
Ideally this variability would be reduced to increase uniformity in responses across the state.  
The epidemiology of lead notifications is not well understood or monitored, mainly due to difficulties 
accessing the data system. Weakness in data collection instruments are almost solely responsible for 
this, and review of the data fields in NCIMS and how data is entered and stored, including 
introducing some rules to make data entry effective and easily extracted, could have a significant 
impact on this, as could reporting requirements for summary epidemiology reports both at the PHU 
level and the state level.  
Overall the system as it currently stands was reasonably flexible, accommodating changes to the 
notifiable blood lead level and Public Health Act without significant challenge, but was neither 
simple nor acceptable. The existence or parallel systems of data collection and storage used by PHUs 
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as well as the identification of significant challenges accessing data within the system were reflective 
of this. Changes should be made to the database so that there are no parallel systems or duplication, 
which should involve consultation with PHUs about what changes to NCIMS would improve its 
usability.  
The biggest weakness of the system was the poor data quality. As identified by many of the users, 
the structure of the database was almost solely responsible for this. Data entry of blood levels was 
problematic, with cleaning of these blood lead levels an extremely complex endeavour requiring 
strong software and a significant time commitment, a response unfeasible to most PHUs. As 
outlined in recommendations 11 and 12, urgent changes to be implemented should include 
introducing rules to improve data quality, including entry of blood lead levels as numerals only, and 
introduction a drop-down box to indicate the units used (either ʅŐͬĚ> Žƌ ʅŵŽůͬ>Ϳ.  dŚĞ ĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞ 
ĐĂƚĞŐories should also be reviewed. “Occupational lead exposure” should be introduced as an 
exposure category and the remaining categories reviewed for utility and to ensure they reflect 
current exposure trends, and reduced in number if possible. In addition, technological changes need 
to be considered, such as introduction of capillary testing into the case definition.  
Although there was a perception among some members of the Public Health Unit network that lead 
is no longer an important public health issue, increasing evidence of public health effects even at 
lower levels mean that it is important that the system adapts to the changes and remains useful and 
fit for purpose into the future. The challenges in monitoring trends over time with the current 
system have meant that identification of how and in what direction the system should change have 
been based on anecdote and experience rather than evidence. Improvement of the system should 
allow ongoing evidence-based change to occur. Ideally the protocol should be updated so it is more 
proscriptive and there is greater uniformity in responses between PHUs. In addition, Safe Work NSW 
and NSW Health should continue to work together so that differences in response between the two 
groups (such as what constitutes a notifiable blood lead levels) are addressed formally and guidance 
can be provided to individuals and health providers in the community. Health also needs liaise 
closely with SafeWork NSW so that important information gathered about workplaces meeting or 
not meeting their legislative responsibilities is addressed, and so that workers are empowered 
within the workplace to protect themselves from the effects of exposure to lead. NSW Health, and  
particularly Environmental Health Branch, is in a unique position to advocate for these workers with 
the surveillance system as it currently stands, and this would be an opportunity to put health and 
disease prevention on the agenda of all agencies.  
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Finally, greater uniformity in response should occur across NSW. A clear and detailed protocol with 
clear delineation of responsibility for tasks would enable this. Information sharing among the public 
health network should also be encouraged, allowing practitioners to tap in to the wealth of 
experience across the state and allow the cultivation of corporate knowledge and a sense of 
ownership of lead surveillance at all levels of NSW Health. 
Limitations  
This evaluation was conducted internally within NSW Health to provide an overview of the system as 
it currently stands and review NSW Health practices. As such, key persons outside NSW Health who 
may have been able to provide key insights on lead surveillance and elevated blood lead as a public 
health problem were not consulted. These included general practitioners, occupational physicians, 
individuals notified with elevated blood lead (both those exposed in the community and those 
exposed occupationally), and SafeWork NSW. Once changes based on the findings of this evaluation 
are formalised and implemented, a wider review of lead exposure in NSW may lead to some 
interesting insights on how to prevent lead exposure in the community in the future. It would also 
be useful to gain the perspectives of members of the community who have had elevated blood lead 
levels notified to see whether the public health response was useful to them and ways in which it 
could be improved.  
The complexity of the surveillance system, heterogeneity in responses to lead notifications on the 
part of different PHUs, and a lack of clarity of how the overall system functioned meant that this 
evaluation focused mainly on the gathering of qualitative information about how the system worked 
in practice (a process evaluation). The impact of the surveillance system on the outcome of blood 
lead levels in the community was beyond the scope of the evaluation. Cost-effectiveness of the 
surveillance system, including the cost in terms of resources, time and manpower in following up 
notifications of elevated blood lead, was also not considered. These could be areas for future 
evaluations to consider, ensuring that the NSW elevated blood lead surveillance system remains 
effective, cost-effective and fit for purpose.  
Conclusion 
This evaluation of the NSW elevated blood lead surveillance system identified several areas where it 
could be improved. These included problems with data quality, uniformity of response, concerns 
about data sharing including with other agencies), and the inability to analyse epidemiological data. 
Overall, with changes to data capture, greater standardisation of the response to lead notifications 
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across PHUs, and with an increasing focus on collaboration, the lead surveillance in NSW is well-
positioned to continue to be effective into the future.   
Recommendations 
1. Review the lead response protocol to ensure the response required from PHUs is clear, both
in terms of case follow-up and information collection and reporting requirements
2. State explicitly in the response protocol who has responsibility for specific actions, including
clarification of the roles of PHUs and of Environmental Health Branch
3. Introduction of regular reporting requirements for lead (such as a quarterly or annual review
of the epidemiology and of data completeness) would lead to timely identification of
challenges with the dataset and provide information for ongoing improvements to the
system
4. Continuing education for Environmental Health branch staff in the collection and analysis of
surveillance system data and in the use of NCIMS and SAPHARI would lead to improved
confidence of the staff in owning the lead surveillance system
5. Regular data review meetings between the Surveillance team and the Environmental Health
team would enable both groups to have a greater understanding of the current state of lead
surveillance in NSW
6. NSW Health and Safe Work NSW should collaborate to regularly communicate with
laboratories (NSW health) and workplaces (Safe Work NSW) to provide education about
blood lead and remind of them of their testing and notification obligations
7. Provide written clarity within the protocol about data sharing provisions with Safe Work
NSW, including what information can be shared and when, and who to ask if they have
uncertainty (e.g. Environmental Health Branch)
8. Clarify with Safe Work NSW what information is provided to employees and employers
about blood lead testing and public health follow up, and if deficiencies are identified work
with Safe Work NSW to ensure that information is provided that is clear and comprehensive
(e.g. a brochure that outlines to workers that they should be having blood lead testing
regularly if they are employed in a high-risk occupation, and that they can expect contact
from the PHU if their level is high)
9. Implement regular reporting of surveillance data, both centrally and from PHUs, on a regular
basis (e.g. quarterly or annually). This may require the development of a reporting template
10. Make the lead response protocol more explicit to promote a uniform response to elevated
blood lead level notifications across PHUs
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11. Identify key data fields in NCIMS that are challenging for data entry and extraction (such as
blood lead level and exposure) and address these as a matter of urgency to improve the
usability of the system for data analysis (discussed in more detail in recommendations 12-14,
below)
12. Convert the entry field for blood lead level to a numerical field and create a drop-down box
to record the units (or alternatively require all blood lead levels to be entered in a single
type of units, e.g. µg/dL)
13. Create within NCIMS a standardised reporting form that is automatically generated and can
be reviewed regularly (such as weekly or fortnightly) to allow ongoing monitoring of trends
and identify problems with data quality or timeliness as they occur
14. Further explore with PHUs what parallel systems they use for data collection and what these
offer that is missing from NCIMS to make NCIMS more acceptable to PHUs for the collection
and recording of surveillance data
15. Work in partnership with Safe Work NSW to more closely align notification levels for
occupationally exposed adults
16. Review the fields in NCIMS to ensure they are capturing information that is relevant and
useful in a form that is easy to analyse – this could include changing some of the risk
categories and making selection of options (such as hobbies) from a drop-down list
17. Develop targeted messaging towards populations of culturally and linguistically diverse
backgrounds regarding risk factors for lead exposure, including those of particular relevance
to specific groups (such as Ayurvedic medicines)
18. Make information and fact sheets about elevated blood lead levels available in a variety of
languages
19. Provide training to Environmental Health staff in how to extract and analyse data from the
system to build capacity within EHB and increase confidence in use and oversight of the
system
20. Update the case definition to include capillary testing (perhaps as “probable” case) to reduce
misclassification bias in the system, with clear requirements about when confirmatory
testing is required. This may also increase testing among younger children and lead to
increased sensitivity of the system as a whole
21. Develop a mechanism by which clusters could be more easily detected – this could include a
requirement to record workplace in NCIMS or an automated mapping process that generates
maps based on home or workplace address periodically.
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Elevated Blood Lead Levels - Response Protocol for 
NSW Public Health Units 
1. Surveillance Objectives
x To identify cases and recommend appropriate risk reduction measures.
x To monitor the epidemiology to inform the development of better risk reduction strategies.
2. Case Definition
A confirmed case requires: 
x A person with a venous blood lead level of ≥5 µg/dL (0.24µmol/L)
3. Notification Criteria and Procedure
Elevated blood lead level is to be notified by: 
x Laboratories on diagnosis (electronically or by routine mail to the local Public Health Unit).
x Only confirmed cases should be entered onto NCIMS.
4. The Disease
Causative Agent 
Lead is a naturally occurring metal found in the earth’s crust. It has a wide variety of uses in manufacturing due to 
its properties of being soft, malleable and corrosion resistant. Australia is one of the world’s major lead-producing 
countries.  
Most people in Australia live in places where there are very small amounts of lead in food, drinking water, air, 
dust, soil and consumer products. Exposure to higher than background levels of lead may occur in areas where 
there are industrial sources of lead or through exposure to lead-containing paint. However, people’s exposure to 
lead has substantially reduced in recent decades due to national initiatives which have restricted the addition of 
lead to paint and petrol, and the use of lead in consumer goods (e.g. toys, cosmetics and cans). In addition, lead 
management programs in endemic areas, such as Broken Hill, have resulted in a steady decline in blood lead 
levels in children.  
Lead and lead compounds are not beneficial or necessary for human health, and can be harmful to the human 
body.  
Mode of Absorption 
Elevated blood lead levels usually derive from the ingestion of lead-containing substances, the inhalation of lead-
containing dust and transfer from mother to foetus. Less commonly, some forms of the metal can be absorbed 
through the skin. Young children (under 5 years) and pregnant women are especially vulnerable to environmental 
exposure to lead, but adults engaged in particular occupations and hobbies are also at risk. 
x Public health priority: Routine
x Public Health Unit (PHU) response time: Respond to confirmed cases within 3 working days.
Enter confirmed cases on Notifiable Conditions Information Management System (NCIMS) within
5 working days.
x Case management: Ascertain source where possible, and recommend risk reduction measures.
Notify SafeWork NSW, where appropriate, of cases from occupational exposure.
x Contact management: Consider identification of other persons affected by the same source or
the transfer of contaminant to other household members.
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The average blood lead level among Australians is now estimated to be below 5 micrograms per decilitre (5 
µg/dL or 0.24 µmol/L). A blood lead level greater than 5 µg/dL (0.24 µmol/L) suggests that a person has been, or 
continues to be, exposed to lead at a level that is above what is considered the average ‘background’ exposure in 
Australia. 
Note that in communities that are at risk of known excess lead exposure due to industry (such as Broken Hill), 
Public Health Authorities run specific programs to monitor and reduce lead exposure.  
Clinical Presentation 
Health effects as a result of lead exposure differ substantially between individuals. Factors such as a 
person's age, the amount of lead, whether the exposure is over a short-term or a longer period, and the 
presence of other health conditions, will influence what symptoms or health effects are exhibited. Lead can 
be harmful to people of all ages, but the risk of health effects is highest for unborn babies, infants and 
children under 5 years. 
It is well established that blood lead levels equal to or greater than 10 µg/dL (0.48 µmol/L) may have harmful 
effects on many organs and bodily functions. Effects such as increased blood pressure, abnormally low 
haemoglobin, abnormal kidney function, long-term kidney damage, behavioural problems, cognitive impairment 
and abnormal brain function have been observed at blood lead levels between 10µg/dL and 60 µg/dl (0.48-2.89 
µmol/L) in adults and children.  
Encephalopathy—which is characterised by irritability, agitation, poor attention span, headache, confusion, 
uncoordinated walking or movement, drowsiness, convulsions, seizures or coma—can occur at blood lead levels 
of 100–120 µg/dL (4.82-5.79 µmol/L) in adults and 70–100 µg/dL (3.37-4.82 µmol/L) in children. In extreme 
situations, irreversible brain damage or even death can occur at these blood lead levels. 
A comprehensive review of the health effects of lead by the National Health and Medical Research Council 
(NHMRC) in 2015 found an association between blood lead levels below 10 µg/dl (0.48 µmol/L) and health 
effects in some population groups. However there was insufficient evidence to conclude that lead at this level 
caused any of the health effects observed. 
5. Managing Single Notifications
Response Time
Investigation 
Within 3 working days of notification of a confirmed case, begin follow-up investigation. 
Data Entry 
Within 5 working days of notification enter confirmed cases on NCIMS. 
Response Procedure
The response to a notification should be carried out in collaboration with the case's health carers and/or 
SafeWork NSW. Regardless of who does the follow-up, PHU staff should ensure that action has been taken to:  
x Confirm any symptoms associated with exposure, including onset date
x Confirm whether the case or relevant care-giver has been provided with the results before beginning the
interview
x Seek the doctor's permission to contact the case or relevant care-giver
x Review case management
x Identify household contacts who may also be at risk of elevated blood lead levels
Response protocol for single elevated blood lead level notifications in non- endemic areas 
[For endemic areas, refer to existing local protocols and programs for managing lead notifications in children]. 
The protocol outline below is for new notifications. If the notification relates to follow up from a previous notified 
blood lead level within the last 12 months (BLL), the PHU response can be modified according to the 
circumstances of the case. 
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Level Blood lead 
level 
Age PHU Response 
1 Greater or 
equal to 5 
but less than 
10 µg/dL 
(≥0.24 - 
<0.48 
µmol/L) 
Under 5 
years 
x Information: Consult treating doctor. Standard letter to case’s
parent/guardian and NSW Health’s factsheet ‘Lead exposure in
children’.
x Risk management: If requested by the doctor or the family offer
counselling on risk reduction/contact management to case’s
parents/guardians.
x Blood test: Household members may need to be tested particularly
young children and pregnant women.
5 years 
and 
above 
x Information: Consult treating doctor. Standard letter to case’s
parent/guardian and NSW Health’s factsheet ‘Lead exposure in
children’.
x Risk management: Not routine. At the discretion of the PHU.
x Blood test: Household members may need to be tested particularly
young children and pregnant women.
2 Greater or 
equal to 10 
but less than 
25  µg/dL 
(≥0.48 - 
< 1.2µmol/L) 
Under 5 
years 
x Information: Consult treating doctor. Standard letter to cases
parent/guardian and NSW Health’s factsheet ‘Lead exposure in
children’.
x Risk management:  Offer counselling/home risk assessment to
case’s parents/guardians as appropriate.
x Blood test: Household members may need to be tested particularly
young children and pregnant women. Retest BLL after 6 months or
earlier if clinically indicated.
5 years 
and 
above 
x Information: Consult treating doctor. Standard letter to case. If non
occupational exposure provide lead factsheet on risk identification and
management to requesting doctor or case as appropriate.
x Work related exposures: Suggest case or treating doctor advice
patient to discuss BLL with employer in the case of occupational
exposure. Inform SafeWork in case of a cluster of cases.
x Risk management: Offer counselling/home risk assessment to case
as appropriate.
x Blood test: Household contacts may need to be tested particularly
young children and pregnant women.
3 Greater or 
equal to 25 
but less than 
45 µg/dL 
(≥1.2- 
<2.2 µmol/L) 
Under 5 
years 
x As for level 2, plus
x Environmental assessment: Conduct preliminary environmental
assessment, including home visit, exposure pathways and sampling if
source not obvious.
x Expert advice: Seek expert advice from clinical toxicologist for future
BLL retesting.
5 years 
and 
above 
x As for Level 2,plus
x Environmental assessment: Conduct preliminary environmental
assessment, including home visit, exposure pathways and sampling if
source not obvious.
x Work related exposures: Strongly suggest case or treating doctor
consult SafeWork NSW for further advice on occupational exposure, if
appropriate.
4  Greater or 
equal to 45 
µg/dL 
(≥ 2.2 
µmol/L) 
All ages x As for level 3, plus
x Medical treatment: If BLL of or above 45 µg/dL (2.17 µmol/L) in a
child ensure treating doctor is aware of result when received as BLL
at these levels may require urgent medical treatment (chelation).
x Medical treatment: If BLL above 70 µg/dL (3.37µmol/L) requesting
doctor is aware of the result as BLL at these levels in an adult may
require urgent medical treatment (including chelation).
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Management
a. Investigation and Treatment of Cases
The main treatment for adults and children involves: 
x Reducing or preventing the case's exposure to lead sources
x Reducing the impact of exposure or eliminating it
x Ensuring that exposure to other sources does not occur.
Education
The case or relevant care-giver should be informed about the effect of the blood lead level and the likely causes. 
In particular, emphasis should be placed on minimising the exposure of young children and pregnant women to 
sources of lead. 
Information for community members and health care professionals is available from PHUs. 
 http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/environment/factsheets/Pages/lead-exposure-children.aspx 
The Office of Environment and Heritage Pollution Line, telephone 131555 or internet site 
 http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/pollution/ 
Other information on lead is also available from 
 http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/pesticides/lead.htm 
Exposure Investigation 
The case or relevant care-giver should be asked about sources of lead contamination such as: 
x Lead paint on houses built before 1970 (including the case's and neighbouring houses), and in particular
(i) any renovation or demolition of these houses and (ii) whether a young child is known to engage in
eating soil and paint (pica).
x Involvement in high risk occupations, including lead mining and smelting, metal repair or foundry work,
painting and decorating, automotive (including radiator) repairs or breaking down old car batteries
x Engaging in high risk hobbies involving lead or lead paint, including casting metal sinkers, antique
furniture restoration, lead soldering, lead lighting and indoor shooting
x Living in an area associated with large and small lead industries or areas with historic high traffic flow
x Household pets which may provide an exposure pathway for lead dust
x Use of traditional medicines such as Ayurvedic or Burmese remedies.
x Infants who regularly chew or suck on painted toys, cots, window sills, paint chips, etc.
x Other potential sources such as sandpits, vegetable gardens or domestic poultry
Further information on occupational sources of lead can be obtained from SafeWork   NSW on 13 10 50 or 
http://www.safework.nsw.gov.au/ 
Isolation and Restriction 
None 
Environmental Evaluation 
If the source of the exposure is not clear after the initial investigation has taken place, the PHU should arrange for 
an environmental assessment of the residential area if the case's blood lead level is in excess of 25 µg/dL (1.2 
µmol/L) and/or the implicated source may affect the broader community. 
Environmental Control measures 
The Public Health unit response to any exposures identified will need to be tailored to the specific risks identified. 
General advice can be provided by telephone or the provision of information such as factsheets, or advice on 
managing lead paint in the home (for example refer to Lead Safe Blitz video) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1zkvJGH1uA 
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In some instances an EHO may provide an assessment through a home visit. Householders (or the landlord of 
the property) may also be advised to engage the services of an independent assessor or remediator to advise or 
assist with exposure risk reduction.  
b. Contact Management:
Identification of Contacts 
Contacts can be defined as all persons exposed to the same source as the case (see case definition), or who 
have secondary exposures (e.g. children of persons who bring lead dust home on their clothes). 
Investigation and treatment of Contacts of Confirmed Cases
Blood lead testing should be recommended for: 
x Children under 5 years and pregnant women if another household member has a blood lead level ≥5 µg/dL
(0.24 µmol/L).
x Children aged 9 to 48 months who live in or visit older dilapidated housing with peeling paint
x Children aged 9 to 48 months who have been present during renovations of older housing painted before
1970
x Children who have siblings with elevated blood lead levels
x Children with pica, particularly if living in lead contaminated environments
x Children aged 9 to 48 months whose parents may be occupationally exposed or who are living near lead
smelters, battery breaking yards, lead ore bodies or near  highways or main roads with historic heavy traffic
x Children exposed to less common pathways such as lead hobbies or alternative medicines containing lead.
Education 
Advise susceptible contacts (or parents/guardians) of the risk of elevated blood lead levels. In particular, 
emphasis should be placed on minimising the exposure of young children and pregnant women to sources of 
lead.
Isolation and restriction 
None 
6. Managing special situations:  Cluster of notifications
Multiple notifications relating to individual workplaces should be referred to SafeWork NSW for further follow-up 
and management. Further advice can be sought from Environmental Health Branch, Health Protection NSW. 
In circumstances where there appears to be geographical clustering of non-occupational cases, excluding known 
lead endemic areas (especially in children under 5), and the source is unknown, further investigation may be 
warranted. Further advice can be sought from Environmental Health Branch, Health Protection NSW. 
7. Appendices
A. Fact sheet: Lead Exposure in Children
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LABORATORY NOTIFICATION FORM
REVISED: June 2017 
CONFIDENTIAL 
LABORATORY DETAILS
Lab Number:  ...........................................................................
Lab Address:  ...........................................................................
Specimen Collection Date: __ __ / __ __  / __ __ __ __ 
Lab Name:  ..............................................................................
Telephone:  ..............................................................................
Notification Date:  __ __ / __ __  / __ __ __ __ 
PATIENT DETAILS
Last Name: (first 2 letters only for HIV)  ...........................................
First Name: (first 2 letters only for HIV) ...........................................
Address:  .................................................................................
State: ..................................................... Postcode:  ................
Date of Birth: __ __ / __ __  / __ __ __ __         Age:  ................
Date of Onset: __ __ / __ __  / __ __ __ __ 
Gender:    Male    Female    Transgender 
Language Spoken at Home:  ....................................................
Country of Birth:  .....................................................................
Occupation/School: (Not for HIV)  ................................................
Date of Death: (if applicable)  ......................................................
Indigenous status: 
 Aboriginal
 Torres Strait Islander
  Both Aboriginal and  
Torres Strait Islander
 Not Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
 Not stated
Reason for testing:  .......................................................................................................................................................................
Risk factors for infection (including possible exposure or underlying medical condition):  ...............................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................
CONDITION (please tick)
 Anthrax 
 Arboviral infections, including:
- Barmah Forest virus
- Chikungunya virus
- Dengue virus
- Ross River virus
- Japanese encephalitis virus
- Kunjin virus
- Murray Valley encephalitis virus
- Yellow fever ☎
- Zika virus
- Other
Avian Influenza ☎
Botulism ☎
Brucellosis
Campylobacter infection
Chancroid
Chlamydia
Cholera  ☎
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease  ☎
Cryptosporidiosis
Diphtheria  ☎
 Donovanosis
 Giardiasis
 Gonorrhoea
 Haemophilus influenzae type b ☎
 Hendra virus infection ☎
 Hepatitis A ☎, B, C, D (delta), E ☎
 HIV – SEE HIV NOTIFICATION FORM
 Influenza
 Invasive pneumococcal infection
 Lead in blood ≥5 μg/dL (≥0.24 μmol/L)
 Legionellosis ☎
 Leptospirosis
 Listeriosis ☎
 Lymphogranuloma venereum
 Lyssavirus ☎
 Malaria
 Measles ☎
 Meningococcal infections ☎
 MERS-CoV ☎
 Mumps
 Paratyphoid ☎
 Pertussis 
 Plague ☎ 
 Poliomyelitis ☎
 Psittacosis
 Q Fever
 Rabies ☎
 Rotavirus infection
 Rubella
 Samonellosis
 Severe acute respiratory syndrome ☎
 Shigellosis
 Smallpox ☎
 Syphilis
 Tuberculosis
 Tularaemia ☎
 Typhoid ☎
 Typhus (epidemic) ☎
 VTEC/STEC ☎
 Viral haemorrhagic fevers ☎
☎ Please notify these conditions by telephone to the Public Health Unit on 1300 066 055. See over for your local Public Health Unit contact details
Referring doctor details
Name:   ....................................................................................
Telephone:  ..............................................................................
Address:  .................................................................................
State:  ......................................................  Postcode:  ..............
Method of identificaton (please tick) 
 Antigen  Antibody  Microscopy  Culture  NAT  Other
Species/subtype (if applicable) .................... Specimen/site:  ........................................ Comments:  ............................................
NSW HEALTH USE ONLY
Date received: __ __ / __ __  / __ __ __ __        PHU: Record No: 
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Public Health Unit Mailing Address Contact After Hours/on call
NOTE: (s) = secure fax number
Albury 
Murrumbidgee LHD
PO Box 3095 
Albury 2640
Ph: 02 6080 8900
Fax: 02 6080 8999
AH: 02 6080 8900
Bathurst 
Western NSW LHD
PO Box 143 
Bathurst, 2795
Ph: 02 6330 5880
Fax: 02 6332 3137 (s)
AH: 0428 400 526
Broken Hill 
Far West LHD
PO Box 457 
Broken Hill, 2880
Ph: 08 8080 1499
Fax: 08 8080 1196 (s)
AH: 0419 917 426
Camperdown
Sydney LHD 
PO Box 374
Camperdown 1450
Ph: 02 9515 9420
Fax: 02 9515 9467 (s)
AH: 02 9515 6111
Dubbo 
Western NSW LHD
PO Box 4061
Dubbo, 2830
Ph: 02 6809 8971
Fax: 02 6841 2261 (s)
AH: 0418 866 397
Central Cost PHU 
Central Coast LHD
PO Box 361 
Gosford, 2250
Ph: 02 4320 9730
Fax: 02 4320 9746 (s)
AH: 02 4320 2111
Goulburn 
Southern NSW LHD
Locked Bag 11
Goulburn, 2580
Ph: 02 4824 1840
Fax: 02 4822 5038 (s)
AH: 02 6080 8900
Hornsby 
Northern Sydney LHD
Hornsby Hospital
Palmerston Rd
Hornsby 2077
Ph: 02 9477 9400
Fax: 02 9482 1358 (s)
AH: 02 9477 9123
Lismore 
Northern NSW LHD
PO Box 498
Lismore 2480
Ph: 02 6620 7585
Fax: 02 6620 2552 (s)
AH: 0439 882 752 
If unanswered:
0417 244 966 or
0407 904 280
Liverpool 
South Western Sydney LHD
PO Box 38
Liverpool 1871
Ph: 02 8778 0855
Fax: 02 8778 0838 (s)
AH: 02 8738 3000
(Liverpool Hospital Switch)
Newcastle 
Hunter New England LHD
Locked Bag 10
Wallsend, 2287
Ph: 02 4924 6477
Fax: 02 4924 6048 (s)
AH: 02 4924 6477
Parramatta 
Western Sydney LHD
Locked Bag 7118
Parramatta BC 2124
Ph: 02 9840 3603
Fax: 02 9840 3591 (s)
AH: 02 9845 5555
Penrith 
Nepean Blue Mountains LHD
PO Box 63
Penrith 2751
Ph: 02 4734 2022
Fax: 02 4734 3444 (s)
AH: 02 4734 2000
Port Macquarie 
Mid North Coast LHD
PO Box 126
Port Macquarie 2444
Ph: 02 6588 2750
Fax: 02 6588 2837 (s)
AH: 0439 882 752
If unanswered:
0417 244 966 or
0407 904 280
Randwick 
South Eastern Sydney LHD
Locked Bag 88
Randwick 2031
Ph: 02 9382 8333
Fax: 02 9382 8314 (s)
AH: 02 9382 2222
Tamworth 
Hunter New England LHD
Locked Mail Bag 9783 
NEMSC 2348
Ph: 02 6764 8000
Fax: 02 6766 3890 (s)
AH: 02 6764 8000
Wollongong 
Illawarra Shoalhaven LHD
Locked Bag 9
Wollongong 2500
Ph: 02 4221 6700
Fax: 02 4221 6759 (s)
AH: 02 4222 5000
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• Thank you for agreeing to speak with me today 
• I am going to be asking a series of questions about your experiences of working with blood lead in NSW. This should take about 
25-30 minutes.
• There are no right or wrong answers!
• We are conducting an evaluation of the NSW blood lead surveillance system to assess its performance, and make 
recommendations regarding its structure and function. It is hoped that this will result in improvements to the system so that it
continues to be useful to the public health network and the wider community. 
• When I refer to “system” I am talking about the system as a whole and not only the electronic information management system
known as NCIMS 
• First of all I want to show you a flow chart showing my understanding of how the blood lead surveillance system works in NSW.
Can you look over it and tell me if you think it looks accurate? Is there any steps or information missing? 
Core questions to be asked of all stakeholders 
1. Can you describe your role in working with blood lead notifications in NSW? How do you
use/are you part of the lead surveillance system?
2. What do you think are the major strengths and weaknesses of the NSW blood lead
surveillance system? Please elaborate
3. Surveillance system attributes
a. Simplicity and acceptability
i. What are your thoughts on the process for lead notifications in NSW?
ii. Do you think the system is easy to use?
iii. Do you have any concerns with patient privacy, data confidentiality and
system security?
b. Flexibility
i. Have you seen any changes to the system over time?
ii. Do you think the system is adaptable when changes (for example changes to
the case definition) occur?
c. Data quality
i. Do you think the data captured is complete and of good quality?
ii. Is the data produced by the system useful to you? Why or why not?
d. Sensitivity, representativeness, PPV
i. Do you think we are identifying most/all cases of elevated blood lead levels?
ii. Is any particular group is missed?
iii. Do you think the system is able to detect clusters?
ƉƉendiǆ ϯ͗ ore ƋƵestions for face-to-face interǀieǁs 
Interviewee: 
238
e. Timeliness
i. Do you think the system is timely?
ii. (For users):
1. What time frame do you typically respond to a notification over?
What factors might influence how the timeliness of a response?
2. Do you find the process of using the system time-consuming?
f. Stability
i. Do you think to system is reliable and able to provide information when
needed?
4. How do you think the NSW blood lead surveillance system could be improved?
Other potential questions to be asked (mainly for front-line users) 
1. Notifications and actions/processes:
a. What information do you seek when you speak to a patient?
b. Do you routinely contact the requesting doctor?
c. Do you feel able to advise patients on risk reduction measures and next steps?
d. Do you send any kind of letter out?
e. Do you recommend retesting?
f. Do you things differently depending on the age of the person being notified?
g. Who else do you speak to when you get a notification? (If anyone)
h. Who in your workplace looks at the lead data? (if anyone)
i. What happens if it is a workplace exposure? Do you do anything differently?
j. Do you feel confident in managing notifications where there are other agencies
involved? (e.g. Safe Work)
k. What do you do when you have multiple notifications for the same individual?
2. The system in general:
a. Do you think the current system identifies people from disadvantaged or at-risk
groups?
b. Do you think there is anything missing from the current system?
c. Do you think the lead surveillance system is well linked with other systems?
d. If you could change one thing about how lead is notified, what would it be?
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Managing lead notifications in NSW Public Health Units 
(Please tick the relevant box or provide a written response) Yes No 
1. Do you find the NCIMS application useful in managing notifications of elevated blood lead? 
If no, please provide brief comment: 
2. Do you use an additional database (separate to NCIMs) in your PHU to record information 
about notifications of elevated blood lead level?  
If yes, can you please provide some details (e.g. access database, excel spreadsheet, custom database, other): 
3. Do you have a dedicated questionnaire you use to collect information from cases when you 
interview them? 
If yes, where did you get this questionnaire from? (e.g. developed locally, obtained from other PHU, obtained 
from NSW Health, other) 
4. Who in your public health unit follows up notifications of elevated blood lead level? (Tick all that apply) 
• Public health nurse
• Surveillance officer
• Environmental health officer
• Other (please provide details):
5. Does your public health unit routinely produce reports describing the epidemiology (e.g. 
rates, number) of elevated blood lead levels in your area? 
If yes, are these for (please tick all that apply): 
• Internal use
• External use
• Other
If yes, please give brief details (e.g. run SAS code weekly, annual report, other): 
6. When you look at aggregate data for lead notifications, do you look at data from (please circle all relevant): 
  NCIMS              SAPHaRI               Own database               Other               Don’t look at aggregate data 
7. Do you have any suggestions for improving the surveillance of elevated blood lead levels in NSW? 
8. Do you have any other comments or observations on managing elevated blood lead in your PHU? 
Thank you for your time! For any other comments or concerns contact Dr Katherine Todd at katherine.todd@moh.health.nsw.gov.au 
ƉƉendiǆ ϰ͗ YƵestionnaire sent oƵt to WƵblic ,ealth hnits ǀia eŵail
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Chapter 6 
Teaching  
The MAE cohort of 2017 teach the MAE cohort of 2018 over afternoon drinks 
 Australian National University, Canberra, March 2017 
“Who dares to teach must never cease to learn.” 
John Cotton Dana, 1912 
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Prologue 
My role and lessons learned  
The Master of Applied Epidemiology has two teaching requirements for scholars: 
1. To conduct a teaching session for the first-year MAE during course block
2. To design a Lesson from the Field (LFF), a teaching exercise based on a real-life problem
encountered during the placement, delivered as a pre-tutorial exercise and with a follow up
tutorial delivered via teleconference.
Myself and two colleagues, Julie Collins and Siobhan St Clair, who had both also spent time in the 
OzFoodNet network, collaborated to present a session on outbreaks entitled “What we wish we had 
known” (Appendix 1). In this session, we outlined some key topics that we felt we lacked clarity on 
when we investigated our outbreaks – on the development and use of questionnaires, on the 
legislation supporting outbreak investigation, and on the potential legal implications of your 
activities when investigating an outbreak. We developed the session using both our own 
experiences, and some well publicised outbreaks that had occurred both nationally and 
internationally. We found this a great experience as it allowed us to consolidate and reflect on what 
we had learned during our first year, and attempt to clarify the really important information.  
The topic I chose for my LFF was “Risk Communication” (Appendix 2). I felt that this was an 
underappreciated topic in epidemiology and a great place to utilise the Environmental Health 
experience I was getting and share this with my colleagues.  Risk Communication is an integral part 
of Environmental Health, and in watching my senior colleagues undertake risk communication 
activities including media interviews it seemed to be a real art. I enjoyed the process of developing 
learning objectives and identifying ways to meet them using the example of the White Bay data 
analysis I had done, as well as incorporating wider media messaging and encouraging my colleagues 
to reflect no what they knew based on the data, compared to the information the community would 
be getting based on mass media. I was initially concerned that my session would not be long enough, 
but it ended up running the full two hours allocated as my group engaged enthusiastically with the 
discussion. I gained a great appreciation of the value of learning objectives in guiding the 
development of a teaching activity and in clarifying what you want students to leave the session 
having achieved.  
In addition to the formal teaching requirements, I also continued in my role as a Conjoint Associate 
Lecturer with the university of Sydney Population health and Medicine Program, teaching third and 
fourth year medical students about public health concepts. Although I had done this for a year prior 
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to commencing the MAE, I feel my abilities as a tutor, including guiding discussion rather than 
lecturing and in clarifying the objectives of the lessons, were significantly strengthened by my 
teaching experiences during the MAE. 
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Outbreaks 2.0
What we wish we knew before we 
did our outbreak investigation!
Siobhan St George, Julie Collins and Katherine Todd
Let’s talk about…
OZ FOOD NET
Learning objectives
• Be aware of practical considerations and 
resources for interviewing cases
• Recognise the legislative frameworks governing 
outbreak investigations
• Identify the type of information that may be 
disclosed during an outbreak investigation
• Recognise legal considerations during an 
outbreak investigation
• Explain the weight of evidence in making 
decisions about outbreaks
Interviewing Tips
• Know your questionnaire
– Information will not always come chronologically
• Know the public health information available
– Fact sheets
• Know some basic information about your case
– Date of specimen collection
– Have a calendar!!
– Map
Interviewing Tips
• Don’t assume that people know who you are or why 
you’re calling
– Multiple healthcare providers / results not always given
– Notification delay
• Explain your line of questioning 
– “I’m now going to ask some questions about your illness…”
• Take the time to build rapport
– May not be the last time you need to speak with that
person
What information should you collect?
• Do you know the agent?
– Specific questionnaires / guidelines
• Do you have a hypothesis?
– Salmonella trawler vs. priority trawler
• What if you don’t know what you’re dealing with?
– Be as systematic as possible to allow comparison 
– Draw on previously established questionnaires to capture 
information (demographics, travel, food)
Appendix 1 - deacŚing first year coŚort͕ DA course ďlocŬ͕ DarcŚ ϮϬ1ϳ ʹ 
͞tŚat ǁe ǁisŚ ǁe Ŭneǁ ďefore ǁe did our outďreaŬ investigation͟
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How should you organise information?
• Questionnaires often paper based / online word
• Enter into a database asap to allow for ongoing 
analysis
– Epi Info
– Excel or Access (if systematic) – Stata 
• Keep all information until the investigation is over
– Don’t throw out your questionnaires!
Resources
Resources Resources
Find the experts!
Legislation
• Each state and territory has legislation
pertaining to the follow-up/investigation of
cases of diseases of public health importance
• This legislation is different in each state
• Usually the Acts particularly relevant to
investigating outbreaks are Food Acts and 
Public Health (and Wellbeing) Acts
Legislation
This commonly happens 
with:
• Receptionists at GP 
clinics* 
• Nurses*
• Hospitals*
• Less familiar GPs*
• Businesses (e.g. 
booking information)
*Especially when seeking 
consent to contact
• It is important to know
what legislation you are 
working under and
what it says so that you
can refer back to it
• People often want to 
know what right you
have to collect
information, and what 
right they have to give it
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Legislation - examples
Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008, Part 9
Division 1 
167 Power to request information
(1) An authorised officer may request a
person to provide information to the 
authorised officer which the authorised
officer believes is necessary to
investigate whether there is a risk to public health 
or to manage or control a risk to public
health.
(2) A person is authorised to provide the 
information requested under 
subsection (1).
Note
See section 227.
(3) A person may refuse to provide the 
information requested under 
subsection (1).
Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008, Part 11 
Division 4 
227 Protection of person giving certain information 
The giving of information that is authorised or 
required to be given under this Act in accordance 
with this Act—
(a) does not for any purpose constitute 
unprofessional conduct or a breach of 
professional ethics on the part of the 
person by whom it is given; or 
(b) does not make the person by whom it 
is 
given subject to any liability in respect of 
it; or 
(c) does not constitute a contravention 
of any 
other Act or law (including common 
law). 
Victoria
Legislation - examples
Foodborne disease investigation lies under the Food Act 2006
Chapter 7, Part 2, Division 7
202 Power to require information
1) This section applies if an authorised person reasonably 
believes
(a) an offence against this Act has been
committed; and 
(b) a person may be able to give information
about the offence.
(2) The authorised person may, by notice given to the person,
require the person to give information about the offence to 
the authorised person at a stated reasonable time and place.
(3) The person must comply with a requirement under
subsection (2), unless the person has a reasonable excuse.
(4) It is a reasonable excuse for an individual to fail to give 
information if giving the information might tend to
incriminate the individual.
Other investigations fall under different acts including the Public Health 
Act 2005
Chapter 3, Part 3, Division 2
99 Power to require contact information
(1) This section applies if a contact tracing officer—
(a)reasonably suspects that a person—
(i)has a notifiable condition; or
(ii) has been in contact with a person 
who has, or may have, a notifiable condition; and
(b) has explained to the person that information is
needed to attempt to prevent or minimise the spread of the 
notifiable condition.
(2) The contact tracing officer may ask the person to give the contact 
tracing officer all or any of the following information(the contact 
information) within a stated time—
(a)the person’s name and residential address or another 
address where the person may be contacted;
(b) the name, address, whereabouts and telephone 
number of any other person—
(i) who may have transmitted the 
notifiable 
condition to the person; or
(ii) to whom the person may have 
transmitted the notifiable condition;
(c) information about the circumstances in which the 
person may have been exposed to the notifiable condition or 
may have exposed another person to the notifiable 
condition
Queensland
Providing information 
• At some point during your investigation you may be 
asked questions like What happened? How did I get 
sick? Are there others? What will happen now?
• It’s sometimes hard to ‘walk the line’ between
providing information and saying something you
shouldn’t (or even knowing what that is!)
• Some say ‘it’s safest to say nothing at all’
• I feel we have a duty, and a fantastic opportunity, to
increase knowledge and awareness in people who are 
often our target audience!
• But we have to be aware of the possible legal 
implications of what we say (Katherine to speak more 
about this) 
Things you usually can and can’t say
(again, check with your PHOs, this may change depending on where you are)
Can (and arguably should!)
• Information about the person you are 
speaking to e.g. typing results
• Information about the pathogen e.g. where 
it originates and how contamination 
commonly occurs 
• Potential sources of infection/risk factors 
depending on survey responses but only 
AFTER the interview (bias)
• Unspecific information about investigation 
processes*
• What will happen with their information 
and what action will be taken
• Education about other relevant risks and 
how to avoid them
• Official information request processes 
*ALWAYS REMEMBER TO INCLUDE CAVEATS
Can’t
• Any absolutes – we can almost never
definitively say anything is the case, just 
that the evidence indicates it!
• Other people’s personal and illness 
information 
• Other people’s specific test results
• Number of cases**
• Suspected sources of infection (when 
source not clear)**
• Results of the environmental
investigation**
• Legal advice
• Anything to the media!
**Providing this information before the 
investigation is completed can be misleading 
or even incorrect!
Requests for Information
• If someone wants access to the full outbreak report 
and other relevant documents (e.g. for legal action) 
they often need to submit an official request for 
information, such as a Freedom of Information (FOI) 
request (VIC) or a request under the Government 
Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW)
• There is usually a fee ($30-50) and requests are 
commonly submitted online 
• Links to the appropriate forms should be available on
your state health department’s website
What are the legal implications of 
outbreak investigations?
• You may become involved in civil, 
criminal or coronial proceedings
• Your investigation report, draft 
reports, copies of letters, emails 
and other communications may 
be subpoenaed and tendered in
court.
• You may be required to be attend
court as a witness
• Your investigation report or how 
you conducted the investigation
may be under review
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Example 1: Civil action Example 2: Coronial inquest
• “[the lawyer for the family]… 
submitted that had the
epidemiological investigation
proceeded with greater haste
during the previous week (had, for 
example, the questionnaire been 
developed within an hour or two, 
and the interviews with parents 
occurred on the 16 or 17 January
instead of the 18th, 19th and 
20th), the conclusion that Garibaldi 
garlic mettwurst was involved 
could have been reached at a much 
earlier stage and not later than 
Friday 20 January... I think that 
submission must be accepted”.
Example 3: Criminal prosecution
What happens if we get it wrong?
Example 4: California strawberries and 
cyclosporiasis
• “Announcements by Texas and Ontario 
public health officials implicating
California strawberries as the source of 
the cyclosporiasis outbreaks in May of 
1996 had a devastating effect on the 
strawberry industry
• Supermarket chains took California 
strawberries off their shelves, in
response to pressure from consumers.
Consumers stopped buying strawberries 
from all sources. Truckloads of 
strawberries headed for market rotted 
as they were turned away by produce
and grocery store managers
• Strawberry sales around the United
States and Canada crashed, causing $40 
million in losses for the industry and the 
loss of 5,000 jobs”
Heavy stuff!
• So how do we make
decisions when the
evidence is unclear?
When do we decide
we have enough
evidence?
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So how do we decide? 
• You must balance the potential 
public health impact of a problem
with the known quality of available 
data and the potential damage to 
business or industry
• Information that might lead officials 
into taking action when data are
suggestive of the source but
insufficient to make a definitive call 
include:
– The severity of the disease
– The population at risk
– Whether exposure is suspected to 
still be occurring
– The quality of available data 
– Potential impact on 
business/industry
Key take-home points
1. Remember that sometimes action
is taken on epidemiological
evidence alone
2. You will constantly be balancing 
the need to take public health
action with creating a critical level 
of evidence to support taking that 
action
3. In an outbreak setting the pressure 
to take action can be intense
4. Document, document, document! 
5. Keep your documents organised
6. When decisions are being made, 
share your opinion – it is ok to 
have a robust discussion! 
7. Your best protection is good
teamwork
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Appendix 2 – Lesson from the field: “Risk Communication”, July 2017 
 
Risk communication 
Learning objectives  
By the end of this LFF students should be able to:  
1. Interpret and communicate epidemiological information to a non-scientific audience 
2. Understand basic principles of risk communication  
3. Formulate a risk communication strategy  
4. Understand what factors affect risk perception  
5. Identify common pitfalls of risk communication strategies  
Background 
White Bay is located in Balmain, in the local government area of Leichhardt in Sydney. White Bay has 
been a working port in Sydney since the mid-1800s. Until the port was first opened to cruise ships in 
2008, it had for many years been less frequently used by large ships. In April 2008, the NSW 
Government temporarily relocated the Cruise Passenger Terminal from Darling Harbour to White 
Bay for a period of five years. In 2009, the NSW Government decided to permanently relocate the 
Darling Harbour terminal to White Bay. 
 
The Port Authority prepared an environmental assessment, including preparation of air quality and 
noise impact assessment studies from cruise ships and terminal operations. In 2011, the Port 
Authority Ports received approval from the NSW Department of Planning and Environment to 
demolish an assortment of buildings and structures on the site and construct the White Bay Cruise 
Terminal (WBCT), with berthing facilities for up to two cruise ships and a new purpose-built cruise 
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passenger terminal. Following approval, the WBCT was constructed by Ports and opened on 15 April 
2013. 
 
Since that time, the local community has expressed concerns about the health impacts of noise, air 
quality and odour from ships and have questioned whether air quality in the area poses any risks to 
those living, working or at school in the area. Some homes are in very close proximity to the 
terminal, and due to the topography of the land, cruise ships funnels are close to these homes. 
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Exercise 1 
Read documents in the Resources folder 1-6 and answer the following questions: 
1. What are the specific concerns of the community?  
2. What has been the response from government and other agencies?  
3. What are some additional concerns or considerations that may be influencing involved 
parties and how might this affect their response?  
a. (These parties could include community members, local government, local 
politicians, the Health department, the Environmental Protection Authority, Cruise 
ship companies and other players).  
Exercise 2 
You as the epidemiologist at the health department have been asked to conduct some analysis of 
publicly available air quality data for White Bay as part of the response to the community’s concerns 
– the product of this analysis is included in the appendix as “Air Quality in White Bay”.  
1. Read document 7, “What is air pollution?”  from the Office of Environment and Heritage. 
Then review the graphs in the appendix and prepare a draft initial response interpreting this 
information for the community and addressing what this means for them.   
You may feel you want more information before you give your response; if so outline what this 
information might be and how you would go about obtaining it.  
(You may want to look up what the maximum acceptable levels of PM2.5 and sulphur dioxide 
(SO2) levels are – I will leave this as a challenge for you!)  
Exercise 3 
Read document 8, “Risk communication strategies”.   
1. Develop a risk communication strategy outlining how you will communicate your findings 
and your recommendations to the community (dot points are fine). Consider the following 
points in your strategy: 
- How would you communicate your findings?  
- Who might you communicate to? 
- In what forum would you communicate your results? 
- Who else might you include in your communication strategy? 
- What is your key message?   
2. Write a sentence or two justifying your choice of risk communication strategy.  
Exercise 4  
Read document 9, “The psychology of risk perception”.  
1. What factors do you think might influence risk perception?  
2. How they may be at play in this situation? 
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Appendix 1: 
White Bay Cruise Terminal – Air quality monitoring  
Air quality monitoring 
In response to ongoing community concerns regarding air quality adjacent to the White Bay Cruise 
Terminal, a single air quality monitoring station was commissioned at the corner of Adolphus street 
and Grafton Street Balmain, approximately 14m above sea level (at street level – see Figures 1 and 
2). As far as practicable this complies with the requirements of the relevant Australian Standard; it 
represents the best available location, but does not fully comply as there are trees within 20m of the 
site. The non-compliance is not expected to significantly affect the results.    
Measurements were recorded of PM2.5 and sulphur dioxide (SO2) levels, as well as wind speed and 
direction. A monthly reported was issued publically on the Sydney ports website describing the air 
quality for the preceding month (results available at http://www.sydneyports.com.au/community/ 
white_bay/sub_page_4/monitoring_results_noise_and_air_quality/air_quality_monitoring_201516)
. It was commissioned to monitor for 12 months from September 2015 to September 2016, and has 
now ceased monitoring. 
The results for the White Bay air quality monitoring station were for SO2 and PM2.5 were compiled 
for the year based on publicly available data, and compared with other air quality monitoring sites in 
Sydney (Figures 3-6).  
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Location of the White Bay air quality monitoring station  
Figure 1 - Location of air quality monitoring station (AQMS) at the corner of Grafton and Adolphus Streets, 
Balmain 
 
Figure 2 - Approximate location of AQMS 
 
Approximate location of air quality monitoring station (Google street view) 
      Location 
of AQMS 
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What the monitoring has shown: 
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
Figure 3 - Comparison of monthly maximum 1-hour average SO2 levels across Sydney regional AQM sites,  
September 2015-September 2016 
 
Figure 4 - Overall average SO2 concentration (µg/m3) in the period September 2015 - September 2016 at 
AQMS across the Sydney region 
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Particulate matter (PM2.5) 
Figure 5 - Comparison of monthly maximum 24-hour average PM2.5 levels across Sydney regional AQM sites, 
September 2015-September 2016 
 
Figure 6 - Overall average PM2.5 level (µg/m3) in the period September 2015 - September 2016 at AQMS 
across the Sydney region 
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Risk communication
A lesson from the field 
What is risk communication? 
What is risk communication? 
• An evidence-based approach to communicating effectively
with the public
• A strategy to providing clear, credible information that is
accessible to the public 
• Three main types of risk communication:
• Precaution advocacy 
• Outrage management
• (Crisis communication) 
Risk = Hazard + Outrage 
Why is risk communication important? 
• It helps people understand risk
• It helps people make informed decisions 
Precaution advocacy 
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6zPoOOvUmNI
ZisŬ coŵŵunication ʹ slides froŵ teleconference teacŚing session 
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Outrage management 
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SuGogll75dU
Principles of risk communication 
• Be truthful 
• Base your statements on evidence 
• This includes not making statements that are not cannot be substantiated and being
prepared to admit what is known 
• Be helpful 
• Respond directly to audience concerns 
• Respond using words or other information appropriate to the audience 
• Be clear 
• Be proactive 
• Build credibility over time 
• Be available 
• Otherwise your audience may go to a less reliable source first! 
“Good” vs. “bad” risk communication 
Helpful risk communication Non-helpful risk communication 
Helps people to understand risk Addresses the controversy without 
addressing the concerns of the public
Addresses knowledge gaps and 
misconceptions 
Does not address knowledge gaps or 
misconceptions 
Gives behaviourally realistic advice Does not provide strategies 
Is based on evidence Appears to be based on a “party line” or 
agenda rather than the science/evidence 
Uses wording that people understand Uses jargon
• No clear objective criteria for what defines 
the risk levels
• No examples of what the risk level might 
mean 
• No advice on what to do!
• Considered “vulnerable to manipulation by 
government officials”
Risk communication – Mad Cow Disease 
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QobuvWX_Grc
Developing a risk communication strategy
1. Understand your audience 2. Analyse your information
- Demographics
- Current knowledge
- Main sources of information 
- Perceptions, priorities and values
- “Credibility influencers”
- Barriers to effective communication 
- Audience’s concerns
- History of the issue 
- Information sources
- Misperceptions and urban myths
- Confusing information 
- Opposing views
3. Organise your information 4. Engage the public
- Spokesperson 
- Holding statements
- Key message development
- Information repository
- Spokesperson training and preparation 
- Communication vehicles (news media, internet,
public of individual meetings, phone calls, letters,
radio interviews)
- Verbal and non-verbal communication 
- Account for different learning styles
- Obtain and respond to feedback 
- Respond to concerns
- Track interactions, issues and resolutions
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Characteristics of effective communicators
• Knowledgeable 
• Well prepared 
• Defined communication goals 
• Forthcoming, honest, at ease
• On time, co-operative and helpful 
• Empathetic, non-judgmental and able 
to validate concerns 
• Stays within area of expertise 
• Understands that everything is “on 
the record”
• Manages non-verbal cues that could 
undermine credibility 
• Knows when to stop talking (and 
listen) 
(non-verbal communication…)
Risk communication – Ebola 
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfcnIXbcofs
OUTRAGE!!!
1. Is it voluntary or coerced? 
2. Is it natural or industrial? 
3. Is it familiar or exotic? 
4. Is it memorable?
5. Is it dreaded? 
6. Is it chronic or catastrophic?
7. Is it knowable or unknowable?
8. Is it controlled by me or by others?
9. Is it fair or unfair?
10. Is it morally irrelevant or morally relevant? 
11. Can I trust you or not?
12. Is the process responsive or unresponsive? From Sandman’s “Risk Communication”
Risk communication – Hendra virus 
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rF_whOkypjY
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Risk communication in the 21st century 
• 24 hour news cycle 
• Increasing demand for news 
• Outrage sells! 
• Social media 
• Rapid dissemination of information 
• The internet
• A wealth of credible and no credible information sources
• Accessible 24/7
• Often difficult to identify who is/is not credible or who has an agenda 
Final tips 
• Have the community trust you BEFORE the crisis happens 
• Planning 
• Risk communication is a process, not an event 
• Establish goals 
• Tailor your message
• Use sources the audience finds credible 
• Preparation 
• Understand your audience and the issues 
• Practice
• Look polished
• Look calm and collected 
• Speak clearly, simply and concisely
• Be as helpful as possible 
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LFF pre-reading documents:  
1. https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/balmain-cruise-terminal-health-fears-spark-dispute-
between-industry-and-regulators-20141011-10rwn6.html  
2. https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/newslocal/inner-west/homeowners-are-leaving-white-
bay-over-cruise-terminal-pollution/news-story/c3f42f32d2fddee708ae5b0264a97b5a  
3. https://www.slhd.nsw.gov.au/populationhealth/pdf/Q&ACruiseShips.pdf  
4. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-28/nsw-port-authority-suspends-overnight-ship-
berthing/6502302  
5. https://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/-/media/epa/corporate-
site/resources/air/whitebaycruiseterminalcommunityimpacts.pdf?la=en&hash=C86F503523
0D721537FD4B63A4815BCE850C24C1  
6. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/10/alan-jones-backs-balmain-
residents-battle-against-cruise-ship-pollution  
7. http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/topics/air/air-pollution 
8. http://www.who.int/risk-communication/training/module-b/en/index2.html  
9. https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/the-psychology-of-risk-perception  
